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The dissertation consists of two chapters regarding private firms financing in the capital market. 
The first chapter explores the long-term failure rate of private firms that issued initial public 
offerings (IPOs) in the public capital market. We study busted, or failed, IPOs to examine the 
underwriter certification hypothesis and windows of opportunity hypothesis in the new issues 
market. Extensive literature pointed out that time-varying characteristics of information 
asymmetry might induce windows of opportunity in capital market when information asymmetry 
is relatively low. During windows of opportunity, private firms can issue public equity with 
lower information costs and more favorable terms. Hypothetically, the windows of opportunity 
tend to occur during the periods when macroeconomic conditions are favorable and the IPO 
volume is high. In contrast to windows of opportunity hypothesis, we document a high bust rate 
of IPOs issued during the high volume periods that have been characterized as periods of 
reduced information asymmetries. We explain this pattern by the increased market share of low 
quality investment in hot IPO markets. Since low-quality investment banks are less able to 
identify and screen out busted, or failed, IPOs, increased participation of low-quality investment 
bank will lower the screening standard of IPO market during high-volume period. Therefore, 
high volume periods appear to provide issuers a window of misopportunity for going public.  
The second chapter investigates an alternative explanation of high failure rate of IPOs issued 
during the “windows of opportunity” that will align the contradiction between “windows of 
opportunity” hypothesis and related empirical results. I found that IPOs issued during the “hot” 
period are more likely delist due to operating inefficiency than IPOs issued during the other 
periods on average. However, conditional on IPOs that are still active, IPOs issued during the 
 
 
“hot” period are more innovative than those issued outside the “windows of opportunity”, in 
terms of both quantity and quality of filed patents. Moreover, lead underwriters adjust the 
underwriting process and direct public capitals to more innovative firms across IPO cycles. This 
pattern is most significant among high-reputed underwriters. Furthermore, high-reputed 
underwriters are more able to identify potential successful innovators during the “windows of 
opportunity” and make investors benefit more from those extremely innovative firms. Those 
results are robust after I control for the issuer-specific characteristics, the underwriting process, 
the “nascent” industry fixed effects, and the endogeneity. Overall, “windows of opportunity” 
period facilitates risk-taking behaviors of investors and drive outcome distribution of IPOs issued 
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CHAPTER I． BUSTED IPOS AND WINDOWS OF MISOPPORTUNITY 
1. Introduction 
Information asymmetries between issuers and investors are widely regarded as important 
and potentially insurmountable problems for firms attempting to raise equity capital in an initial 
public offerings (IPOs).  Since asymmetric information is costly, issuers are expected to make 
decisions that minimize its adverse impact.   
Previous research suggests that several institutional characteristics of the going public 
process can be managed to reduce the degree of asymmetric information between issuers and 
investors. These include the selection of an underwriter (Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Booth and 
Smith (1986)), the ability of the investment bank to conduct premarket and aftermarket 
underwriting activities (Aggarwal (2000), Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000), and Logue, 
Rogalski, Seward, and Foster-Johnson (2001)), and the ability to time the market for new issues 
(Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), Choe Masulis and Nanda (1993) and Loughran and Ritter 
(1995)).  In this paper, we examine the long run performance of issuing companies for evidence 
regarding the existence of ‘windows of opportunity’ and the quality of the ‘certification services’ 
provided by investment banks at the time of issue. Specifically, we examine the impact of 
underwriter certification and services on the post-issue failure rates of IPOs, controlled of issuer-
specific characteristics, capital market, macroeconomic, and stock market conditions. Unlike 
most previous studies, we pay attention to how underwriters affect the high failure rate of IPOs 
issuers during the hot year and how underwriting process affect the long-term operating 




Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) support the existence of “windows of opportunity” for 
equity issues that partially result from time-varying information asymmetry1.  According to this 
hypothesis, managers prefer to conduct new equity issues during periods when information costs 
are low.  When the investors’ costs of discovering inside information are low, companies can 
issue equity with more favorable term. Previous research indicate that these periods are 
hypothesized to occur when issue volume is high relative to historic levels (Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1996)) or macroeconomic conditions are favorable (Choe, Masulis and Nanda 
(1993)). Hypothetically, failure rates should be especially low during “windows of opportunity” 
when asymmetric information is low since investors can discover inside information without 
significant information production costs.  
However, Ritter (1991) documents that the long-run underperformance of IPOs issued in 
high-volume year tend to be more significant than that of IPOs issued in low-volume year (see 
also Loughran and Ritter, 1996). Fama and French (2004) explore the evolving characteristics of 
new listed firms from 1973 to 2001 and document low survival rate of new listed firms issued 
after 1979, a relatively high-volume IPOs issuance period. Consistent with these studies, we also 
document a high bust rate of IPOs issued during the “hot” IPO market. Instead of “windows of 
opportunity”, the high-volume IPO period is actually the “windows of misopportunity”. 
To explain this pattern, Ritter (1991) imply that some low-quality private companies take 
advantage of “windows of opportunity” and raise public capital during the hot year. Fama and 
French (2004) argue that the low expected return from investors during this period allow 
inefficient and unprofitable companies raise public capital, thus causing the low survival rate of 
 
1 In the equity pricing literature, a “window of opportunity” is defined as a period when issuers can raise capital at 
favorable terms.  There is some disagreement, however, as to whether the window is due to time-varying asymmetric 





new listed firms issued during the hot period. However, these studies focus on how IPO issuers’ 
characteristics might cause the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the hot year but omit the 
roles of the most important intermediaries, lead underwriters, of the IPO process.   
During the going public process, one of the most important decisions a firm makes is the 
selection of an investment bank to underwrite its equity offering.  A critical role performed by 
the investment bank is to discover information about the future earnings prospects and economic 
viability of the issuer.  Upon completion of this due diligence process and their assessment of 
inside information, the investment banks decide whether to underwrite the new issue.  Booth and 
Smith (1986) describe this as a certification process, and hypothesize that issuers select 
underwriters to ‘certify’ that the going public decision and the offer price accurately reflect 
inside information about the issuer’s riskiness and future prospects. 
If the due diligence process allows the investment bank to fully discover all available 
inside information, the issue price accurately reflects the future prospects of the firm. Since this 
type of certification is prohibitively costly, an issuer is willing to pay for these services only to 
the point where the expected benefits equal the certification costs. When this occurs, Booth and 
Smith (1986) hypothesize that the offer price is discounted to compensate investors for the 
possibility that incomplete certification will fail to detect adverse inside information. An even 
more extreme incomplete certification outcome occurs when the underwriter fails to properly 
screen firms that should be rationed from the market. Booth and Smith (1986) also indicate that 
the quality demand for the certification service will depend on the investors’ cost discovering 
inside information. Since “windows of opportunity” hypothesis suggests the time-variation in 
information production costs, this time-variation pattern may induce time-variation in the quality 




services over different IPO market period could contribute to the explanation of high bust rate of 
IPOs issued during “hot” IPO years. 
In this study, we specifically explore whether the time-variation certification services 
supplied in the IPO market and quality differences among investment banks cause the high 
failure rate of IPOs issued during the “hot” IPO market. Based on an analysis of 6,502 new 
issues that went public between 1988 and 2015, we specifically explore the likelihood that an 
IPO will subsequently bust, or delist due to operating inefficiency following their IPO. We 
measure the quality differences among underwriters by Carter-Manaster underwriter rank, a 0 to 
9 scale measurement. The higher the Carter-Manaster underwriter rank, the higher the quality of 
lead underwriters are. We document an important time-varying component to the certification 
process. During high (low) volume periods, high quality investment banks lose (gain) market 
share relative to low quality investment banks.  We also show that low-quality investment banks 
consistently underwrite more busted IPOs than their high-quality counterparts, regardless of 
issuer-specific characteristics, underwriting process, capital market, macroeconomic, and stock 
market conditions. The high market share and poor certification services of low quality 
investment banks result in larger bust rates of IPOs issued during periods of high issue volume. 
Several related literature also explore the underwriters’ effects on the time variation 
properties of IPOs. Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) investigates how 
underwriters generate time variations of IPO volumes. They posit that investment banks have 
incentives bundle IPOs subject to the common valuation factors and share the cost of information 
production. These information spillovers could make investors accept some offerings that will be 
excluded without information production, thus causing the high volume of IPOs during some 




investment banks motive the high underpricing during the “hot” year. They document that if 
managers receive personal benefits from investment bankers, such as spinning, they may accept 
lower IPO proceeds. This agency issue will contribute to the positive relation between 
underpricing and the number of companies going public. However, none of these studies address 
the high failure rate of IPOs during the hot year. Khanna, Noe and Sonti (2008) show that 
underwriters may not have sufficient specialized labor in screening IPOs during hot market, thus 
encouraging unqualified firms to enter the IPO market. They implicitly assume that any specific 
investment bank could have reduced screening quality immediately when the IPO market 
becomes hot. However, the underwriting process of IPOs tend to last from months to years, so it 
is unlikely that any underwriters will change their screening standard over very short period. In 
contrast to their assumption, we consider that investment banks will have relatively stable 
screening standard and certification capability over time. Our results show that the main driver of 
the low screening standard in the investment bank industry is the increased participation of low 
ranked or low reputation underwriters during the hot year.  
In this study, we also shed further light on the quality differences among investment 
banks and explore whether low-quality investment banks are less able to identify busted IPOs 
than high-quality investment banks. We empirically document that premarket activities, such as 
partial price adjustment, from low-quality underwriters have less information content related to 
the bust rate of IPOs than those from high-quality underwriters. On the other hand, aftermarket 
activities, such as the exercise of overallotment option (OAO) or price stabilization activities 
from these low-quality underwriters tend to have strong predictive power on IPOs bust rate. 
These results indicate that low-quality underwriters are less able to discover inside information 




premature or unprofitable private companies and rely on aftermarket activities to support the 
performance of their poor clients.   
Some of the IPO literature also explore the quality differences among investment banks. 
Johnson and Miller (1988) and Carter and Manaster (1990) rank underwriters by tombstone 
advertisements in the financial section of newspaper and document that high quality underwriters 
tend to decrease information asymmetry between issuers and investors, contributing to the lower 
underpricing(see also Carter, Dark and Singh (1998)). Alternatively, Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) measure underwriters’ prestige based on their market share and support this prediction. 
However, recent research suggests that this negative association between underwriter’s 
reputation and underpricing seems to change. Beatty and Welch (1996) documents the positive 
relationship between underpricing and underwriter reputation in the 1990s. Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) update Carter-Manaster underwriter rank by both tombstone advertisement placement and 
conversation with practitioners and find similar pattern. They argue that issuers pay more 
attention to analyst coverage rather than capital raising from IPO. In this case, issuers will leave 
money on the table to receive high quality analyst coverage service. Hoberg (2007) constructs a 
new quality measurement of underwriter based on underwriter past initial return and find that 
high underpricing underwriter tend to gain market share from 1984 to 2000. Overall, the exact 
relationship between underwriter and issuers need further exploration. Hence, part of our 
analysis investigates differences in the certification skills and capabilities among underwriters. 
One of the important contributions of our paper is that we empirically demonstrate that low 
quality investment banks are less able to screen out busted IPOs. Furthermore, most previous 
studies focus on the relationship between issuers’ underpricing and underwriters’ quality. Our 




long-run operating efficiency of issuers. We found that issuers that is underwritten by a low 
quality investment bank tend to have a significantly higher delist rate due to operating 
inefficiency in the long-term. 
Our analysis sheds new light on the ‘certification services’ hypothesis and the ‘windows 
of opportunity’ hypothesis, and provides empirical results that have not been previously reported 
in the literature.  We find that:   
• There is an important time-varying component to the certification process. During 
high (low) volume periods, high quality investment banks lose (gain) market 
share relative to low quality investment banks. The high market share and poor 
certification services of low quality investment banks result in larger bust rates 
following periods of high issue volume. This is inconsistent with the “windows of 
opportunity” hypothesis that “hot” or high-volume periods are periods of low 
asymmetric information. 
• Regardless of market conditions, an IPO is more likely to bust if the issuer is 
small, the issue is underwritten by a low quality investment bank, and the 
underwriter have more price stabilization activities and exercises less of the 
overallotment option.  
• Since low-quality underwriters are less able to identify bust issuers, low quality 
underwriters are associated with more failed IPOs. The certification process is 
also imperfect, in the sense that busted IPOs are underwritten by both high-quality 





The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop testable 
hypothesis, and discuss our sample selection procedure in section 3. Section 4 demonstrates that 
the long-run underperformance of IPO firms relative to firms matched by equity size is 
comparable to previous studies. This section is included simply to demonstrate that our sample is 
representative of these studies. Since we examine IPO failures, the debate surrounding long-run 
stock underperformance is not pertinent to our study.  Section 5 provides an aging analysis of 
busted IPOs, and links these results to prior evidence (as well as our own) regarding the long-run 
performance of IPOs. In Section 6, we investigate the relative importance of underwriter 
reputation, underwriting activities, capital market conditions, macroeconomic conditions, and 
stock market conditions for the success and failure rates of IPOs. A multivariate analysis 
specifically explore whether quality of underwriters is significantly related to the likelihood an 
IPO subsequently busts.  Evidence regarding similarities and differences in the factors that 
influence bust rates during different IPO market cycles is also presented. In addition, we address 
the concerns of endogeneity caused by underwriter selection and issuer-specific characteristics. 
Finally, we explore differences in underwriting activities between high-quality and low-quality 
underwriters. Section 7 summarizes our main findings and concludes the paper.   
2. Hypothesis Development 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988, 1994) first documents 
that IPO market have significant time-varying characteristics, in terms of both the number of 
IPOs going public and average initial returns. These time-varying market conditions could create 
a “windows of opportunity” that has low information asymmetry between issuers and investors. 
These periods are hypothesized to occur when issue volume is high relative to historic levels 




Nanda (1993)). During the “windows of opportunity”, private firms can issue public equity with 
low information production costs, and investors can evaluate the prospective performance of 
these issuers without significant cost of discovering inside information. The demand for 
certification service from underwriters also tend to low due to lower information asymmetry. 
Therefore, time-variation in information asymmetries may induce time-variation in the quality of 
certification services supplied in the IPO market. From this prediction, we propose that the low-
quality underwriters that provide low quality of certification service and charge a low 
underwriting fees should gain market share during the “windows of opportunity” or high-volume 
IPO year due to low demand of certification service. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis I: Low-quality underwriters tend to gain market share during the 
“windows of opportunity” when the IPO volume is high, and vice versa.  
Hypothetically, the survival rate of IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” 
should be high due to low information asymmetry between issuers and investors. However, 
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) indicate that private firms issue IPOs during high-
volume IPO year or “hot” period tend to have more underperformance than those issue in low-
volume year or “cold” period. In addition, Fama and French (2004) empirically document that 
the number of new listings on major U.S. stock markets jumps from 156 per year for 1973–1979 
to 549 per year for 1980–2001. They further show an increase of delist rate for firms going to 
public due to poor performance from 16.9% in 1973, a relatively “cold” year, to 44.2% during 
1980-1991, a relatively “hot” IPO period.   
These previous studies explain that private companies tend to take advantage of the 
“windows of opportunity” and raise public capital during “hot” period even though they are not 




studies omit the certification and screening role of underwriters. Even though some speculative 
private firms intend to go to public during the “windows of opportunity”, they cannot complete 
IPO process without an underwriter or investment banker. The very first step of any companies 
that wish to go to public is to choose an investment bank to perform advisory and underwriting 
function during the process. Following our first hypothesis that low-quality underwriters tend to 
increase their market share during the high-volume IPO year, we suggest that increasing 
participation of low-quality underwriters during the high-volume IPO year could be the main 
driver of the high failure rate of IPOs issued at the same time. Consistent with our suggestion, we 
propose our second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis II: IPOs underwritten by low-quality underwriters are more likely 
to bust, especially during the high-volume IPO market periods. 
We admit potential endogeneity biases behind this hypothesis. Booth and Smith (1986) 
discuss the trade-off between the cost of certification and valuation uncertainty. They mention 
that firms with significant valuation uncertainty tend to select high-quality underwriters since 
they can lose significantly from low-quality certification service. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) 
show that this endogeneity bias within the issuer’s underwriter selection can cause the positive 
association between underwriters’ reputation and issuers’ underpricing. Since busted IPOs may 
have greater valuation uncertainty, these IPOs could choose high quality underwriters to 
minimize their wealth loses on the issue date following Booth and Smith (1986). This potential 
endogeneity bias could significant reverse the relationship that we propose in the second 
hypothesis. In the following empirical tests, we address this potential endogeneity bias by 




The second endogeneity issue in our second hypothesis is that the underwriter selection 
process is a two-way affair. The private companies will carefully choose their underwriters based 
on their general reputation, expertise, and quality of research coverage, and at the same time, 
investment banks will cautiously screen and select private companies as their clients. In general, 
higher quality investment banks attempt to market IPOs that will experience the least probability 
of delist due to operating inefficiency to maintain their reputation within the industry. For these 
speculative private firms that intend to take advantage of the “windows of opportunity”, the only 
choice they have is to cooperate with low ranked underwriters during the IPO process. On the 
other side, low-quality underwriters are less able to certify offer price from issuers, so they are 
not attractive to larger and profitable companies. In addition, these low-quality underwriters tend 
to have lower screening standard within the investment bank industry and may be less able to 
identify premature and unprofitable private companies. This selection limitation between 
underwriters and issuers suggest that low-quality underwriters consistently underwrite busted 
IPOs since these low-quality underwriters always deal with more risky firms for which the 
likelihood of bust in the public market is high. Even though this selection limitation will predict 
the same negative association between the quality of underwriters and the bust rate of IPOs, it 
will undermine the casual effect behind this relationship. To address this selection limitation, we 
partially control the issuer-specific characteristics in our logit regression by adding several 
fundamental variables, such as log of revenue, total liability to total asset ratio, working capital 
to total asset ratio, and a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer has positive EBIT.  
From previous hypotheses, we assume that low-quality underwriters tend to perform 
lower quality of screening standard and certification service than high-quality underwriters do. 




appropriate underwriters, IPO issuers will cooperate with their underwriters during the rest of the 
IPO process. During the premarket activities, the underwriters will discover inside information 
from their clients and determine the initial offer price range, expected issue size, and partial price 
adjustment (Hanley, 1993; Lowry and Schwert, 2002). In addition to premarket underwriting 
activities, the underwriters of speculative issuers might also perform certain aftermarket 
activities, such as price stabilization activities and exercise of overallotment options. Several 
related literature document that lead underwriters actively support price of less successful IPOs 
(Schultz and Zaman, 1994; Hanley, Kumar and Seguin, 1993; Michaely and Womack, 1999; and 
Aggarwal, 2000). Furthermore, Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) indicate that lead 
underwriters are the dominant market maker for their clients and reduce their inventory risk by 
exercising of overallotment options (OAO). If low-quality underwriters perform worse screening 
and certification service, their premarket underwriting activities tend to have insufficient 
adjustment of both issue size and offer price. In general, busted issuers whose economic 
perspective have significant uncertainty tend to have significant price variation on public market. 
If low-quality underwriters cannot sufficiently adjust the IPOs to compensate investors for future 
uncertainty, they need to rely on aftermarket activities to support their busted clients. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to expect that low-quality underwriters’ aftermarket activities have more 
information contents related to the issuers’ probability of delist due to operating inefficiency than 
premarket activities. Following these predictions, our third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis III: In contrast to underwriting activities from high-quality 
underwriters, premarket activities of low-quality underwriters tend to have less 




3. Sample Selection and Data Description 
We initially identified a list of 12,651 common equity offerings classified as IPOs by the 
Securities Data Corporation New Issues Database (SDC) from January 1988 through December 
2015. Our sample is based on data availability for issuers that we obtain from several different 
sources. The sample selection procedure eliminates IPOs (1) by closed-end funds, real estate 
investment trusts, financial institutions, unit offerings, limited partnerships, and penny offerings; 
(2) without sufficient stock return information available on the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) Nasdaq or American Stock Exchange (Amex) and New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) daily tapes; and (3) for which we can only find missing value of fiscal year end revenue 
one year before the issue date. We obtain the number of exercised OAO from Dealogic and 
verify these numbers from SEC2, and we also extract several macroeconomic index from Federal 
Reserve Economic Data. In addition, we obtain fundamental variables, such as total assets, total 
liabilities, working capital, and EBIT from both SDC and COMPUSTAT. Our final sample 
consists of 6,502 IPOs. 
3.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for firm and offering characteristics. In this study, we 
measure underwriter quality by Cater Manaster rank from Cater and Manaster (1990) and Cater, 
Dark, and Singh (1998) updated in Loughran and Ritter (2004). The median number of Cater-
Manastet rank is 8, a relatively high number, because reputable underwriters tend to underwrite 
more IPOs. We also include variables related to underwriting process, and the definition of those 
variables are shown below: 
 
2 Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) and Logue, Rogalski, Seward and Foster-Johnson (2001) find that SDC often 
misreports actual OAO exercise.  We verified SDC’s information for our sample by obtaining information about OAO 




 ∆P+ (∆P-): the positive (negative) price adjustment, max(∆P, 0) (min(∆P,0)).  
∆P is the difference between the actual offer price and the expected offer price divided 
by the expected offer price, where the expected offer price is calculated as sum of the 
highest and lowest anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary 
prospectus, divided by two. The partial price adjustment phenomenon is first 
documented by Hanley (1993). Lowry and Schwert (2002) first use this relative form. 
Issue_Size_Pct: the natural log of one plus the percentage change in the number of shares 
 offered, calculated as the actual number of shares offered (excluding the exercise of 
the overallotment option) minus the number of shares quoted in the preliminary 
prospectus, divided by the number of shares quoted in the preliminary prospectus.  
Dollar Range: the dollar width of offer range, calculated as the difference between the 
highest  
and lowest anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus 
divided by the expected offer price. 
OAO: the number of additional shares issued by the underwriter through exercise of the 
 overallotment option divided by the actual number of registered shares offered, 
motivated by Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000). 
Price Support: the price stabilization proxy, calculated as a three-level categorical 
variable 
 based on the number of days between the offer date and the first date that the 
secondary market price drops below the offer price. Higher values indicate that price 
stabilization activities were not necessary, and lower values indicate that underwriters 




In addition, we include firm-specific fundamentals to control both issuer-specific 
characteristics and potential endogeneity bias, motivated by Benveniste et al (2003) and Field 
and Lowry (2009). All fundamental measures are measured at the end of fiscal year ending prior 
to the IPO. For firms with trailing zero sales, we have generally reported sales as 0.01 million. 
For firms with no materialized assets until IPO, we also report assets as 0.01 million and exclude 
these firms from calculation of Liabilities / Assets and Working Capital / Assets. We calculate 
IPO Age different from conventional IPO literature as the number of years between issue date 
and December 31, 2017. We include this variable in logit regression to control for the public 
market age of the issuer.  Finally, we include several dummy variable to control for issuer-
specific uncertainty. From table 1, 39.7% of the IPO firms are venture-backed, 40.8% operate in 
what Benveniste et al (2003) refer to as “nascent industries” (three-digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 
367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737, covering pharmaceuticals, computing, electronics, medical and 
measurement equipment, and software industries), and 62.6% generate positive earnings before 
interest and taxes.  
3.2 Distribution of IPOs by Issue Year 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the IPO sample by issue year. New issue volume 
characteristics for the full sample are reported in Column (1). The 6,502 IPOs completed during 
our sample period raised aggregate proceeds of $906.221 billion. We adjust dollar value for 
inflation and report the average proceeds amount for IPOs issued each year in 2017 dollar for 
comparability. The number and dollar value of IPOs are not evenly distributed over the sample 
period. Rather, year-to-year growth in new issue volume is rapid.    
After identifying the IPO sample, we examine the CRSP daily tapes for evidence of a 




sorted into one of three mutually exclusive groups: busted, acquired, or active IPOs. IPO volume 
characteristics are reported for these three subcategories in Columns (2)-(4) of Table 2.   
We classify an issue as “busted” if the firm has a delist code between 500 and 585.  In 
our sample, issues in the bust category are delisted for reasons related to operating inefficiency.  
Busted IPO volume characteristics are reported in Column (2).  We classify an issuer as an 
acquired IPO if the firm has a delist code between 200 and 301.  These are issues that are 
delisted for reasons related to a change in control or listing.  Acquired IPO volume 
characteristics are reported in Column (3).  Finally, we classify an issuer as an active IPO if the 
firm has a delist code of 100.  These are issues that are active and still traded in the market as of 
December 31, 2017.  Active IPO volume characteristics are reported in Column (4). We differ 
from Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) in our treatment of delisted firms.  For IPOs 
that are delisted prior to the anniversary date, they truncate the aftermarket period, and the 
anniversary date buy-and-hold returns end with CRSP’s last listing.  We calculate buy-and-hold 
returns for early delistings following their methodology, but report returns for the delisted firms 
separately from active firms, and distinguish between delistings based on failures and 
acquisitions. 
The relative size of the sample in each subcategory depends on whether listing status is 
measured by the number or the dollar proceeds of new issues.  Based on the number of IPOs, 
27.5% of the sample period IPOs bust, 48.9% are acquired, and 23.6% continue to trade as active 
IPOs as of December 31, 2017.  Based on the dollar value of new issues, 16.1% of the sample 
period IPOs bust, 42.1% are acquired, and 41.8% continue to trade as active IPOs as of 
December 31, 2017.  Bust rates are higher when measured by the number of IPOs.  This 




explain why previous studies that use equally weighted returns find that small IPOs perform 
especially poorly.  
Table 2 reports issue volume characteristics for acquired IPOs separately for two reasons.  
First, if acquisitions of IPO firms were concentrated among poorly performing IPOs, our 
measure of busted IPOs would be biased downward.  Second, acquisitions typically involve the 
receipt of a control premium by target firm shareholders.  Therefore, the performance and return 
patterns of acquired IPOs may be different from busted and active IPOs. Since the long-run 
performance of busted and acquired IPOs is likely to be quite different, we suggest that they be 
treated separately. 
4. Long-Run IPO Performance 
Since the purpose of our paper is to examine the underwriting certification and windows 
of opportunity hypotheses, we do not plan to contribute to the long-run performance debate.3 Our 
focus on issuing firms that subsequently fail renders underperformance per se irrelevant in the 
context of our study. Nonetheless, we present long-run return evidence using firms matched by 
equity size for three reasons. 1) By demonstrating long-run underperformance, we show that our 
sample is comparable to other studies. 2) We want to compare return performance across busted, 
acquired, and active IPO categories since previous studies do not make similar distinctions. 3) 
We would like to support that our definition of busted IPO is a reliable measurement of long-run 
performance of IPOs.  
4.1 Calculation of Excess Returns 
 
3 Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that IPO stocks underperform non-IPO stocks matched by equity 
size. Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (1999) and Eckbo and Norli (2000) show that matching on size and book-to-market 
significantly reduce underperformance levels. Eckbo and Norli (2000) also show that a Fama-French type factor model 




To calculate the long-run return performance of IPOs, we follow Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) by measuring performance as anniversary date buy-and-hold returns 
for IPOs and a set of size-matched non-issuing firms. We report our results as size-adjusted 
excess returns so that our results can be compared directly with the findings reported in Ritter 
(1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995).4 
All long run returns are measured as buy-and-hold returns. Size-adjusted excess returns 
are measured for each IPO as the difference between the issuer’s buy-and-hold returns and the 
contemporaneous buy-and-hold returns on a portfolio of similarly sized non-IPO firms.  Excess 
returns at each holding-period horizon are calculated as an equally weighted average of each 
individual stock’s excess returns. We measure holding-period returns from the closing market 
price on the first day of public trading to the market price on the relevant anniversary date.  That 
is, buy-and-hold returns, iR , are calculated from the first CRSP-listed post-issue closing price to 









where itr  is the raw return on firm i in event month t.  Long-run return performance is 
documented for holding-period horizons, N, of 3, 6, 12, 36, and 60 months.  We use the CRSP 
tapes to follow each issuing firm from its offer date until the earlier of its delisting date, or the 
anniversary holding-period date, or December 31, 2017. If an issuing firm is delisted prior to the 
anniversary date, its total return is truncated on that date.5,6 
 
4 Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that book-to-market effects account for only a modest portion of the low returns 
earned by investors that issue equity.  
5 Issue-date returns are not included for several reasons, including lags between issue date and listing date, especially 
among the older IPOs, as well as the difficulty that investors face in purchasing shares at the offer price.  In addition, 
this is the procedure followed by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
6 Interestingly, Loughran (1993) reports that IPOs underperform for approximately five years.  According to our data, 




For each issuing firm, we obtain five years of size decile portfolio membership from 
CRSP.  For each issuer, size decile portfolio returns are obtained according to the year for which 
issuer returns are being calculated.  For example, if the IPO date is December 20, 2015, then the 
2015 size decile portfolio membership is used to calculate excess returns until the end of 2015.  
We then identify the size decile portfolio for the issuer in 2016, and use that reference group to 
calculate 2016 excess returns.  Thus, at the beginning of each year, the size decile portfolio 
membership used to calculate excess returns for each issue is updated.  Therefore, our measure 









where ptr  is the raw return on firm i’s size decile portfolio in event month t. 
4.2 The Relative Return Performance of Busted, Acquired and Active IPOs 
The impact of annual differences in IPO bust rates on the long-run return performance of 
IPOs is not obvious.  On the one hand, higher bust rates indicate that there is a greater fraction of 
poor performers among IPOs in a given cohort-year.  This would tend to reduce the average 
return performance for the cohort-year group as a whole.  On the other hand, year-to-year 
differences in issue volume can influence cohort-year return performance measures if the quality 
of good and bad issuers varies in different market conditions.  If issue volume is high, the high 
number of acquired and active IPOs could offset the poor performance of a large number of 
busted IPOs.    
Table 3 offers evidence on this point. It indicates that there is variation in the long-run 
excess return performance of IPOs based upon issue year. Several interesting patterns are 




periods immediately following issue, regardless of offer year.  For example, IPOs outperform 
their size matched counterparts by 2.62% during the 3-month periods following their initial 
trading date.   
Second, poor excess return performance begins to appear by the 6-month horizon for 
several, but not all, issue years, and the overall long-run excess return of IPOs turn to relatively 
negative number, -0.68%. There is a lag between the issue date and the onset of poor excess 
return performance for all issue-year cohorts. A t-test indicates that 3 month, one-year, three-year 
and five-year returns are significantly different from zero. 
Finally, aftermarket performance of IPOs is especially poor over both 3 and 5 year 
holding-period horizons, similar to the results reported in Loughran and Ritter (1995).  During 
our sample period, 36-month average excess returns are negative for 20 of the 27 cohort groups. 
Sixty-month average excess returns are negative for most of the cohort groups. Interestingly, 
although IPOs issued in 1988 and 1989 have relatively high cohort year bust rates (32/103 and 
35/120 issues, respectively), average long-run excess returns for these cold market cohort years 
compare quite favorably with average long-run excess returns during hot market cohort years.  
This suggests that factors in addition to bust rates alone influence excess return performance of 
cohort-year IPOs. Moreover, The three-year returns are significantly different from the excess 
returns measured over any of the shorter holding-period horizons at the 0.01 level, based on a 
paired t-test.   
The impact of bust rates on IPO performance can be illustrated by examining holding-
period excess returns over different anniversary dates.  Figure 1 plots holding-period excess 
returns separately for the busted, acquired and active IPOs over several different horizon periods. 




acquired and active IPOs.  Average performance differences begin to appear between the 3-
month and 6-month holding-period horizon.  Consistent with Table 3, the figure suggests almost 
half of a year elapses after issue before investors begin to recognize and price the differences 
between successful and unsuccessful IPO firms.7,8 
Excess returns for acquired and active IPOs are slightly different over 60-month return 
horizons after issuance. In five year after issuance, the excess return of acquired IPOs turn to 
slightly negative, -7%, on average. On the other hand, the excess return of active IPOs tend to 
significantly positive excess returns, 17%, on average. The significant positive excess return 
could come from our capture of active IPOs that is traded on the market for 16.5 years on 
average. Therefore, these active IPOs tend to have the best aftermarket performance to survive 
through two financial crises in 2001 and 2009 separately. In addition, the short-term excess 
returns acquired IPOs are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The figure is consistent with 
the interpretation that, conditional on a change of control, IPOs are priced efficiently on 
average.9 Mello and Parsons (1998) and Zingales (1995) present theoretical models that predict 
new-issue pricing compensates issuers for the subsequent sale of a firm to a strategic buyer 
following an IPO.  The findings that excess returns for the acquired IPOs are close to zero is 
consistent with the hypothesis that issuers extract control premium benefits in the offer price. 
Not surprisingly, excess returns for busted IPOs are exceptionally poor over longer return 
horizons.  One explanation is that new issue pricing methods underestimate the failure rate of 
 
7 Ritter (1991) finds that much of the underperformance occurs in the third post-issue year.  Analysis of IPO cohorts 
reveals that busted IPOs often delist around this time. Ritter also suggests that the concentrations in volumes in certain 
years are associated with taking advantage of windows of opportunity.  Bust rates also increase in high-volume years, 
primarily because low-quality underwriters gain market share during these periods.  It appears that the underlying cause 
of the poor long-run performance of hot market issues is due to the increased presence of low-quality investment banks 
during these market conditions.  
8 A Tukey post-hoc test indicates that differences between busted and active IPOs become significant at 3 months, and 
between busted and acquired IPOs at 12 months. 




IPO firms, thereby resulting in excessively high average offer prices. As a result, investors are 
undercompensated for losses associated with busted IPOs. It appears from the figure that busted 
issues are largely responsible for IPO long-run underperformance during our sample period.  It is 
not clear, however, why there is such a lag between issue date and investor recognition of 
operating performance problems.10  
This finding is reinforced by the observation that acquired IPOs have zero excess returns 
over relatively short return horizon. Ordinarily, one would expect this group to have positive 
expected returns to compensate investors for losses on busted IPOs. Such is not the case during 
our sample period since only active IPOs have slightly positive excess returns. One interpretation 
of this evidence is that there is a tendency for these ‘successful’ IPOs to underperform even 
without failing. Thus, an analysis of busted, acquired and active IPOs provides a perspective that 
differs considerably from the view that long-run investing in a typical IPO is “hazardous to your 
wealth” (Loughran and Ritter (1995), p. 46). Most importantly, our results support that our 
definition of busted IPO is a reliable measurement of long-run performance of IPOs.  
It is also interesting to investigate the aftermarket performance of IPOs with different 
lead underwriters as the focus of this paper is to explore how quality differences among lead 
underwriters might affect the long-term outcome of IPOs issued across IPO cycles. Figure 2 
plots the average size-matched excess return of IPOs with either high-quality or low-quality lead 
underwriters. The lead underwriters that have Cater-Manaster underwriter ranks above sample 
median will be sorted into high-quality group, otherwise they will be low-quality lead 
underwriters.  
 
10 For busted IPOs, excess returns are not significantly different from zero at the three- and six-month holding-period 




In figure 2, the IPOs with high-quality lead underwriters could beat the size-matched 
portfolio within one year after the issue date, and will underperform size-matched portfolio by 
12% for a five-year investment horizon. On the other hand, the IPOs with low-quality lead 
underwriters will have consistent underperformance since three month after the issue date and 
eventually reach the worst performance by the fifth year after the issuance. The pattern in figure 
2 suggests that IPOs with either high-quality or low-quality lead underwriters will have long-
term underperformance on average (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). The most 
important observation from figure 2 is that IPOs with the high-quality lead underwriters could 
consistently outperform those IPOs with low-quality lead underwriters over the five-year 
investment horizon, in terms of the size-matched excess return. Those results imply that high-
quality lead underwriters are consistently associate with IPOs that have better performance in the 
long-term. Therefore, it is interesting to further explore how high-quality lead underwriters affect 
the long-term performance or outcome of IPOs and whether underwriting activities will have 
influences on the IPOs after the issue date.   
5. Aging Analysis and the Long-Run Performance of IPOs 
Few investors would consider bust rates to be important during the period immediately 
following an IPO. However, as issuing firms mature and initial capital levels are depleted, some 
firms will experience poor operating results and exhaust their capital reserves.  Since this 
problem is likely to increase with IPO firms’ public market age, cumulative bust rates will 
increase over time for a given cohort year. In this section, we will perform an “aging analysis” of 
busted IPOs and briefly explore why premature or unprofitable firms can successfully raise 




Firstly, we need to address two questions: 1) whether this increase in IPO failure rates is 
immediately apparent to underwriters and investors and 2) whether this high failure rates are 
obscured by the number of contemporaneous issues. For example, since the number of new 
issues significantly varies over our sample period, a simple comparison of contemporaneous IPO 
failures relative to the aggregate new issue market size may underestimate the true bust rate. It is 
important then to accurately estimate the relation between the age of an IPO and the failure rates 
in issue year cohorts using an aging analysis. As we demonstrate in this section, a failure rate 
analysis that accounts for age produces a very different picture of bust rates in the market for 
new equity issues.  
The observation that investors may periodically underestimate failure rates in segments 
of the capital market is not new.  Asquith, Mullins and Wolff (1989) document the consequences 
of improper consideration of the aging of new issues on returns in the high-yield bond market. 
They recommend measurement of default over time based upon a cohort analysis of bonds issued 
during the same year.  We find that this phenomenon may be important in the market for new 
equity issues as well. 
Table 4 provides evidence on the relation between busted IPOs and their year of issue.  
Panel A presents annual bust rates for each issue year.  Bust rates are expressed as the percentage 
of aggregate cohort-year issue volume that fail n years following the offer date.  For example, 
0.10 percent of IPOs issued in 1988 fail within 1 year of their offer date; an additional 1.22 
percent fail within 2 years; and so on.  This analysis illustrates the annual relation between issue 
date and bust date based upon the offer year, providing evidence on the time to failure. Panel B 




prior annual bust rates.  This evidence provides a measure of the overall fraction of cohort-year 
issues that bust as of a specific holding period anniversary date.  
Two important characteristics are evident.  First, bust rates are generally low immediately 
following the issue date.  Since IPOs successfully raise a significant amount of equity capital, 
this low failure rate is not surprising.  Second, the importance of an IPO’s public market age on 
the cumulative cohort-year bust rates becomes apparent over time. Although there are some 
variations in bust rates for each year, yearly bust rates decrease with time overall, possibly due to 
cooling down of the IPO market in recent years. Older IPOs have much higher cumulative 
default percentages than those issued in recent issue years on average (Panel B).  For example, 
cumulative bust rates for IPOs issued during 1988-2005 range between 7.52% and 30.35%.  
Cumulative bust rates for IPOs issued during 2014 and 2015 are as low as 1.94% and 1.16%.  
Although there is a lag between the issue date and the bust date, investors would be expected to 
anticipate such failures and to require compensation for bearing this risk. Apparently, this is not 
the case. 
Busted IPOs can be a relatively large percentage of their issue-year cohort universe, 
especially for the oldest IPOs included in our sample. However, by the time these issues actually 
bust, the IPO market is much larger due to the rapid growth in new issue volume over our sample 
period. Rapid growth makes the high cohort-year bust rates appear small relative to the aggregate 
size of the outstanding issues, which is more heavily dominated by the recently issued IPOs with 
low bust rates.  Simply put, aged and unaged yearly bust rates provide substantially different 
pictures about the failure rates of IPOs.  
To illustrate the extent of the difference, Table 5 reports unaged yearly bust rates 




Unaged bust rates do not consider failure relative to issues that have been public for a similar 
amount of time.  Rather, this measure reports bust rates as a percentage of total sample period 
market size.  As the table indicates, annual unaged bust rates are lower than the cohort-year 
aging analysis.   For example, as of December 31, 2017, the aged dollar volume bust rate for 
1988 issues is 16.1% (Table 4) while the unaged bust rate (based upon total proceeds amount 
issued during the sample period) is 0.10%.  Thus, as in the high-yield bond market, our analysis 
suggests that public market age has an important effect on the measured frequency of busted new 
equity issues.   
If bust rates are not stationary through time, but rise with the IPO’s public market age, 
and if there is rapid growth in new-issue volume, bust rates are severely underestimated by the 
unaged measure. This distinction between aged and unaged bust rates may explain why investors 
appear to ignore the impact of low-probability, high-loss events on IPO delist due to operating 
inefficiency. Low contemporaneous measures of busted IPOs can dramatically understate failure 
rates over longer time horizons. In such an environment, new issue pricing decisions may not 
provide sufficient compensation for the true risk of these offerings until investors recognize the 
importance of aged bust rates. This aging effect may also partially explain the less number of 
IPOs issued during the recent year. Since unaged cumulative bust rate become significantly large, 
investors are driven away from the IPO market. The low demand on IPO market cause less 
issuance of IPOs in most recent years. Overall, this aging analysis motivate us to include variable 
IPO Age to control for the aging properties of busted IPOs. The question why the IPO market is 
cooling down in most recent years will be an issue for future investigation. 




Previous section show that our definition of busted IPOs is reliable and IPO Age will be 
an important control factor if we explore what factors could contribute to the likelihood of busted 
IPOs. In this section, we specifically investigate whether underwriters contribute to the high 
frequency of busted IPOs during the high-volume IPO periods (Table 2). We first sort 
underwriters into two groups: high-quality and low-quality underwriters based on the sample 
median of Carter-Manaster underwriter rank. We present the market share of both high-quality 
and low-quality underwriters over time, in terms of both the number of IPOs and the amount of 
capital raised. We further explore the correlation between bust possibility of IPOs and quality of 
underwriters at macro level.    
In addition, we identify factors that systematically differentiate between new issues that 
bust and those that do not. We then explore the relationship between the likelihood that an IPO 
busts and the quality of underwriters, measured by Carter-Manaster underwriter rank, at micro 
level. We also examine whether the full sample results hold under different types of IPO market 
conditions—hot, cold and normal.  The full sample test presumes asymmetric information is 
time-invariant while the market conditions test allows for the potential influence of time-varying 
asymmetric information on IPO bust rates. In both sets of tests, we interpret the explanatory 
variable coefficients as evidence of the relative importance of underwriter reputation, the 
underwriter’s management of the going public process, capital market conditions and 
macroeconomic conditions for the marketing of failed and successful IPOs.  
Finally, we discuss potential endogeneity issues related to selection bias between 
underwriters and issuers, and specifically explore the underwriting activity differences between 
low-quality and high-quality underwriters.  




Since underwriters have very intensive participation during the IPO process, we 
specifically explore whether underwriters contribute to the existence of “windows of 
misopporunity”, high bust rate of IPOs issued during the high-volume IPO year. Specifically, we 
examine the screening and certification roles that investment banks provide when firms go public. 
Higher-quality investment banks have greater reputation at stake, and therefore would be more 
adversely affected by failing in these roles. If underwriters differ in their ability or their incentive 
to conduct due diligence during the going public process, busted IPOs are more likely to be 
underwritten by less-prestigious investment banks. 
Although we expect that high-quality underwriters provide more credible certification, 
their screening of new issues may nonetheless be imperfect. Even high-quality investment banks 
may underwrite busted IPOs, we also expect that market conditions and market share may 
impact the incidence of busted IPOs.  For example, an increase in the volume of new issues may 
increase the costs of conducting adequate due diligence and issuer certification because the 
average quality of the issuer pool may change, or underwriting capacity constraints at the 
investment bank may become binding (Khanna, Noe and Sonti, 2008). In addition, changes in 
underwriter market share may impact the overall quality of the certification of new issues if there 
are differences in the skills of investment banks. 
Carter and Manaster (1990) argue that low-risk firms attempt to reveal their value to the 
market by selecting underwriters with high prestige. In this case, a prestigious underwriter is 
adept at identifying lower-risk IPO firms, while non-prestigious underwriters undertake the IPOs 
of those issuing firms that are unsuitable for their prestigious counterparts. If the distribution of 




IPOs would change as well.  The propensity of investment banks to underwrite risky IPOs may 
change over time as well.  
Table 6 presents underwriter market share and bust percentages by IPO issue year sorted 
by underwriter reputation. Panel A presents the information based on proceeds amount, and 
Panel B presents the information based on the number of issues.  Lead underwriters for each IPO 
are identified from the SDC database, and updated Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation 
measures are obtained from Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and updated by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). An underwriter is classified as high-quality if it has a Carter-Manaster reputation 
measure greater than the overall sample median, and classified as low-quality otherwise. 
Several noteworthy characteristics are observable in Table 6.  First, higher-quality 
investment banks have larger underwriting market share than lower-quality investment banks 
overall. The magnitude of the difference depends on whether market share is measured by issue 
proceeds (Panel A) or the number of IPOs (Panel B).  This difference is due to the fact that 
lower-quality investment banks tend to underwrite smaller IPOs. According to the proceeds 
amount, market share for the high-quality investment banks ranges between 48.8% (in 1994) and 
99.6% (in 2008). High-quality investment banks underwrite the majority of issue proceeds 
during our sample period. 
 Second, high-quality underwriters experience a loss of market share in high-volume 
periods.  For example, according to proceeds amount, high-quality investment bank market share 
decreases from 88% to 65% during 1988-1992 to 59% to 48% during 1993-1997. Although the 
high-quality underwriters tend to dominate the IPO market in “cold” IPO market, the overall 
pattern is the low market share of high-quality underwriters during “hot” period. The decrease in 




or because high-quality investment banks are capacity constrained so that issuers must use 
lower-quality investment banks.11 Whatever the reason, underwriters who are expected to have 
less incentive or ability to efficiently screen and certify new issues gain market share when IPO 
volume increases.  
Third, high-quality investment banks underwrite a larger volume of busted IPOs than low 
quality investment banks in 23 of 28 cohort-year according to proceeds amount. On the other 
hand, the fraction of busted IPOs underwritten by high-quality investment banks has significant 
variations and ranges between 36% (in 1996) and 99% (in 2008) due to the significant time-
series variations in the number of IPOs over time (Panel A). Relative to their overall market 
share, low-quality investment banks underwrite a disproportionately large percentage of busted 
IPOs.  In 23 out of 28 sample year, the fraction of busted IPOs (according to proceeds amount) 
underwritten by low-quality investment banks is greater than their issue year market share.  The 
difference between the absolute and relative underwriting performance of investment banks may 
be explained by the superior screening and certification skills of higher quality investment banks 
and by the attempts of low-quality underwriters to penetrate the market by underwriting more 
speculative new issues. 
Finally, lower-quality investment banks underwrite more busted IPOs in 15 of 19 cohort-
year before 2007 and in 3 of 9 cohort-year after 2007 (Panel B). The fraction of busted IPOs 
underwritten by low-quality investment banks ranges between 43% (in 1990) and 89% (in 1994) 
before 2007 and between 20% (in 2008) and 75% (in 2015) after 2007.  There is also some 
evidence of an aging effect here as well.  For example, 42% (21/50) of the 1988 IPOs 
underwritten by the low-quality investment banks busted while only 7% (3/41) of their 2015 
issues busted.  One interpretation of the evidence could be that low-quality investment banks 
 




underwrite fewer busted IPOs during hot markets. On the other hand, the IPOs issued after 2007 
have had less time to bust. Furthermore, it is possible that the high-volume IPO periods turn to 
less “hot” after 2009 financial crises, causing lower fraction of busted IPOs underwritten by low 
quality investment banks. In order to separate the effects of issue volume and public market age, 
the multivariate analysis must control for both effects.    
Overall, table 6 shows that a greater proportion of the IPOs underwritten by low-quality 
investment banks bust, and these investment banks gain market share in hot markets. Thus, our 
evidence would be consistent with our first hypothesis that low-quality underwriters tend to gain 
market share during the “windows of opportunity” when the IPO volume is high, and vice versa.  
From table 6, we show that a great proportion of IPOs that are underwritten by low-
quality underwriters tend to bust eventually. Therefore, it is worthwhile specifically exploring 
the correlation between market share of low-quality underwriters and IPO bust rate over time. 
We measure the market share of low-quality underwriters as the number of IPOs that are 
underwritten by the low-quality underwriter divided by the total number of IPOs for each month. 
We measure the market share of low-quality underwriters by the number of IPOs issued instead 
of issue amount since the number of IPOs underwritten by low-quality underwriters can better 
capture the market share variations of low-quality underwriters. Consistent with the market share 
measurement, we calculate the Bust Rate as the number of IPOs that eventually bust divided by 
the total number of IPOs issued for each month. 
From table 6, we also observe correlations among bust frequency of IPOs, the number of 
IPOs issued, and market share of low-quality underwriters. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) 
suggest that investors are less fearful of buying overvalued equity in high-volume issue markets. 




of asymmetric information between issuers and investors. There are, however, two different 
interpretations of the window of opportunity story to consider.  First, if private information is a 
significant determinant of equity issuance decisions, firms may time their issues to correspond 
with periods of low information asymmetries. In this case, high-volume periods (hot markets) 
would be interpreted as periods of low information asymmetry, and we would expect more 
busted IPOs to be underwritten during low-volume periods (cold markets).  Conversely, herding 
theory suggests that investors can become overly optimistic, and be more receptive to 
investments in poor-quality firms.  This interpretation suggests that investors are less 
discriminating during hot markets, which implies that we should observe more busted IPOs 
underwritten during these periods.12 Therefore, our tests of correlation between bust rate and 
market share of low-quality underwriters will include the measurement of the number of IPOs 
issued per month and control variables shown relate to the variation in equity issuance.  
Many IPO firms also issue follow-on equity offerings soon after their initial equity sale, 
which suggests that conditions in the seasoned equity market may be important (Jegadeesh, 
Weinstein and Welch (1993)). Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) propose that aggregate seasoned 
equity issuance could affect the number of IPOs issuance. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and 
Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988, 1994) document that the number of IPOs issued tend to be 
varied with the average intial returns. The periods of highest initial returns tend to be followed 
several months later by peak in the number of IPOs.  
A different version of the window of opportunity story suggests that macroeconomic 
conditions rather than capital market conditions influence information asymmetries and investor 
 
 
12 Investigations of the role of capital market conditions and transactions on security issuance decisions include Ritter 
(1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) in the IPO market, and Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Bayless and Chaplinsky 




psychology. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) argue that information costs and security issue 
volume depend on macroeconomic conditions (see also Lowry, 2003; Gao, Ritter, and Zhao, 
2013). Fama and French (1989) identify a systematic relation between macroeconomic 
conditions and expected rates of return on corporate securities. The information asymmetry 
interpretation predicts that busted IPOs are more likely when macroeconomic conditions are poor, 
while the herding theory interpretation states that busted IPOs are more likely when 
macroeconomic conditions are favorable.  
Finally, going public decisions and IPO bust rates may also relate to conditions in other 
segments of the capital markets.  Research suggests that issuers occasionally postpone IPOs 
when credit market conditions are favorable (James (1992)). Many studies indicate stock market 
conditions could also potentially affect the variations in equity issuance, such as market returns 
(e.g., Henderson et al., 2006; Huang and Ritter, 2016), market volatility (Schill, 2004), market 
liquidity (Hanselaar et al., 2018), and market sentiment (Lowry, 2003).  
Table 7 presents primary market, stock market, and macroeconomic condition 
information for IPOs during hot, cold and normal IPO market cycles, as defined using the lagged 
three month moving average of aggregate monthly IPO issue volume. 13   Based on the 
methodology described in Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), we define market conditions in the 
following way.  For each month during the sample period, we obtain monthly IPO issue volume.  
We then form moving averages based upon the issue volume for the three months immediately 
preceding the issue month.  Each issue month during the sample period is then ranked according 
to the level of the lagged three-month moving average.  The issue months in the top quartile of 
the lagged three-month moving averages are characterized as hot.  The issue months in the 
 
13 We have also conducted the analysis using industrial production to define market conditions.  The results are available 




lowest quartile of the lagged three-month moving averages are characterized as cold.  The 
remaining months are considered normal.  Figure 3 illustrates the identification of hot, cold and 
normal markets during our sample period.  The figure also includes information on the length of 
the market cycles, issue volume and bust frequencies during the different market conditions.14, 15 
Several interesting relations are observed in Table 7.  First, most IPO failures occur 
during hot market conditions (1192), followed by normal (507) and then cold markets (91).  The 
low incidence of cold market failures would seem to support the predictions of herding theory.  
Note, however, that overall issue volume is also highest in hot (3528 issues), followed by normal 
(2489 issues) and then cold market conditions (485 issues).  Therefore, the higher incidence of 
busted IPOs during better IPO market conditions is at least partly attributable to higher issue 
volume during these periods.  The table also indicates that busted IPOs are a higher fraction of 
issue volume during hot markets (34%) than either normal markets (20%) or cold markets (19%).  
These results indicate the high failure rate of IPOs issued in hot markets (Fama and French, 2004) 
and support our documentation of “windows of misopportunity” from table 2. 
Table 7 also indicate that market share of low-ranked underwriter tend to be significantly 
higher during hot year (66%) than cold (35%) and normal (37%) year. This is consistent with the 
result from table 6 and implies the positive correlation between market share of low-ranked 
underwriter and the number of IPOs issued. Since the bust rate of IPOs also tend to be the 
 
14 The identification of hot, cold and normal markets is designed to provide some perspective on similarities and 
differences in IPOs conducted in different market conditions. In the multivariate analysis, issue volume is treated as a 
continuous rather than a discrete categorical variable. We also repeat the analysis according to the dollar value (rather 
than the number) of IPOs.  In some cases, the inferences about busted IPOs are found to be sensitive to the use of the 
dollar value rather than the number of IPOs.  Therefore, we recommend caution in interpreting results from empirical 
studies that use only the number of IPOs to describe hot and cold IPO market conditions. 
 
15 For consistency, all macroeconomic and capital market variables reported in this section are lagged three month 
moving averages. The measurement of conditions over a three month period prior to the offer date captures the idea 




highest during the hot year, the high market share of low-quality underwriters could significantly 
relate to the high bust rate of IPOs during the hot year.  
Finally, table 7 identifies a number of significant differences among cold, normal, and hot 
IPO market conditions. We document that hot IPO market tend to have the highest seasoned 
equity offerings volume and average initial return (Choe, Masulis and Nanda, 1993; Ibbotson 
and Jaffe, 1975; and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, 1988, 1994). In contrast to James (1992), 
table 7 shows that credit market condition is favorable during the “hot” IPO year. One potential 
explanation is that lower Term Premium and Default Premium may indicate the excess aggregate 
supply of capital in the market, indicating favorable macroeconomic conditions. Although 
industrial production index is the lowest during “hot” IPO cycle, this result is driven by the fact 
that most recent year tend to be either “normal” or “cold” IPO period and that industrial 
production index is a nonstationary variable. Overall, the “hot” IPO cycle tend to be the period of 
time when macroeconomic conditions are favorable. Furthermore, “hot” IPO year tend to have 
lower stock market volatility and more market liquidity than either “cold” or “normal” IPO year 
(Hanselaar et al., 2018). Investors will also become over-optimistic during “hot” IPO year.  
In table 8, we specifically explore the correlation among market share of low-quality 
underwriters, bust rate of IPOs, and the number of IPO issuance. In column (1) and (2), we 
regress market share of low-quality underwriters on the number of IPO issuance and a bunch of 
control variables that relate to IPO volume. Consistent with both table 6 and table 7, there is a 
significant positive correlation between the market share of low-quality underwriters and IPO 
volume. This correlation is still significant (p<0.001) after controlling for other equity issuance, 
macroeconomic, and stock market conditions. This result support the hypothesis that low-quality 




Table 8 also supports the positive correlation between the number of IPO issued and the 
bust rate of IPOs. In column (3), the coefficient estimated for IPO Volume is positive and 
significant at 0.1 percent level. This result confirms that the bust rate tend to higher during high 
IPO volume year. However, the correlation between IPO Volume and Bust Rate is driven by 
other equity issuance, macroeconomic, and stock market conditions. In column (4), the 
coefficient estimated for IPO Volume is no longer significant due to further control of other 
equity issuance, macroeconomic, and stock market conditions variables. These results suggest 
that high bust rate of IPOs issued during the high-volume year can be partially explained by the 
fact that favorable capital market and macroeconomic conditions produce excess demand from 
investors and allow more premature and private firms raise pubic equity (Fama and French, 
2004).  
Finally, we find that market share of low-quality underwriter is positively and 
significantly correlated to the bust rate of IPOs from table 8. In column (3) the coefficient 
estimated for market share of low-quality underwriter is positive and significant, even after 
controlling the capital market conditions. In column (4), the coefficient for market share of low-
quality underwriter is still significant but slightly marginal due to significant multicollinearity 
issues. Those results indicate that increased participation of low-quality underwriters 
significantly relate to the high bust rate of IPOs issued during the high-volume year, while this 
relation is partially driven by IPO market cycles.  
Overall, we found that the bust rate of IPOs tend to higher during the “hot” IPO year, and 
the low-quality underwriters tend to gain market share at the same time. We also find the 
significant positive correlation between increased participation of low-quality underwriters and 




participation of low-quality underwriters is the main driver of the high bust rate of IPOs issued 
during the high-volume year at this point. On the one hand, the definition of low-quality 
underwriters may not fully capture the quality differences among underwriters. On the other 
hand, endogeneity issues could significantly affect the coefficient estimation within OLS 
regression in table 8. We will address these issues in the following sections.  
6.2 Underwriter Reputation and Likelihood of Bust 
Previous sections document a significant positive correlation between market share of 
low-quality underwriters and bust rate of IPOs at macro level but fail to develop specific 
relationship between underwriter’s quality and the likelihood that IPOs will eventually delist due 
to operating inefficiency. In this section, we specifically explore this relationship at issuer or 
micro level. In addition, IPO underwriters affect both the supply of and the demand for new 
shares through their pre-issue price, issue size adjustment decisions, their aftermarket 
overallotment option (OAO) exercise decisions, and price stabilization activities. The 
underwriting activities can indicate the quality of certification service provided by underwriters 
and partially represent issuer-specific unobserved characteristics. Therefore, we will also include 
both premarket and aftermarket activities proxies during IPO process into our analysis. 
Table 9 presents evidence on issue characteristics and underwriter market activities that 
could influence the likelihood that IPOs will eventually bust, or delist due to operating 
inefficiency.  
Consistent with previous finding, Underwriter reputation (Reputation) is significantly lower for 
busted IPOs than for the sample of acquired and active IPOs. This result further supports that 




Table 9 also shows the issuer-specific characteristics of IPOs. During the pre-market 
period, investment banks commonly use a comparable companies methodology to establish the 
expected offer price of an IPO (see, e.g., Kim and Ritter (1999)).  Revenue is often the most 
important operating performance metric in this valuation process, because other common 
performance benchmarks such as operating income and operating cash flow are frequently 
negative, especially for younger firms.  Larger and more established revenue streams are likely 
to produce more accurate estimates of firm value.  In addition, some investment banks 
recommend that issuers attain a certain level of revenue prior to a public market offering.  Low 
revenues may be an indication of a less-seasoned business model.  In this case, lower revenues 
may indicate a premature entry into the public market.  If so, survival rates would be lower for 
these issuers. Not surprisingly, revenue tend to be lower for busted issues than acquired and 
active issues. Table 9 also indicates that the busted issues tend to be traded on public market for 
longer period of time than acquired and active issuers. One potential explanation is that public 
firms that are traded on public market for longer time are more likely to bust eventually since 
those firms need to survive through two significant financial crises (2001 and 2008). On the 
other hand, IPO issuers that eventually delist due to merger and acquisition might drive down the 
average public market age for the acquired and active group. Those results suggest that it is 
important to include these issuer-specific characteristic variables in our further test of the 
relationship between underwriter reputation and likelihood of busted IPOs.  
In addition to issuer-specific characteristics, premarket activities performed by 
underwriters could affect the likelihood of busted IPOs. Prior to an IPO’s offer date, investment 
banks establishes a preliminary price and offer size in the prospectus and market a new issue 




to the underwriter through nonbinding indications of demand. In response this feedbacks from 
investors, the final offer price and the exact number of shares to be sold are not determined until 
the day before issuance, and sometimes the actual day of issuance. Since the investment bank 
aggregates private information about investors’ demand for an issue, pre-issue underwriter 
decisions could be related to subsequent failure and survival rates of new issues. In table 9, we 
examine initial offer price range, pre-issue offer price changes, and issue size adjustment by the 
underwriter as evidence of its marketing skills and expertise. Partial price adjustment activities 
by underwriters is quantified by measuring revisions in expected offer prices during the pre-
market period.  Changes in offer price (ΔP) are calculated as the difference between the actual 
offer price and the expected offer price, divided by the expected offer price. We further divide 
this partial price adjustment measurement into positive (ΔP+) and negative components (ΔP-) 
following Lowry and Schwert (2002). Issue_Size_Pct measures the issue size relative to the 
numbers reported in the offering prospectus and Dollar Range is the dollar width of offer range 
and indicates ex ante uncertainty about the value of the issuer.16 
Table 9 presents that busted issues tend to have less upward partial price adjustment. 
These results support that busted issues are not attractive to investors due to their limited 
operating efficiency. Table 9 further shows that downward partial price adjustment is not 
significantly different between busted issues and acquired and active issues. Even surprisingly, 
the initial dollar range that indicates issuer valuation uncertainty is narrower for busted issues 
than for acquired and active issues. We further explore these interesting pattern and further sort 
new issues into two categories, depending on whether the issues are underwritten by high-quality 
underwriters or low-quality underwriters in table 9. We found that high-quality underwriter tend 
to have more downward partial price adjustment for busted issues and estimate narrower dollar 
 




range for acquired and active issues. In contrast, low-quality underwriters will have same 
magnitude of downward partial price adjustment for either busted issues or acquired and active 
issues and tend to underestimate the dollar range of busted issues. Therefore, we conclude that 
the counterintuitive pattern shown in table 9 is mainly driven by poor certification service 
provided by low-quality underwriters. These underwriters underestimate the valuation 
uncertainty of busted issues and perform insufficient downward adjustment of the offer price, 
causing narrow dollar range and low magnitude of downward partial price adjustment for busted 
issues. These results imply that low-quality underwriters perform lower quality certification 
service and screening standard in IPO market than high-quality underwriters do.  
In addition to premarket activities, investment banks will also perform certain 
underwriting activities after the IPO issue date in response to investors’ aggregate demand for an 
issue. Since weaker demand issues will indicate a high possibility of bust in the future, the 
underwriter’s aftermarket activities may also relate to the subsequent failure and survival rates of 
new issues. In general, underwriters provide two important aftermarket activities on behalf of 
issuers, exercise of overallotment option and price stabilization activities. Since underwriters 
typically oversell an issue, the overallotment option (OAO) provides an opportunity for the 
underwriter to cover its short position at a price equal to the offer price. Therefore, the OAO 
allows the underwriter to support issue demand without excessive exposure to price risk and 
potentially indicate the demand from investors. The other aftermarket activity will be price 
stabilization activities. The other potentially important but unobservable aftermarket activity 
conducted by IPO underwriters is price stabilization or support. Price stabilization involves any 
activity by the underwriter designed to impede price declines of the new issue, and the level of 




we predict that busted issues tend to receive more intense price stabilization activities but less 
overallotment option exercise from their lead underwriters.17 
  We measure OAO exercise as the number of additional shares purchased by the 
underwriter under the OAO during the aftermarket period, divided by the number of registered 
shares sold in the offering.  Underwriters can purchase up to 15% of the registered shares if the 
OAO is exercised.  Thus, the variable ranges between 0% and 15% where higher values indicate 
greater use of the OAO by the underwriter. Consistent with our prediction, table 9 indicates that 
the sample of acquired and active IPOs OAO exercise averages (9.9%) is significantly higher 
than that of busted IPO (7.9%). The Wilcoxon rank-sum test supports that OAO exercise average 
difference between these two groups is significant. Since OAO exercise is largely a function of 
aftermarket demand for an issue, aftermarket investor demand may be relate to long-run survival 
and failure rates. Given that the immediate aftermarket investor returns are similar for all IPOs 
(Table 3), secondary market investor demand may be a more informative indicator of IPO failure 
than aftermarket investor returns. This is likely due to the ability of underwriters to manipulate 
prices, and therefore distort returns, in the period immediately following new issues. 
We deduce the extent of price stabilization by observing price and trading patterns during 
the aftermarket period since underwriters are not required to report their actual price stabilization 
activities. Several proxies for measuring the impact of price stabilization have been proposed in 
the literature, including the width of bid-ask spreads, estimates of Black-Scholes put option 
prices and the number of days until the secondary market price of the IPO first drops below the 
 
17 Evidence on IPO underwriter activities prior to the issue date is presented in Hanley (1993) and Logue, Rogalski, 
Seward and Foster-Johnson (2001).  Studies that focus on the aftermarket activities of the underwriter include Aggarwal 
(2000), Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000), Hanley, Kumar and Seguin (1993), Hanley, Lee and Seguin (1996), and Logue, 





offer price.  Our empirical tests use the latter measure. 18  For each IPO in the sample, we 
determine the number of days between the offer date and the first date the secondary market 
price drops below the offer price. Since this distribution is skewed, we create a discrete 
categorical variable based on a day-count convention. Issuers whose market prices decline below 
the issue price within two days of the offer date are assigned a value of 1.  Thus, low values of 
the categorical variable indicate that underwriters abandoned aftermarket support activities 
quickly.  If issuers experience price declines below the offer price within the next 28 days, we 
assume that underwriters were participating in extended price stabilization activities. These 
issues are assigned a value of 2. Finally, higher values of the categorical variable indicate that 
price stabilization activities were not necessary.  Issuers that did not experience price declines 
below the offer price within the first 30 days of trading are assigned a value of 3.19 
According to Table 9, underwriters tend to perform less price stabilization activity for the 
sample of acquired and active IPOs than for busted IPOs (2.51 versus 2.37).  This is consistent 
with our OAO results, since underwriters would be expected to provide price stabilization 
support for weak issues through secondary market purchases (Aggarwal (2000)).   
Overall, table 9 suggest that there are a number of differences in underwriter activities 
between the acquired and active IPOs and busted issues. Busted issues have less revenue and 
smaller preliminary price ranges, have lower magnitude of upward partial price adjustment, 
experience more intensive aftermarket price support activities, receive less exercise of 
overallotment options, and are underwritten by lower-quality investment banks. These results 
 
18 Following Hanley, Kumar and Seguin (1993) and Hanley, Lee and Seguin (1996), we use daily closing prices from 
CRSP to determine whether the market price dropped below the offer price.  Therefore, our estimate of Price Support 
depends on whether the closing price on any given day is above, equal to, or below the offer price. 
19 Our analysis assumes that transaction prices below the offer price indicate the cessation of price stabilization activities.  
The offer price is the maximum allowable stabilizing bid under SEC Rule 10b-7.  To the extent that price stabilization 
occurs at prices below the offer price, our measurement of price stabilization works against identification of systematic 




also suggest that it is important to include these issuer-specific characteristics and underwriting 
process in our multivariate analysis.  
Based on the evidence from table 9, several factors may distinguish busted IPOs from all 
other IPOs. We construct two sets of logit regression to further explore the relation between 
these factors and the success and failure rates of IPOs. Most importantly, we would like to 
identify the relationship between failure rates of IPOs and underwriters quality. The first set 
examines the impact of these factors on IPO bust rates throughout the entire sample period.  This 
assumes that the marginal impact of the explanatory factors is constant in different IPO market 
conditions.  The second set of analyses presents evidence regarding similarities and differences 
in the factors that influence bust rates during different IPO market cycles.   
In Table 10, we estimate several different logistic regressions to examine the impact of 
the explanatory variables on the likelihood that an IPO busts during our sample period.  The 
dependent variable for each model is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO issuer 
subsequently bust by December 31, 2017, and is equal to zero otherwise. In each model, a 
positive (negative) independent variable coefficient indicates that the explanatory variable 
increases (reduces) the likelihood that an IPO will bust. 
Regressions (1) and (2) examine the impact of underwriter quality on the likelihood that 
an IPO subsequently busts. Regression (1) controls for the issuer-specific characteristics and the 
premarket underwriting activities. Regression (2) adds the two aftermarket underwriting 
activities conducted by investment banks to the specification. This analysis provides evidence on 
whether underwriter quality and underwriter activities prior to or subsequent to issue date are 
related to the likelihood that an IPO subsequently busts. In both regressions, we also control for 




for the public market aging effect documented in Section 5. Regression (3), (4), and (5) include 
control variables represent equity issuance, macroeconomic, stock market conditions, and 
“nascent” industry fixed effects from Benveniste et al (2003). Consistent with previous finding, 
the IPO Age variable is also highly significant and positively relate to the likelihood that an IPO 
subsequently busts. We also document significant negative relation between bust likelihood and 
revenue. In contrast to conventional interpretation, we suggest that revenue might indicate a 
certain degree of product market acceptance. IPO issuer with limited revenue will indicate some 
private firms may choose to go public too early in the development of their business model. Our 
results suggest that firms conducting IPOs with an insufficient revenue base may in fact reduce 
the likelihood of their own long run survival. 
The results indicate that IPOs underwritten by low-quality investment banks are more 
likely to subsequently bust, consistent with our second hypothesis, and support that underwriters 
provide valuable certification and screening services.  This result also suggests that higher-
quality investment banks do a better job identifying qualified businesses during the going public 
process.  In fact, a one unit increase in Carter-Manaster ranking is associated with between a 
19% to 21% decrease in the odds of a busted IPO. Investors should be wary of new issues 
underwritten by low-quality investment banks.20, 21 This significant effects are consistent with 
further control of equity issuance, macroeconomic, stock market conditions, and “nascent” 
industry fixed effects. Combined with results shown in table 8, we propose that the increase 
participation of low-quality underwriters reduce the average screening standard of investment 
bank industry and allow more private firms with high likelihood of bust go to public during the 
 
20 Another possible implication is that investors should exercise caution in participation in IPOs underwritten by online 
investment banks.  These new issues may not be subject to the same level of certification and screening that occurs 
during the traditional book-building process. 
21Odds ratios were calculated as (100(




high-volume year. Therefore, this increase market share of low-quality underwriters is actually 
the main driver of the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the “hot” IPO market.   
Furthermore, Table 10 presents that some of premarket activities have predictive power 
on the bust likelihood. In contrast to results from table 9, we found that downward partial price 
adjustment is a significant negative predictor of busted IPOs, while upward partial price 
adjustment is not a consistently significant predictor. Counterintuitively but not surprisingly, 
Dollar Range is a significant negative predictor of the bust likelihood. This result is consistent 
what we found in table 9 and is mainly driven by the fact that low-quality underwriters tend to 
misunderstand the inside information and business characteristics of issuers. We will further 
explore this interesting pattern in the following section.  
Finally, the results provide some support for the existence of a significant relationship 
between aftermarket underwriter activities and bust likelihood.  Stabilization activity (Price 
Support) is a significant negative predictor of a busted IPO in all regression models except, and 
overallotment exercise decisions (OAO) are negative and significant. This pattern suggests that 
there is significantly more price support activities and less exercise of the OAO for busted IPOs. 
Consistent with table 9, the great demand of stabilization activities (Price Support) is likely to 
predict high possibility that IPOs will eventually bust. Furthermore, High levels of OAO exercise 
generally indicate high demand for an issue and aftermarket stock price levels that exceed the 
offer price.  Since issues with weak demand are more likely to bust, busted IPOs tend to 
consistently have less or no exercise of OAO after the issue date. On the other hand, price 
stabilization activities indicate potential aftermarket stock performance of issuers and significant 




activities for busted issues might partially explain that immediate aftermarket stock performance 
is not significantly different among active, acquired, and busted issues (Table 3).  
Although busted IPOs have an important relation with the reputation of the underwriter 
and aftermarket underwriter activities, capital market conditions may affect the success of a new 
issue.  Indeed, we have noted that one version of the window of opportunity story is that firms 
take advantage of excessive optimism in the capital markets to time issue decisions.  Going 
public is often the first stage in a process of capital acquisition and ownership changes.  IPOs are 
often followed by follow-on seasoned equity offers and merger and acquisition activity.  In 
addition, credit market conditions offer a substitute source of capital when IPO market 
conditions are poor. 
Regression (3) – (5) provides evidence on the relationship between busted IPOs and IPO 
volume conditions.  There is a significant positive relationship between the level of activity in 
the IPO market and subsequent bust rates. Busted IPOs occur when IPO issue volumes are high, 
a result that provides some support for the herding version of the window of opportunity story 
that more busted IPOs underwritten during high-volume periods. The IPO Volume is significant 
in predicting likelihood of busted IPOs, but the explanatory power of the IPO Volume declines 
gradually after we have full control of other market conditions. One reasonable explanation is 
that the high IPO volume is mainly driven by excess investor demand that is produced by 
favorable macroeconomic and capital market conditions.  
 The results also shed light on whether the increase market share of low-quality 
underwriters drive the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the high-volume year. If IPO 
market condition is the main driver of the increased number of busted IPOs, we would expect to 




Regression (3)-(5). The positive coefficient of IPO Volume in our study, in conjunction with the 
significant underwriter reputation result, suggests that it is not only hot market conditions per se 
that increase the incidence of busted IPOs, but also that low-quality underwriters gain market 
share during these periods. The increased failure rate of IPOs in hot market is not only driven by 
the increased volume of new issues, but also that more new issues are underwritten by 
investment banks with poorer certification and screening skills. Apparently, the window of 
misopportunity is thrown open by the combination of market share gains by low-quality 
underwriters and excessive investor demand for new issues. 
Overall, the results in Table 10 show that busted issues tend to be underwritten by low-
quality underwriters and indirectly support that increase market share of low-quality 
underwriters during the high-volume year could drive the high failure rate of IPOs issued during 
this period. Table 10 also conclude that busted issues tend to have greater downward partial price 
adjustment, less exercise of overallotment option, and more price stabilization activities. 
Although the table 10 indicates that small initial offer price range will imply a high possibility 
that IPO will subsequently bust, this results are mainly driven by low-quality certification service 
and inaccurate interpretation of inside information by the low-quality underwriters.  
Factors Influencing Bust Rates During Different IPO Market Cycles 
This section considers whether the underwriter reputation, premarket activities, and 
aftermarket activities affect IPO failure rates across market conditions since cyclic variation in 
the quality of IPOs could result in differential failure rates across different market conditions. 
The focus of this IPO cycle analysis will be the logistic regression during “hot” period since we 





To examine this hypothesis, we estimate separate logistic regressions in hot, cold and 
normal markets. The dependent variable is still a dummy a dummy variable equal to one if the 
IPO issuer subsequently bust by December 31, 2017, and is equal to zero otherwise. IPO market 
conditions are measured using the lagged three-month moving average IPO volume, consistent 
with table 7. The logistic results are presented in Table 11.  Panels A, B, and C respectively 
report cold, hot and normal market regressions. 
The evidence indicates that bust rates are not influenced by identical factors across 
different IPO market cycles.  We briefly highlight some of the more interesting results. First, the 
Carter-Manaster measure of underwriter quality is negative and significant in all three market 
condition regressions.  The results are consistent with the hypothesis that lower-quality 
investment banks are more likely to underwrite IPOs that bust, regardless of whether market 
conditions are hot, cold or normal.  Thus, it appears that low-quality underwriters consistently 
provide low-quality certification service and have below average screening standard over 
different IPO market conditions. Those results further support that increase market share of low-
quality underwriters during the high-volume year will undermine the average screening standard 
of investment bank industry and allow more premature or unprofitable companies issue public 
equity, causing the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the same time.  
The importance of the underwriter also appears to vary according to market conditions. A 
one unit increase in the underwriter’s reputation was associated with at least a 18% decrease in 
busting.  Table 11 indicates that the magnitude of this relation is strongest in cold markets. For 
every one unit increase in Carter-Manaster reputation, the odds of busting decreased about 24%. 
In hot and normal markets, the link between underwriter reputation and busting, while 




largest magnitude of coefficient for underwriter reputation during the “cold” period only suggest 
the smaller number of busted IPOs issued during the “cold” period and the smaller market share 
of low-quality investment banks. In contrast, underwriter reputation tend to have the strongest 
explanatory power on likelihood of busted IPOs during the “hot” period. The z-statistic for 
underwriter reputation in “hot” period is -10.61, which is significantly larger than -2.92 in “cold” 
period and -7.33 in “normal” period in absolute term.  
Table 11 also offers some evidence on the relation between premarket activities and 
likelihood of bust across different IPO cycles. Downward partial price adjustment can 
significantly predict likelihood of busted IPOs in both “normal” and “cold” period but not in 
“hot” period after including more control variables. On the other hand, upward partial price 
adjustment and initial offer price range are significant in predicting likelihood of busted IPOs 
during both “normal” and “hot” period but not during “cold” period. The significant coefficient 
for initial offer price range has a negative sign, indicating that the IPOs with narrow initial offer 
price range are more likely to bust in the future. As we discussed before, this counterintuitive 
relation is driven by low-quality certification service performed by low-quality underwriters. In 
contrast to normal and cold market, most premarket activities have limited explanatory power on 
bust rate of IPOs during the “hot” periods. Therefore, those results further support that the 
quality of underwriting activities tend to become lower during the “hot” period and some 
“normal” periods. Such decrease in quality is mainly driven by the increase market share of low-
quality lead underwriters during the same time, as suggested by previous sections. Finally, the 
overall explanatory power of logistic regression based on concordant and psuedo R-square is 
larger during “cold” period than both “hot” and “normal” periods on average. Those results 




and “normal” period on average and further prove that increase participation of low-quality 
underwriters during the “hot” periods lower the average screening standard of investment bank 
industry and cause the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the “hot” periods.   
Moreover, aftermarket underwriter activities are significant determinants of IPO bust 
rates in hot markets and in normal markets but not in cold markets. The exercise of 
overallotment option has significant explanatory power on the likelihood of busted IPOs during 
hot periods. Since more busted IPOs tend to go to public during hot markets, these busted IPOs 
demand significantly less exercise of overallotment option due to their relatively poor 
aftermarket performance. Therefore, the significant variations in the exercise of overallotment 
contribute to the significant explanatory power of variable OAO, while this variation is relatively 
low during the “normal” or “cold” period. On the other hand, Price Support tend to gain 
significant explanatory power during the normal periods. These results are consistent with our 
predication that aftermarket activities tend to have more predictive power on the possibility of 
busted IPOs especially during the hot markets or relatively “hot” normal markets. 
Finally, table 11 also presents relationship between the likelihood of bust and the number 
of IPOs issued. IPO Volume has significant explanatory power on likelihood of busted IPOs only 
in “normal” periods. Since we construct the logistic regressions by different IPO cycles based on 
IPO Volume, it is not surprising to find that IPO Volume is not a significant predictor of long-run 
failure rate of IPOs in either “cold” or “hot” period. Overall, these results imply that IPOs issued 
during relatively high-volume periods are more likely to bust in the future and further support 
our documentation of “windows of misopportunity”.  




Previous sections show that IPOs underwritten by lower-quality or lower reputation 
underwriters tend to have high possibility of bust in the future. However, our results are derived 
from logistic regression with potential endogeneity biases. Booth and Smith (1986) indicates that 
issuer’s selection on underwriters will depend on the trade-off between the benefits from reduced 
underpricing and certification costs. They specifically mention that issuers with greater valuation 
uncertainty tend to choose high-ranked underwriters who perform better certification service but 
charge higher certification costs since these risky issuers will bear great losses from significant 
underpricing. On the other hand, less risky issuers will choose low-ranked underwriters since 
they can reduce the certification costs and their benefits from certification is limited. Following 
Booth and Smith (1986), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that riskier private firms might 
choose more prestigious investment banks, and this endogeneity bias causes the erroneous 
inference that more prestigious are associated with higher underpricing in the early 1990s. Since 
riskier private firms are more likely to become busted IPOs, the endogeneity bias within 
underwriter choice will imply that IPOs underwritten by high-quality underwriters will have 
higher possibility of bust subsequently. Since we can still find a negative relation between 
underwriter reputation and likelihood of busted IPOs without controlling of this endogeneity bias, 
we expect that the control of this endogeneity bias will not undermine but strengthen the 
negative relation between underwriter reputation and likelihood of busted IPOs.  
Following Benveniste et al (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004), we use four 
instrumental variables: Log Revenue, Log Asset, Nascent Industry Dummy, and VC Dummy. 
These variables represent firm-specific valuation uncertainty since riskier firms may have more 
to gain from high-quality certification service performed by high-quality investment banks. 




Manaster underwriter rank on these four instrumental variables. The explanatory power is very 
high, an adjusted R2 of 40.3%. Firms with greater revenue and assets before the issuance tend to 
choose more prestigious investment banks since these firms tend raise larger public capital and 
will lose more from low-quality certification service. In addition, firms in nascent industries are 
more likely to choose more prestigious underwriters. Finally, we find that VC-backed companies 
choose significantly higher quality underwriters on average, consistent to both Benveniste et al 
(2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004).  
In column (2) to (5) of table 12, we include the fitted value of Carter-Manaster 
underwriter rank Reputation2SLS, estimated from OLS regression in column (1), issuer-specific 
characteristics, premarket activities, aftermarket activities, and capital market conditions. The 
dependent variable for these four columns is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO issuer 
subsequently bust by December 31, 2017, and is equal to zero otherwise. The column (2) in table 
12 is the full sample logit regression and indicate, as predicted, even more significantly negative 
relation between underwriter quality measurement and the likelihood of busted IPOs. Column (3) 
to (5) in table 12 explore the same relation over different IPO cycles, “cold”, “hot”, and 
“normal” periods. These results further confirm that IPOs underwritten by low-quality 
underwriters are more likely to bust even after controlling the endogeneity bias of underwriter 
selection process. Finally, the explanatory power of premarket activities and aftermarket 
activities is consistent with previous finding (Table 10 and Table 11). Overall, the control of 
endogeneity bias within the issuer’s choice of underwriter will strengthen our conclusion that 
IPOs underwritten by lower-quality underwriters have higher possibility of bust subsequently. 




during the high-volume period will contribute to the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the 
same time.  
The other potential endogeneity bias stems from the possibility that high-quality 
underwriters may only deal with less risky firms for which the likelihood of bust in the long run 
is low. To address this concern, we include more issuer-specific characteristics in our logit 
regression in table 13 to control the firm-specific uncertainty and future economic viability. 
Since the data related to fundamental variables for private firms before the issue date is limited, 
the sample size of regression in table 13 will reduce to 5,321 observations. This sample size is 
still comparable to most of IPO literature, so we tend to assume this sample size reduction will 
not cause biased inference of the relation we document in this paper. Moreover, I tend to argue 
that underwriting activities themselves actually capture some unobserved characteristics of IPOs, 
thus contributing to the control of such endogeneity bias at some extents. 
In column (1) of table 13, we first control the endoegeneity bias stemming from the 
issuer’s underwriter selection by first stage OLS regression with the same instrumental variables 
in column (1) of table 12: Log Revenue, Log Asset, Nascent Industry Dummy, and VC Dummy. 
The coefficient estimated for each instrumental variable is comparable to the estimation results 
from previous table. From column (2) to (4), we include more fundamental variables: Liabilities / 
Assets, Working Capital / Assets, and EBIT Dummy, documented by Field and Lowry (2009) as 
important predictors of IPO outperformance after the offer date. Liabilities / Assets and Working 
Capital / Asset basically indicate the leverage and capital structure of the issuers prior the offer 
date. EBIT Dummy is also the proxy of firm’s profitability or firms’ valuation uncertainty since 




negative earnings will have greater uncertainty relate to future economic viability (Kim and 
Ritter, 1999; Benveniste et al, 2003; Fernando, Gatchev, and PSpindt, 2005). 
After further control of both endogeneity issues, the quality measurement of underwriters 
Reputation2SLS, as predicted, still has a negative and significant (p<0.001) relation with the 
likelihood that IPOs will subsequently bust. This relation is independent of issuer’s underwriter 
choice and issuer unobserved characteristics. Moreover, IPOs that have greater downward partial 
price adjustment, less exercise of overallotment options, and more price stabilization activities 
tend to have higher possibility of bust in the future. Those results are consistent with results 
shown previously (Table 10, Table 11, and Table 12) and are robust after control of equity 
issuance, macroeconomic, and stock market conditions. 
Overall, the IPOs underwritten by low-quality underwriters are more likely to bust in the 
future, and this relation is highly significant (p<0.001) after control of endogeneity biases 
stemming from both issuer’s underwriter choice and issuer-specific characteristics. Combined 
with previous finding that low-quality underwriters tend to gain market share during the high-
volume year, we conclude that increase market share of low-quality underwriters lower the 
average screening standard and average quality of certification service, allowing more 
speculative and premature private firms issue IPOs and causing the high failure rate of IPOs 
issued during the “hot” periods.  
6.4 Underwriting Activities Performed by Underwriters 
In previous section, we use Carter-Manaster underwriter rank updated by Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) to measure the quality differences among underwriters and found that IPOs 
underwritten by lower-quality underwriters are more likely to bust in the future. One of the 




standard and worse certification service than high-quality underwriters. In this section, we will 
investigate the validity of this assumption and explore the underwriting activities performed by 
both high-quality underwriters and low-quality underwriters. 
 We sort the lead underwriters of IPOs into two groups: An underwriter is classified as 
high-quality if it has a Carter-Manaster reputation measure greater than the overall sample 
median, and classified as low-quality otherwise, following the same criteria as in table 6. We 
explore the underwriting activities of both group of underwriters by separate logistic regressions 
within each group in table 14.   
Panel A of table 14 indicate that most of premarket activities performed by low-quality 
underwriters do not have strong predictive power on the likelihood of bust for IPOs. One 
exception is downward partial price adjustment, which is only marginally significant in one of 
five specifications. The other one is offer price range. Consistent with the univariate evidence 
shown in table 9, the coefficient for Dollar Range is negative, indicating that issuers with less 
valuation uncertainty are more likely to bust subsequently. The cause of this counterintuitive 
relation is that low-quality lead underwriters may not fully capture the inside information of IPO 
issuers and tend to have inaccurate evaluation of issuers’ operations and long-term performance. 
Therefore, low-quality lead underwriters are likely consistently underestimate the valuation 
uncertainty of risky and premature firms and keep overestimate valuation uncertainty of 
profitable firms with stable cash flow and mature products. On the other hand, panel A further 
shows that aftermarket activities, exercise of overallotment options and price stabilization 
activities, have significant predictive power on likelihood of bust for IPOs with low-quality lead 
underwriters. These results suggest that low-quality underwriters cannot perform sufficient 




quality underwriters tend to rely on aftermarket activities to support the aftermarket performance 
of their busted clients. 
In contrast, the underwriting activities of high-quality underwriters show a different 
pattern. Panel B of table 14 shows that partial price adjustment and issue size adjustment 
performed by high-quality underwriters have significant predictive power on long-run failure 
rate of IPOs, while only overallotment option exercise (OAO) is significant in explaining the 
likelihood of bust for IPOs. Those results support that high-quality underwriters perform 
efficient insider information discovery from IPO issuers during the underwriter process, such as 
downward partial price adjustment and upward adjustment of the shares issued. Therefore, high-
quality underwriters do not rely significantly on aftermarket activities to support the aftermarket 
performance of busted IPO issuers.  
Moreover, table 14 shows that the overall explanatory power of logistic regressions of 
IPOs with high-quality lead underwriters is much higher than those of IPOs with low-quality 
lead underwriters, in terms of the concordant and psuedo R-square. Most importantly, such high 
model explanatory power is mainly driven by premarket activities performed by high-quality 
lead underwriters, while the logistic model of low-quality lead underwriters tend to gain 
explanatory power from mistakes in premarket activities (offer price range) and excessive 
aftermarket activities (price stabilization activities). Those results further support that high-
quality underwriters can better evaluate the future economic viability and adjust the offer price 
and offer size of IPOs accordingly before the offer date, while low-quality underwriters perform 





Overall, we find validation of our assumption that low-quality underwriters perform 
worse screening and certification service than high-quality underwriters do. Those results further 
support that increase participation of low-quality underwriters during the high-volume year will 
reduce the average screening standard and quality of certification service within investment bank 
industry, allowing more premature and unprofitable private firms raise public equity and 
inducing the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the “hot” periods.  
6.5 Underwriter Fixed Effect 
In previous section, we use Carter-Manaster underwriter rank updated by Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) to measure the quality differences among underwriters and assume that this 
variable can fully distinguish the quality differences among investment banks. However, recent 
literature casts doubts on conventional quality measurement of investment banks. Hoberg (2007) 
documents that conventional quality measurement cannot explain the persistent underwriter-
specific components of IPO initial pricing. Bao and Edmans (2011) show that Carter-Manaster 
underwriter rank cannot fully capture the ability of investment banks in generating better M&A 
outcomes, measured by three-day cumulative abnormal return. If Carter-Manaster underwriter 
rank cannot fully capture the quality differences among underwriters in performing IPO 
certification services, our previous documented relation between quality differences among lead 
underwriters and long-run performance of IPOs could simply indicate components of 
underwriters’ effects on long-run performance of IPOs. The predictive power of underwriting 
activities could simply represent some persistent underwriting behaviors of investment banks 
(Hoberg, 2007).  
Bao and Edmans (2010) include the advisor fixed effects instead of quality measurement 




of M&A deals served by different investment banks. Their results suggest that underwriter fixed 
effects could be better measurements of underwriters quality. In this section, we follow Bao and 
Edmans (2010) in using underwriter fixed effect instead of Carter-Manaster underwriter rank to 
capture the quality differences among investment banks. Specifically, the underwriter fixed 
effects only include the investment banks that serve as lead underwriter for at least five IPOs 
over 1988-2015. Since the significant increase number of lead underwriters since 2000, the 
investment banks will be regarded as lead underwriters only if they serve as both lead 
underwriter and book-runner. Finally, we account significant merger and acquisition between 
two underwriters as another underwriter.22    
In table 15, we explore previous relation between underwriting activities and long-run 
bust rate of IPOs by multivariate logistic regressions with underwriter fixed effects. Consistent 
with previous finding, IPOs that receive more downward partial price adjustment tend to have 
higher possibility of delist due to operating inefficiency. Furthermore, Dollar Range still has a 
negative predictive power on the likelihood of busted IPOs. Finally, busted IPOs tend to receive 
less exercise of overallotment options and more price stabilization activities from lead 
underwriters. Overall, table 15 validates that the predictive power of underwriting activities on 
IPO long-run performance are independent of the persistent underwriting behaviors of any 
specific investment banks. 
An interesting pattern shown in table 15 is that underwriter fixed effects do capture more 
information content related to the operating efficiency of IPO issuers than the conventional 
underwriter quality measurement, consistent with Bao and Edmans (2011). For instance, the 
concordant and  Pseudo R-square in column (5) of table 15 is 0.755 and 0.156 respectively, 
 




which is greater than the concordant, 0.738 , and  Pseudo R-square, 0.134, shown in column (5) 
of table 10.  
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Busted, or failed IPOs provide an opportunity to study the impact of the quality of the 
certification and marketing services of underwriters on the new issues market.  We test whether 
periods of better certification quality and less information asymmetry correspond with lower bust 
rates.  We find that there are important differences in the quality of underwriter certification 
skills. We also show that lower quality investment banks gain market share during periods of 
high issue activity.  Since a large number of issuers receive, on average, lower quality of 
certifications due to the greater market share of low quality underwriters cause bust rates to be 
especially high following hot markets. Since previous research has characterized hot markets as a 
period of low asymmetric information, our results are inconsistent with the window of 
opportunity hypothesis. Instead, high volume periods appear to provide issuers a window of 
misopportunity for going public.   
Our results also extend our understanding of the certification hypothesis by documenting 
the cross-sectional and time-series properties of the certification skills of different investment 
banks.  High quality investment banks do a better, albeit not perfect, job of certification in the 
new issues market.   
In their study of the original issue high-yield bond market, Asquith, Mullins and Wolff 
(1989) attribute default misestimation problems to the fact that junk bonds were new to the 
capital markets, so investors had little historical experience with them.  One intriguing 
implication of our analysis is that these misestimation episodes may recur periodically in the 




of hot markets in different industry sectors (e.g., oil and gas in the early 1980s, biotechnology in 
the late 1980s, internet companies in the late 1990s, and housing bubble from 2004 to 2007) 
cooling off when investors ultimately recognize that too many poor quality firms have been 
underwritten.   If this is indeed the case, our results suggest investigation of the unresolved 
question of why underwriters and investors make the same error periodically. 
One caveat of our study is there are new methods of underwriting IPOs. Online 
investment banks suggest that they will provide broader distribution of new issues. Our results 
indicate that high-quality investment banks provide valuable screening and certification services.  
If online investment banks do not provide similar quality services, the IPOs they underwrite may 
have subsequently higher bust rates.  More generally, the introduction of new technology into an 
intermediary relationship may be problematic if improvements in the information production and 
distribution functions are offset by diminished certification capabilities.  
Finally, our suggestion that some firms may go public too early requires further 
investigation.  The literature focuses extensively on the costs and benefits of public versus 
private ownership, with little analysis of how these costs and benefits evolve over time.  The 
optimal timing for public market entry and the possibility and consequences of entry that is too 




CHAPTER II. WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY AND FIRM INNOVATION 
1. Introduction 
IPO is the most important process for private firms to start raising public equity and to 
become the public traded companies. IPOs provide firms significant amount of capitals to 
finance positive NPV projects, purchase more expensive long-term fixed assets, expand 
operational scope, and boost R&D investment. However, not all firms benefit from going public 
and not all firms issue IPO at the right time. Since IPO market has significant time-varying 
information asymmetry, the market-timing of IPOs might affect the post-IPO outcome. Bayless 
and Chaplinsky (1996) suggests that firms are more willing to issue equity during low 
information asymmetry period, so they could reduce the costs related to certification and 
information production and issue IPOs at more favorable terms. They thus support the existence 
of “windows of opportunity” for equity issuance. Theoretically, the “windows of opportunity” is 
more likely occur during the high-volume period since greater number of IPOs issuance can 
provide market with more information related to common valuation factor.  
Following this “windows of opportunity” hypothesis, IPOs issued during the high-
volume year or “hot” period are supposed to have better performance than those issued during 
other periods. However, most empirical studies provide evidences that contradict this hypothesis. 
Ritter (1991) documents that the IPOs issued during the high-volume year tend to underperform 
more than those issued during the low-volume period. In previous chapter, we show that the 
IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” are more likely to delist due to operating 
efficiency than IPOs issued during the “cold” period (Fama and French, 2004). Given the high 
failure rate of IPOs issued during the “hot” period, we tend to argue that the “windows of 




In this paper, I am going to come up with an alternative explanation of high failure rate of 
IPOs issued during the “hot” period to align the contradiction between “windows of opportunity” 
hypothesis and the related empirical results. Specifically, I explores whether investors are more 
willing to invest in more risky and more novel firms during the “windows of opportunity” and 
drive the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the same time. Innovation is a risky and 
experimental process that will include exploration of untested topic or approaches. The most 
innovative and superior findings will require greater risk taking since those experimental 
processes tend to be associated with greater uncertainty and greater failure rate. To motivate 
more impactful innovation, investors need to exhibit great tolerance to the failure of 
experimental process (MANSO 2011). Tian and Wang (2014) measures the extent of failure 
tolerance by whether the venture capital keep putting capital into underperformed private firms. 
They specifically document that firms backed by more failure-tolerant VCs tend to become more 
innovative after IPOs. Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2017) also developed a model to support that 
investment cycles might facilitate investors to support more experimental process and contribute 
to the commercialization of technologies. Normally, investors are more willing to take greater 
risks if they have excess capitals, and “windows of opportunity” in equity market tend to occur 
during the time when macroeconomic conditions are favorable, when the market over-optimism 
is high, when the capital market has great liquidity (Choe, Masulis and Nanda, 1993; Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995; Hanselaar et al., 2018). Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the favorable 
capital conditions during the “windows of opportunity” will encourage public investors to 
support IPOs with more uncertain technologies, more original technologies, and more novel 
products. Since investors tend to invest more IPOs associated with more experimental operations 




failure rate of IPOs. On the other hand, the IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity”, 
especially those obtain successful results from more challenging research process, should 
become more successful than those issued in other periods.  
In this study, I proxy the investors’ risk-taking behaviors during the period of “windows 
of opportunity” by the three-month moving average number of IPOs issued prior to the effective 
date of IPOs. I found that IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” are more likely to 
delist due to operating inefficiency on average. However, conditional on IPOs that are still public 
traded, IPOs issued in this period will file a greater number of patents and receive a greater 
number of citations. Moreover, I document the positive relationship between the logarithm of 
IPO volume and the quality of filed patents, in terms of Novelty, Originality, and Scope 
(Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe. 1997; Seru, 2014). Therefore, those IPOs issued during 
“windows of opportunity” period are more innovative not only in terms of quantity but also of 
the quality of innovations. The positive relationship between the logarithm of IPO volume and 
post-IPO innovation is still significant after I control the reputation of lead underwriters, the 
issuer-specific characteristics, the underwriting process, and the “nascent” industry fixed effects 
(Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu. 2003). Overall, “windows of opportunity” period 
facilitates investors to take greater risks and support more innovative firms, so the outcome of 
IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity’ is more likely to have a distribution with fatter 
tails than that of IPOs issued during other periods. In the other words, those IPOs will both 
become significantly more likely to fail and become extremely successful and innovative.   
   I next turn to the question whether different lead underwriters of IPOs will influence 
the extent of investors’ risk-taking behaviors during the “windows of opportunity”. Lead 




so they are supposed to affect the investors’ risk taking behaviors, especially during the time 
when investors have sufficient capitals to take additional risks. During the “windows of 
opportunity”, investors tend to change their risk-taking behaviors and become less risk-averse to 
innovative firms. Therefore, lead underwriters will become more supportive to those firms with 
greater innovative potential during this period. More importantly, lead underwriters are 
differentiated by their reputation and ability to investigate inside information related to private 
firms. Therefore, lead underwriters with different reputation and ability might have different 
effects on the outcome of investors’ risk taking behaviors during the “windows of opportunity”. 
On the one hand, highly-reputed lead underwriters are more likely to identify firms with greater 
innovative potential and greater possibility to succeed from the experimental process (Cater and 
Manaster, 1990; Cater, Dark, and Singh, 1998; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Hoberg, 2007). 
Therefore, those underwriters are more likely to direct public capital to extremely successful and 
innovative firms during the “windows of opportunity”. On the other hand, low-reputed or small 
investment banks have comparative competitive advantage over larger banks in supporting small 
innovative private firms because they evaluate private firms based on soft information and are 
more likely to reduce the information asymmetry of small firms (Berger and Black 2011). 
Moreover, it is documented that small firms might pay more attention to develop innovative 
products (Kraft, 1990; Cohen and Klepper, 1996, Klepper, 1996) and are more likely to create 
important innovations (Rosen, 1991; Akcigit, 2009; Akcigit and Kerr, 2018; Stoffman, Woeppel, 
and Yavuz, 2020). Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that low-reputed or small lead 
underwriters might take advantage of “windows of opportunity” and attract more capitals for 




In this study, I measure the quality of lead underwriters by Cater-Manaster underwriter 
rank, firstly introduced by Cater and Manaster (1990) and Cater, Dark, and Singh (1998) and 
updated in Loughran and Ritter (2004). This quality measurement is a scale measurement from 0 
to 9. The value of nine indicate the lead underwriters with the highest reputation and quality, 
while the rank of zero means the lowest quality of lead underwriters. Consistent with the first 
chapter, I found that IPOs underwritten by high-reputed lead underwriters are less likely to delist 
due to operating efficiency. Moreover, the reputation of lead underwriters are positively 
associated with the post-IPO innovative outputs and quality, conditional on IPOs that are still 
publicly traded. Those results indicate that high-reputed lead underwriters are more likely to 
identify extremely innovative and successful firms. Most importantly, I document that high-
reputed underwriters will amplify the positive relationship between the logarithm of IPO volume 
and post-IPO innovation outputs and quality, suggesting that high-quality investment banks 
could navigate investors’ risky investments during the “windows of opportunity” to IPOs that are 
more likely to be extremely successful and innovative. Those relationships are also robust to the 
control of the issuer-specific characteristics, the underwriting process, and the “nascent” industry 
fixed effects.  
One explanation of this result is that same high quality lead underwriters adjust their 
certification service during the “windows of opportunity” and become more supportive to 
innovative firms. Another but not mutual exclusive explanation is that some investment banks 
are more able to take advantage of more innovative IPOs during the “windows of opportunity”, 
while other investment banks might also perform more certification service for IPOs due to 
excess capitals from investors but are less able to distinguish potential successful innovators. The 




result in both extremely failed and successful IPOs issued during this “windows of 
opportunity”.23 To explore those two explanations, I include the underwriter fixed effects in the 
regression of the logarithm of IPO volume and the post-IPO innovation. I found that both 
explanations are valid, suggesting that our findings are not purely driven by the change of market 
share among the lead underwriters, but also by lead underwriters that adjust their underwriting 
activities across the IPO cycles. Furthermore, the findings that IPOs issued during the “windows 
of opportunity” are more likely to become extremely innovative and successful are mainly driven 
by the IPOs underwritten by high-reputed underwriters. Overall, high-quality lead underwriters 
are likely to adjust their underwriting strategy across IPO cycles. They also tend to make 
investors earn more from IPO investment because they are more likely to identify IPOs with 
extremely high innovative outputs and quality. 
Finally, I turn to the question whether the IPOs issued during the “windows of 
opportunity” are systematically different from IPOs issued around other periods. My previous 
finding could be driven by the unobserved characteristics of IPOs issued during the “windows of 
opportunity”. On the one hand, innovative firms might be more likely to file an IPO during the 
“windows of opportunity” to take advantage of favorable capital market conditions. On the other 
hand, firms might intentionally alter their business focus and participate in more experimental 
innovation process to attract public capitals during “windows of opportunity”. Those alternative 
explanations propose a classical endogeneity concerns of my previous findings and might 
undermine the robustness of my explanation that investors are more willing to take innovative 
 
23 In the first chapter, we document that low-quality underwriters tend to gain market share during the “windows of 
opportunity” or “hot” period. The main results in the first chapter also support that low-ranked underwriters are 
more likely to perform certification service for IPOs that eventually delist due to operating inefficiency. Overall, the 




risks during the “windows of opportunity”, thus driving the fatter tails of post-IPO outcome 
during this period. 
To address those alternative explanations, I apply the two-stage least square method with 
an instrumental variable. Specifically, I instrument the three-month moving average the number 
of IPOs issued by the corresponding three-month moving average the number of debt issuance. I 
select this specific instrumental variable based on the special features of debt. The majority 
weights of public investors’ portfolio are allocated between debt and equity, but those two 
securities have significantly different return mechanism and structure. The return of debt is 
mostly fixed and have very limited upside potential. Consequently, Debt investors tend to pay 
attention to the past performance and backward-looking financial metrics of the firms. Their 
main focus is whether the firms can generate sufficient cash flow to maintain regular interest 
payment. Moreover, the objective of most debt or bond investment is to reduce the volatility of 
the portfolio and generate regular cash flow. In the other words, public investors are unlikely to 
take excess risks by allocating more capitals to the debt instruments. On the other hand, the 
return pattern of equity has unlimited upside potential and no regular fixed cash flow. On 
average, public equity investors are more willing to take excessive risks and tend to evaluate 
investment opportunities based on forward-looking financial metrics of the firms. Therefore, 
they are more likely to increase capital supply to take advantage of “windows of opportunity”. 
Since public investors of debt and equity will respond to different investment opportunities, I 
could use the number of debt issuance to capture the increased IPO investment due to increase 
supply of capital into the market rather than due to the parts related to investment opportunities. 




does not provide upside potential to the debtholders and that capital that flows into the debt 
investment do not predict the innovative potential of the firms.  
My previous findings are mostly robust to the implementation of the instrumental 
variable and the second-stage least square approach. These findings suggest that, conditional on 
the IPOs still publicly traded, the greater supply of capitals due to risk-taking from investors 
during the “windows of opportunity” causes the greater innovation outputs of IPOs issued during 
the same period. The second-stage least square results are also robust to the control of the issuer-
specific characteristics, the underwriting process, and the “nascent” industry fixed effects. The 
inclusion of the instrumental variable also reveal some interesting pattern. The instrumented IPO 
volume still significantly and positively drive greater innovation output of IPOs issued during the 
same time but not significant relate to innovative quality of IPOs, measured by Novelty, 
Originality, and Scope. However, if I interact the instrumented IPO volume with the dummy 
equal to one if the lead underwriters have Cater-Manaster underwriter rank above or equal to the 
sample median rank, I found significant and positive relationship among this interactive variable 
and all innovative measurements. Those results suggest that greater risk taking of public 
investors can support more firms with greater innovative outputs but not innovation quality 
possibly because it is relatively challenging to identify IPOs with both significant innovative 
output and quality. More importantly, the high-reputed lead underwriters can efficiently assist 
public investors to allocate excess capitals toward even more successful firms with both high 
innovative output and high innovation quality. This result further emphasizes the importance of 
financial intermediaries in the process of asset allocation. 
This study is related to a large body of literature that documents the significant variations 




issued during the “hot” period (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, 1988, 
1994; Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu, 2003; Lowry, 2003; He, 2007; Helwege and 
Liang, 2004; Ivanov and Lewis, 2008; Liu and Ritter, 2011; Boeh and Dunbar 2014; Colak, 
Durnev, and Qian, 2017; Hanselaar, Stulz, and Dijk, 2018). Several literatures also propose 
potential explanation of the high failure rate of IPOs issued during “windows of opportunity”. 
Fama and French (2004) document a high delist rate for IPOs issued during the more recent high 
volume period. They tend to argue that the lower required cost of equity might drive more 
speculative private firms issuing IPOs. Those speculative IPOs significantly contribute to the 
high delist rate of IPOs issued during the high-volume period. Khanna, Noe, and Santi (2008) 
theoretically suggest that investment banks might have labor constrained when the number of 
IPOs issued is significantly high. Since the investigation and screening of IPOs requires very 
specialized skills, investment banks might not have sufficient excessive labors given 
unpredictable high IPO works. Therefore, the labor-constrained is likely to reduce the quality of 
certification service and lower the average screening standard of the investment bank industry, 
causing the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the “hot” period. In previous chapter, we 
document that low-quality underwriters tend to increase their market share during the high-
volume IPO year and they are more likely to be associated with IPOs that delist due to operating 
inefficiency. Moreover, the premarket underwriting activities from low-quality investment banks 
tend to include limited information that could forecast the future failure of the IPOs. Therefore, 
we agree with Khanna et al (2008) that the average screening standard is lower during the 
“windows of opportunity”, but our results suggest that the lower screening standard is caused by 
the increase participation of low-quality underwriters rather than the labor-constrained of 




issued during the high volume year or “hot” period is due to the fact that speculative and 
premature private firms tend to take advantage of “windows of opportunity” and fool the public 
investors to rush in the IPO market. Their empirical evidence is interpreted as the rejection of 
“windows of opportunity” hypothesis. In contrast to previous literature, this study tends to 
propose an alternative but not mutual exclusive explanation that is consistent with the high 
failure rate of IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” but also justify the “windows of 
opportunity” hypothesis. Specifically, the main results suggest that the high failure rate of IPOs 
is caused by greater risk taking from investors, so the IPOs issued during the “windows of 
opportunity” are more likely to become both extremely successful and extremely failure. This 
explanation also justify the “windows of opportunity” since less risk-averse investors tend to 
finance more innovative firms during this period and provide real opportunities to the most 
creative firms.  
My findings also complements the studies that consider the role of finance in the process 
of innovation (see Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Lerner, Sorensen, and 
Stromberg, 2011; Tian and Wang, 2014). Brown, Fazzari, and Peterson (2009) found that small 
innovators tend to rely more on equity financing to support their R&D since they have limited 
amount of internal cash flow. Manso (2011) propose that creative innovative outcome requires 
tolerance of early-stage failure since the most influential innovative might require repeat failure 
and experimentation at early stage. He thus argue that the contract with long-term compensation 
scheme can better motivate firm innovation. Acharya and Xu (2017) found that public equity 
market could support firms with external financial demands to generate better patent portfolio. 
Recent literature specifically pays attention to how financial market cycles affect the firm’s 




timing and the investors’ risk taking behaviors in experimentation. Consistent with Manso 
(2011), their theoretical model suggests that the most innovative firms tend to be significantly 
affected by financing risk, the risk that they might not have sufficient capitals to finance their 
subsequent projects, since they are more likely to experience early-stage failure. Therefore, they 
argue that investors during the “hot” periods tend to have capital surplus and could reduce the 
financing risks faced by those innovative firms. They conclude that “hot” period can boost the 
financing of the most innovative firms and generate greater innovative outcome. In this study, I 
document that the increase number of IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” is 
associated with greater innovative output and quality, conditional on IPOs that are still publicly 
traded, which is consistent with theoretical prediction from previous literature. Similarly, Nanda 
and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) document that VCs funded in the “hot” period tend to be generate 
greater value at IPOs or acquisition, generate more patents, and receive substantial citations. 
They show that those effects are significant after they control the private-firm specific 
characteristics, industry, IPO or acquisition year, and endogeneity concerns. In contrast to Nanda 
and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) that focus the relationship between investment cycles and startup 
outcome within the private capital market, my study explores this relationship in the public 
equity market, especially the IPO market. There are several differences between public equity 
market and private equity market, and those differences might have different implication on the 
innovative outcome of publicly traded firms. Firstly, the capitals provided by public equity 
market are much more abundant than those from private market. Since private firms can have 
access to the public equity market through IPOs, those firms that are real innovators should have 
even sufficient capitals to recruit researchers that are more talented and generate even higher-




capitals pay more attention to process development and operating efficiency, which might not 
contribute to the innovative property of the firms. Second, the competitive environment for 
public traded market might have mixed implications on innovations. On the other hand, publicly 
traded companies might face more severe competitive environment, so they could have greater 
motivation to invest in R&D and intends to acquire greater competitive advantages. On the other 
hand, they might have less tolerance to failure from experimentation process and tend to focus on 
low but positive NPV projects instead. Consequently, my study contribute to this line of research 
by extending the relationship between investment cycles and innovative outcome to the public 
equity market. 
The results are also relevant to a growing body of literature that explores how the 
financial intermediaries might affect the firms’ innovative outcome. Nanda and Nicholas (2014) 
show that bank distress will negatively affect the R&D investment and innovation quality of 
publicly traded firms due to greater financial constrained and additional pressures on asset 
allocation. However, they focus on banks that provide direct capitals to the innovative firms. In 
IPO market, the major financial intermediaries are investment banks who rarely provide capitals 
to the IPO issuers directly. Most of their responsibility is related to marketing and certification 
service. Therefore, most IPO literature tend to focus how lead underwriters or investment banks 
can reduce the information asymmetry associated with the IPO issuers (Cater and Manaster, 
1990; Cater, Dark, and Singh, 1998; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; 
Hoberg, 2008). Nevertheless, those studies pay limited attention to whether the lead underwriters 
could affect the long-term outcome of the IPOs. In contrast, this study explores whether different 
efforts and quality in marketing and certification service could significantly affect the innovative 




results suggest that even though lead underwriters do not provide capitals directly to IPO issuers, 
their efforts and quality of marketing and certification service will significantly affect the post-
IPO innovative outputs and quality. More importantly, the high-quality lead underwriters could 
adjust their marketing and underwriting strategies during the time when the market has excess 
supply of capitals to support firms with significant innovative potential. At the same time, the 
high-quality lead underwriters can assist public investors to benefit more from the periods when 
those investors have excess capital by efficiently direct their capitals to the most innovative firms. 
Overall, my study contribute to this line of research by specifically showing that lead 
underwriters could play a significant role in the long-run post-IPO innovative outcome.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will discuss about the 
sample, the proxy of capital supplies, the innovative measurement, and the control variables. 
Section 3 explores whether the excess supply of capitals from public investors will influence the 
innovative outcome of the IPOs during the same time and provides the main findings of this 
study. In Section 4, I investigate how the reputation or quality of lead underwriters will affect the 
effects of capital supplies in the IPO market on the post-IPO innovative outcome. Moreover, I 
will come up with several explanation that could interpret the findings within this section. 
Section 5 will eliminate the concerns that the IPOs are systematically different across IPO cycles 
and include the two-stage least square analysis to address the concerns of endogeneity. Section 6 
summarizes our main findings and concludes the paper.   
2. Sample and Empirical Measures 
The sample for this paper is consistent with that of previous chapter. I initially identified 
a list of 12,651 common equity offerings classified as IPOs by the Securities Data Corporation 




data availability for issuers that we obtain from several different sources. The sample selection 
procedure eliminates IPOs (1) by closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts, financial 
institutions, unit offerings, limited partnerships, and penny offerings; (2) without sufficient stock 
return information available on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Nasdaq or 
American Stock Exchange (Amex) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) daily tapes; and (3) 
for which we can only find missing value of fiscal year end revenue one year before the issue 
date. I then merge my IPO dataset with the patent database of Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and 
Stoffman (see Kogan et al 2017). Since the database only updates the patent and citation patent 
data to 2010, so I exclude the IPOs that issued after the end of 2008 to avoid potential truncation 
problem.   
In this study, I am trying to explore the tail pattern of post-IPO outcome across IPO 
cycles. I tend to argue that IPOs that issued during “windows of opportunity” are more likely to 
become both extremely successful and extremely failure. If my argument is correct, I should 
observe that IPOs issued during “windows of opportunity” should be more successful than IPOs 
issued during other periods, conditional on IPOs that are still publicly traded. To implement my 
empirical tests, I examine the CRSP daily tapes for evidence of a delisting event. Based upon the 
CRSP delisting code as of December 31, 2017, each new issue is sorted into one of three 
mutually exclusive groups: busted, acquired, or active IPOs. I classify an issue as “busted” if the 
firm has a delist code between 500 and 585.  In our sample, issues in the bust category are 
delisted for reasons related to operating inefficiency.  I classify an issuer as an acquired IPO if 
the firm has a delist code between 200 and 301.  These are issues that are delisted for reasons 
related to a change in control or listing. Finally, I classify an issuer as an active IPO if the firm 




December 31, 2017. This study will focus on the “active” group of IPOs. The final sample of 
“active” IPOs issued from 1988 to 2008 include 968 IPOs.  
The main independent variable in this study is the IPO Volume, which is used to proxy 
the supply of capitals into IPO market across IPO cycles. I use the logarithm of three-month 
moving average IPO volume for each month to capture prior IPO market conditions and adjust 
for potential seasonality. Specifically, to calculate the IPO volume for month t, I will use the 
logarithm of the average number of IPO issues among month t-3, t-2, and t-1. The other 
important variable included in the regression analysis is the Cater-Manaster Underwriter Rank, a 
0 to 9 scale measurement. The higher the number of Cater-Manaster Underwriter Rank, the 
higher the quality of investment banks is. Investment banks can provide certification service and 
marketing efforts to IPOs, but they differ significantly in terms of those underwriting activities. I 
believe that the ability of lead underwriters play a significant role in the long-run success of IPOs 
since high-reputed lead underwriters are more likely to screen out the worst firms and identify 
firms with the greatest innovative potentials. Therefore, I include the Cater-Manaster 
Underwriter Rank in the regression analysis to further investigate how quality differences among 
lead underwriters could affect the long-run innovative outcome of IPOs, especially those issued 
during the “windows of opportunity”. The specification of other variables in this study will be 
introduced below. 
Section 2.1 will discuss the definition of innovative outputs and quality. Section 2.2 then 
will introduce the control variables within this study.  
2.1 Measurement of Innovative Outputs and Quality 
In this study, I tend to measure the success or innovation of IPOs by the quantity and 




significantly, even though not perfectly, related to the economic success or innovation of a 
company, while citation of patents could imply the quality of each patents (Trajtenberg, 
Henderson, and Jaffe, 1997; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001, 2005). Similarly, Nanda and 
Rhodes-Kropf (2013) apply patent information to indicate the innovation outcome of firms, serve 
as alternative long-run financial performance of startups. Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and 
Stoffman (2017) suggest that the important of innovation could significantly affect the valuation 
of publicly traded firms. Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2020) include patent related information 
to measure the output of R&D and indicate the extent of corporate innovation. Overall, patent 
and citation information could be a reliable proxy of corporate success and innovation. 
I obtain patent and citation data from patent database of Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and 
Stoffman (see Kogan et al 2017). This database covers U.S. patent granted, patent citations, 
patent class, and citation class up to 2010. Patents are included in the database only if they are 
eventually granted. Previous literature tend to document that the gap between filing date and 
grant date is on average two years. Therefore, my IPO sample is restricted to issues before the 
end of 2008 to reduce potential truncation concerns associated with the dataset. 
Following the innovative literature, I calculate two measurements of innovative outputs. 
One measurement is the firm-level average number of filed patent per year (Pat), following Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, (2001, 2005) and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013). However, this 
measurement is a relatively simple and preliminary measurement of the innovative activities 
since the number of filed patents might vary significantly across technology class. Moreover, the 
simple count of patents may not capture the variations among those patents. Therefore, following 
Hall et al (2001, 2005), Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013), and Dong et al (2020), I also create 




the aggregate importance of patents filed for each firm over time. As mentioned in Hall et al 
2001, the patent database has significant truncation problems since the patent filed in the later 
period might not have sufficient time to accumulate citations. To address this concern, I follow 
Hall et al 2001, Seru 2014, and Dong et al 2020 to divide the number of citations by the average 
number of citations within the same technology class and filed within the same year. Finally, I 
transform those measurement, Pat and Cites, to log values to limit extreme influential effects and 
to become consistent with the proxy of capital supplies in the public equity market, the logarithm 
of three-month moving average number IPOs issued.  
In addition to the innovative output measurements, I follow Dong et al (2020) and 
construct three innovative quality measurement to identify the extreme innovative IPOs. The first 
measurement is the conventional firm-level number of citations per patent average over each 
year, following Seru (2014). I call this measurement Novelty since novel patents tend to receive 
greater number of citations, following Dong et al (2020). The higher magnitude of this 
measurement suggest higher level of innovative quality from post-IPO experimental activities. 
Similarly, this measurement is adjusted for the technology class and year effects, suggested 
above.  
The second innovative quality measurement is Originality, defined as the one minus the 
Herfindahl concentration index for the fraction of citations made by the patent to patents in other 
technological classes, following Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997) and Dong et al (2020). 
For example, if one finance patent cites one patent from computer science, two patents from 
biology, one patent from statistics, and one pharmacy patent, then the originality of this finance 
patent is 0.72 (1-((1/5)2+ (1/5)2+(2/5)2+(1/5)2)). The high magnitude of this measurement 




Therefore, this kind of patents are more likely to come up with creative findings and new useful 
approaches (see Schumpeter 1934; Basalla 1988; Romer 1990; Weitzman 1998; Singh and 
Fleming 2010). 
The last variable of innovative quality is Scope, following Trajtenberg, Henderson, and 
Jaffe (1997) and Dong et al (2020). The variable Scope is calculated as one minus the Herfindahl 
index across technological classes of future citations of the patent. For instance, if a finance 
patent is cited by two accounting patents, one statistics patent, three chemistry patents, and one 
computer science patents, then the Scope of this finance patent is 0.45 (1-((2/7)2+ 
(1/7)2+(3/7)2+(1/7)2)). This variable reflects the extent of influences from the patent. Normally, 
the patent that could affect a wide range of research in different field should have higher quality. 
Overall, each of these three innovative quality variable is measured at firm-level average per 
year and serve as finer criteria to identify the extremely innovative IPOs in my “active” IPO 
sample.        
2.2 Control Variables 
In this study, I will explore the relationship between excess capitals supplied by investors 
and the post-IPO innovative outcome. Therefore, it is important to distinguish this relationship 
from other factors that might also affect the corporate innovation. 
Firstly, the issuer-specific fundamentals might significantly affect the innovative out 
come of IPOs. Firms with greater amount of revenue prior to IPO might have sufficient cash 
flow to make R&D investment, so they are more likely to create more valuable patents after the 
their IPO. Moreover, the effects of the amount of assets on firms’ innovation might be two-fold. 
On the one hand, firms with large assets prior to IPO might spend too many cash flows on long-




private firms could capitalize the R&D investment and have relatively larger amount of assets. 
Those firms with larger capitalized R&D assets are more likely to develop creative findings and 
become extremely innovative. Overall, those fundamental variables should be included in the 
regression analysis to reduce the concerns that the post-IPO innovative outcome is mostly driven 
by those fundamental characteristics. 
Furthermore, issuers might systematically differ from each other across IPO cycles and 
some characteristics may not be accurately captured by either fundamentals and some qualitative 
measurements. In the other words, some issuer-specific characteristics might not be observable. 
Moreover, lead underwriters might perform different underwriting activities for different issuers, 
and those underwriting activities might also significantly affect the long-run post-IPO innovation. 
Therefore, I include several underwriting process variables to reduce those concerns. On the one 
hand, those underwriting activities should partially reflect some unobservable characteristics of 
private firms since the lead underwriters need to investigate the private information associated 
with the firms and provide public investors reliable, accurate, and relevant information to 
evaluate the IPO. On the other hand, those underwriting variables could cover most of the 
underwriting process and could accurately proxy the underwriting activities. Firstly, I include 
two variables to capture the partial price adjustment from lead underwritings during the IPO 
process. Normally, the investment banks will negotiate with the private firms about the offer 
price when the banks draft the preliminary prospectus. During the IPO process, the lead 
underwriters will adjust the initial offer price according to the investigation of the firms and the 
feedbacks from institutional investors. The partial price adjustment should reflect some inside 
information related to the private firms. Following Lowry and Schwert (2002), I compute ∆P as 




offer price, where the expected offer price is calculated as sum of the highest and lowest 
anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus, divided by two. 
Then I divide this variable into two components, ∆P+ and ∆P-, the positive and negative price 
adjustment, max(∆P, 0) and min(∆P,0) respectively. As mentioned in Lowry and Schwert (2002), 
those two components might have different implications on the IPOs.  
The second underwriting variable is the Issue Size Percentage, or the natural log of one 
plus the percentage change in the number of shares offered, calculated as the actual number of 
shares offered (excluding the exercise of the overallotment option) minus the number of shares 
quoted in the preliminary prospectus divided by the number of shares quoted in the preliminary 
prospectus. The third underwriting variable is called Offer Price Range. This variable reflects the 
dollar width of offer range and indicate the potential uncertainty associated with the private firms. 
The variable is calculated as the difference between the highest and lowest anticipated values of 
the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus divided by the expected offer price. 
Finally, it is important to note that the industry will also have significant effects on the 
innovative outcome of firms. Firms in novel industry, such as automatic intelligence and 
pharmaceutical, are definitely more innovative than firms in mature industry, such as utility. To 
address the industry-specific effects, I include broader industry-fixed effects in the regression 
analysis. Specifically, I follow Benveniste et al (2003) and define “nascent industries” as IPOs 
with three-digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737, covering 
pharmaceuticals, computing, electronics, medical and measurement equipment, and software 
industries. Then, I create industry dummy variables for each “nascent industry” and include them 




industry” covers most of the novel industry, my regression analysis results should be robust to 
the industry-specific effects. 
Table A1 provide the descriptive statistics for variables included in the regression 
analysis. In table A1, I provide the mean of each variable for the full sample and also the mean 
of each variable across cold and hot period. Consistent with previous chapter, hot and cold 
market conditions are defined using aggregate monthly IPO issue volume. Each month during 
the sample period is ranked according to the level of 3 month moving average of IPO issue 
volume.  The months in the top quartile of issue volume are characterized as hot. The months in 
the lowest quartile of issue volume are characterized as cold. Consistent with our definition of 
“hot” and “cold” period, the average IPO volume tend to be higher during the “hot” period than 
“cold” period. 
It is important to note that the IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” tend to 
have lower revenue, assets, and lead underwriters with lower reputation on average than those 
issued during “cold” period. More importantly, the IPOs issued during the “windows of 
opportunity” tend to have higher possibility to delist due to operating inefficiency and low 
possibility to stay in the public market. Those results suggest that the IPOs issued during the 
“windows of opportunity” are actually systematically worse than other periods on average. 
However, if I focus on IPO issuers that are still publicly traded, the pattern changes 
dramatically. Even though those active IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” still 
have lower revenue than those issued across other periods, those active IPOs issued during “hot” 
or high-volume period tend to create more patents and receive more citations per year. Moreover, 
their patents tend to receive more citations on average. Those results suggest that IPOs issued 




innovation quantity and innovative quality, conditional on issuers that maintain their position in 
the public equity market. Therefore, the results in table A1 has two important implications. On 
the one hand, IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” are more likely to fail in the 
long-run. On the other hand, the IPO issuers that issue equity within the same period and 
maintain publicly traded will become more innovative and successful. Those results are 
consistent with my prediction that if the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the “windows of 
opportunity” is caused by greater risk-taking of investors, the IPOs issued during this period will 
become both extremely failure and extremely successful. Overall, the descriptive results from 
table A1 provides the most preliminary evidence to support my argument about “windows of 
opportunity”.  
3. Main Results 
In this study, I am trying to build a relationship between IPO cycles and post-IPO 
outcome. Specifically, I argue that public investors with excess capitals during “hot” period are 
more likely to finance firms that commit to innovative activities, which are associated with 
greater uncertainty but could generate significant success and competitive advantages. Therefore, 
I expect that the IPOs issued within the same period are likely to become both extremely failure 
and extremely successful.  
I proxy the excess supply of capitals and the period of “windows of opportunity” by the 
three month moving average number of IPOs issued per month. In table A2, I construct the 
regression of failure rate of IPOs on the log of IPO volume. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that equals to one if the IPO delist due to operating inefficiency, otherwise equal to zero. 
The regression result in column (1) of table A2 show that the IPOs are more likely to delist due 




alternative factors might drive the post-IPO outcome, such as the quality of lead underwriters, 
the fundamentals of private firms prior to the IPO date, the underwriting activities, and the 
industry. Therefore, I control those alternative factors gradually in for column (2) to (4) in table 
A2. The results from those columns suggest that the positive relationship between IPO volume 
and failure rate of IPOs is robust after the control of those factors. In addition, the issuers with 
higher quality lead underwriter are less likely to delist due to operating inefficiency after the 
IPOs. Finally, the results show the private firms that have higher revenue and assets prior to IPOs 
are also less likely to delist due to operating inefficiency after their IPOs. Those results suggest 
firms’ operating performance is likely to persist even after they receive a huge amount of 
funding.  
3.1 Innovative Measurement 
The results in table A1 suggest that private firms that issue IPOs during the “windows of 
opportunity” are more likely to fail. This is consistent with the first part of my argument that 
public investors tend to become less risk-averse and are willing to invest in firms with greater 
innovative uncertainty during “windows of opportunity”, so the IPOs issued during the same 
period are more likely to fail on average. The second part of my argument is that the risk-taking 
behaviors from investors during “hot” period should not only increase the failure rate of IPOs but 
also significantly increase the extent of success of IPOs within the same period. In the other 
words, the post-IPO outcome should have a fatter  tails for IPOs issued during the “hot” period, 
so they are both more likely to succeed and failed.  
To explore this second part of my argument, I construct the regression of post-IPO 
innovation measurement on IPO volume, the proxy of excess supply of capitals and period of 




traded since I would like to focus on the IPOs at the right tail of the distribution. The table A3 
show the results for the regression of post-IPO innovative outputs on IPO volume. I measure the 
innovative output by both average level of patent filed per year and average citations received 
per year. Column (1) and column (4) in table A3 show that the log of IPO volume has positive 
and significant coefficient for both innovative output measurements. Those results suggest that 
IPOs that issued during the high volume year and are still publicly traded could create more 
patent and receive more citations per year than those active IPOs issued during the other periods. 
As shown in column (2), (3), (5), (6), this positive and significant relationship between IPO 
volume and innovative output measurements are robust to the control of the quality of lead 
underwriters, the fundamentals of private firms prior to the IPO date, the underwriting activities, 
and the industry. Overall, those results suggest that, conditional on successful IPOs, those issued 
during the “windows of opportunity” could be more innovative than those issued during other 
periods. Therefore, those results further support that right-hand side distribution of long-term 
performance for IPOs issued during the “hot” periods tend be fatter than that for other IPOs.  
The innovative literature normally concerns that the simple count of patent and citations 
might not accurately reflect the innovation created by the firms. Following Hall et al 2001 and 
Seru 2014. I include Novelty, Originality, and Scope as additional innovation measurement. As 
suggested by Hall et al 2001 and Seru 2014, those measurements can better capture the quality of 
innovation generated by firms. Similar to table A3, I construct regression of those three 
innovation quality measurement on the log of IPO volume for IPOs that are still publicly traded, 
since I tend to focus on successful IPOs or the right-hand side outcome distribution for IPOs. 
Table A4 present the outputs of those regressions and show that the IPO volume also positively 




that IPOs issued during the high-volume period are more likely to create higher quality 
innovation. More importantly, this significant positive relationship is also robust to the control 
variables and industry fixed effects defined above. 
Overall, those results indicate that IPOs issued during “windows of opportunity” are 
more likely to fail on average. However, conditional on successful or “active” IPOs, the private 
firms that issue IPOS during the high-volume period are more likely to become extremely 
innovative, in terms of both innovative quantity and innovation quality. On the one hand, those 
results support that public investors during “windows of opportunity” are less risk averse and are 
more likely to finance innovative firms, thus causing high failure rate of IPOs issued within the 
same period, since influential innovation requires experiments and has great uncertainty.  On the 
other hand, those results confirm that risk-taking behaviors from public investors actually make 
“active” IPOs issued during “windows of opportunity” become even more successful than this 
group of IPOs that issued across other IPO cycles. Therefore, it implies that “windows of 
opportunity” dose provide real opportunities to private firms with great innovative potential and 
contribute to the innovative activities in the economic world. 
3.2 Financial Measurement 
Thus far, I have shown that even though IPOs issued during the hot periods are more 
likely to fail on average, they are also more likely to file more patent, receive more citations, and 
achieve better patent quality, conditional on relatively successful outcome. Those observations 
are restricted to the innovative outcome of IPOs issued during the hot periods. Innovation could 
benefit directly to firms since they could improve operating efficiency, gain market shares, and 
acquire competitive advantages through innovative process. However, investors could not 




stock price, so it is reasonable to come up with an alternative outcome variable directly at the 
concerns of investors.  
In this subsection, I am going to explore how active IPOs issued during the hot periods 
will compensate investors’ tolerance of failure. The financial measurement I used is the five-year 
market capitalization of IPO shares after the issue date. Conventionally, the objective of 
corporations is to maximize the wealth of shareholders as long as the management share the 
same incentives with the shareholders. Investors could benefit from higher valuation in the long-
term since the majority of their return from IPO investment comes from the capital gains in the 
stock. Moreover, investors will have greater tolerance of failure and make investment into risky 
and experimental IPOs only if they expect that they could earn significant amount of returns 
from those IPOs that will eventually succeed through the experimental process and achieve 
extreme success. Therefore, long-term market capitalization of IPO shares will be directly related 
to the interest of investors and could specifically quantify the rewards that investors could earn 
from their patience, tolerance of failure, or even the willingness to fail.  
 To analyze the financial returns that investors could earn from their risk-taking or 
tolerance of failure during the “windows of opportunity” or hot IPO market periods, I use five-
year market capitalization of IPOs after the issue date as the dependent variable and perform 
similar regression as in table A3 and A4. This long-term market capitalization measurement is 
adjusted by the size of IPOs on the issue date since greater initial size of the offering will 
definitely inflate the long-term market capitalization. Moreover, I also adjust this financial 
measurement by the purchasing power of money since IPOs issued on different date will go 
through different economic periods and might have experienced different magnitude of inflation 




three-month moving average IPO volume has positive and significant coefficient after I control 
the issuer-specific characteristics, underwriting activities, and industry effects. These positive 
and significant coefficients indicate that, conditional on successful experimental outcome, IPOs 
issued during hot periods are more likely to achieve greater market capitalization after the 
adjustment of initial issuance size and inflation. This result further support that investors could 
experience more wealth growth from their patience and greater tolerance of failure in the hot 
periods. Overall, previous results imply that investors’ patience and greater tolerance of failure 
could benefit both themselves and their invested IPOs, and “windows of opportunity” actually 
provide real opportunities to both innovative IPOs and risk-taking investors.  
It is also important to note the role of lead underwriters in this analysis. Table A2 suggest 
that the quality of lead underwriters significantly affect whether the IPOs will delist due to 
operating inefficiency eventually. Table A3 and A4 support that those “active” IPOs with higher 
reputed lead underwriters could file more patents, receive more citations, and create high-quality 
patents. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the lead underwriters will play a significant 
role in post-IPO process. It is also interesting to explore how the quality of lead underwriters 
might affect the public investors’ risk-taking behaviors during the “windows of opportunity”. In 
section 4, I am going to specifically explore this question.   
4. Role of Lead Underwriters 
From previous section, I found that IPOs issued during the “hot” period were more likely 
to be in the tails of the distribution of innovation outcome than those issued during the “cold” 
period. Those results are consistent with my expectation that novel firms are more likely to be 




play an important role within this pattern. Therefore, I will specifically explore how lead 
underwriters affect the IPOs issuance and post-IPO innovation outcome across IPO cycles. 
Lead underwriters could be the most important financial intermediary during the IPO 
process. For an issuer, the first step in the IPO process is to select one or several investment 
banks as the lead underwriters, normally based on their reputation, expertise, and research 
quality in certain industry. Lead underwriters will work with the IPO issuers through the 
registration, marketing, “road show” presentation, and IPO pricing (Cater and Manaster, 1990; 
Hanley, 1993; Cater, Dark, and Singh, 1998; Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara, 2000; Habib and 
Ljungqvist, 2001; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Chiang, Lowry, and Qian, 2018). Even after the 
private firms go to public, the lead underwriters will keep monitoring the performance of the 
IPOs and perform certain after market activities, such as price stabilization activities and the 
exercise of overallotment option. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the lead underwriter 
could significantly influence how private firms issue IPOs across IPO cycles and during the 
“windows of opportunity”. 
To explore this pattern, I construct a dummy variable equal to one if the lead underwriters 
of IPOs has Cater-Manaster Underwriter Rank above sample median, and zero otherwise. I 
include an interactive variable between this dummy and the logarithm of IPO volume to explore 
how the quality difference among lead underwriters might affect the innovation outcome of IPOs 
issued during the “windows of opportunity”. Table A6 presents the regression results and show 
that the interactive variable has significant and positive influences on the post-IPO innovative 
outcome in terms of both innovation outputs and innovation quality. This positive and significant 
coefficient indicate that the “active” IPOs that issued during the “windows of opportunity” and 




those only issued during the “windows of opportunity”. In the other words, the high-reputed lead 
underwriters could reinforce the positive association between post-IPO innovative outcome and 
excessive capital supplies during the “windows of opportunity”.  
Table A6 suggests that high-reputed lead underwriters could assist investors identifying 
the extremely innovative IPOs during the hot periods and maximize the rewards of investors 
from their patience and tolerance of failure during the “windows of opportunity”. It is also 
interesting to investigate whether lead underwriters will adjust their underwriting activities 
during the hot periods. Conventionally, high-quality lead underwriters prefer profitable firms 
with stable cash flow and mature products. They are less likely to cooperate with risky firms 
because the failure of IPOs could significantly harm their reputation. However, investors will 
have greater tolerance of failure during the hot periods and prefer more risky but innovative 
investment. If lead underwriters do notice investors’ greater tolerance of failure during hot 
periods, they are likely to cater to investors’ behaviors and assist more experimental private 
firms through the IPO process.  
To explore this question, I perform regression of innovative outputs and innovative 
quality on interactive variable between IPO volume and dummy of high-quality lead 
underwriters, and Cater-Manaster Underwriter Rank. Table A7 shows the regression results for 
IPO innovative outputs. The positive and significant coefficient of the interactive variable 
suggests that high-quality lead underwriters do perform more underwriting service for more 
innovative IPOs, in terms of innovative outputs and conditional on active IPOs. Moreover, this 
positive coefficient is still significant after the control of IPO volume, issuer-specific 
characteristics, other underwriting activities, and industry effects. Similarly, table A8 shows the 




positive coefficient for two out of three innovative quality measurement when the IPO volume is 
not included. Those results support that   high-reputed lead underwriters adjust their underwriting 
activities according to investors’ sentiment. During the hot periods, those high-quality lead 
underwriters will use their expertise in stock selection to identify high-quality innovators and 
direct excess capitals during the “windows of opportunity” to those IPOs that are more likely to 
achieve extremely success and superior innovations. This explanation even suggest that high-
quality lead underwriters actually contribute to the capital allocation efficiency in IPO market.  
However, table A8 also presents that the interactive variable between IPO volume and 
dummy of high-quality lead underwriters becomes insignificant as I include both IPO volume 
and lead underwriter Cater-Manaster underwriter ranks. Instead, the coefficient of logarithm of 
three-month moving IPO volume remains positive and significant in two out of three innovative 
quality measurements. Those results might indicate that high-quality lead underwriters may not 
be able to help investors identify the IPOs with greater potential innovative quality during the hot 
periods. However, this is not a reasonable explanation since table A4 does show that Cater-
Manaster underwriter rank has positive and significant coefficient for three different innovative 
quality measurement. One alternative possibility is that there is significant correlation between 
IPO volume and Cater-Manaster underwriter rank, so the significant multicollinearity make both 
interactive variable and lead underwriter quality measurement insignificant. This possibility 
raises an alternative explanation of previous documented positive coefficient of the interactive 
variable. It is possible that some high-quality lead underwriters only come into the IPO market 
during the “windows of opportunity” and take advantage of more innovative firms during the 
same period. In this case, high-quality lead underwriters might only acquire better market-timing 




explanation is not likely to be valid because the previous chapter documents that only low-
ranked lead underwriters increase their market share during the “windows of opportunity”, it is 
still worth exploring this alternative explanation at more micro level.  
To explore the role of lead underwriter within the pattern further, I run the same 
regression as in table A3 and A4 but at the lead underwriter-firm level. In this case, I have 
multiple observations for “active” IPOs that have several lead underwriters within my sample. 
Under this specification, I could include the lead underwriter fixed effects in the panel, so I could 
specifically explore whether the lead underwriters adjust their underwriting activities across IPO 
cycles.  
Table A9 presents the regression of innovation outputs on the proxy of “windows of 
opportunity” at lead underwriter level with lead underwriter fixed effects. The column (1) and 
column (3) in table A9 is comparable to the column (3) and column(6) of table A3 except that 
the regression in table A9 is performed at lead underwriter level and include the lead underwriter 
fixed effects. Table A9 shows that the log of IPO volume is still positive and significant in the 
regression of innovation output after I include the lead underwriter fixed effects. These 
significant and positive coefficients suggest that the lead underwriters do adjust their 
underwriting activities during the “hot” period to raise funding for firms that could generate a 
greater number of patents and citations after their IPOs. On the other hand, the coefficients of 
excess capital supply proxy in table A3 for column (3) and (6) are 0.12 and 0.162 respectively, 
and the coefficients for the same variable in table A9 are 0.12 and 0.132 respectively. Those 
coefficients are not significantly different and could not support that same lead underwriters only 
become active during “windows of opportunity” to perform underwriting service for more 




the underwriting adjustment from lead underwriters across IPO cycles and support that high-
quality lead underwriters are more able to identify private firms that have significant innovative 
potential. 
I then further explore whether quality differences among lead underwriters might have 
different influences on the pattern I observed above. I perform the same lead underwriter level 
regression but divide the sample into two groups given the Cater-Manaster Underwriter Rank of 
lead underwriters. The column (2) and (5) in table A9 show the regression results for the group 
of lead underwriter that have CM Underwriter Ranks above sample median over my sample 
period. Column (3) and (6) in table A9 show the similar regression but only for the low CM 
Underwriter Ranks lead underwriters. The difference is significant between those two groups of 
lead underwriters. The coefficient for log of IPO volume is consistently significant for the group 
of high quality lead underwriters but not significant for the other low-quality group. Moreover, 
table A10 shows similar regression except the dependent variable is innovative quality rather 
than pure innovation outputs. Similarly, table A10 indicates that the log of IPO volume is only 
significant within the group of high-quality lead underwriters. Moreover, table A10 alleviate the 
concerns that high-quality lead underwriters could not identify those IPOs with potential to 
achieve high-quality innovative outcome, as suggested by table A8. Those results confirm that 
the pattern observed from both table A3 and table A4 is mainly driven by IPOs with high-quality 
underwriters, while low-quality underwriters do not contribute to more extreme innovative 
outcome of IPOs that issued during the “windows of opportunity”. 
These findings are important as they support that lead underwriters change their 
underwriting behaviors across IPO cycles to support IPOs that have greater innovative potential. 




period are mostly supported by high-quality lead underwriters. It is surprising since high-quality 
lead underwriters are normally associated with more mature and profitable firms, while low-
quality lead underwriters are more likely to work with relatively young and speculative firms. 
Previous documented results reverse the conventional wisdom and present that high-quality lead 
underwriters are more able to identify novel private firms and benefit investors by bringing their 
capitals to those firms that are more likely to generate high quantity and quality innovations. On 
the other hand, the low-quality underwriters could not perform such screening and certification 
service, so investors who follow the capital allocation suggestion from low-quality underwriters 
will capture those innovative IPOs during the hot periods. Overall, high-quality lead underwriters 
adjust their underwriting activities during the “windows of opportunity” and contribute to more 
efficient capital allocation when investors have excess capital supplies and thus greater tolerance 
of failure. 
5. Alternative Definition of Success IPOs 
 Previous results show that even though IPOs issued during the hot periods are more likely 
to fail on average, they are also more likely to achieve extreme innovation and financial success, 
conditional on active IPOs. Those results are based upon the assumption that IPOs still publicly 
traded will be the relatively successful group of IPOs. However, some IPOs that delist due to 
acquisition might choose to delist because of strategic considerations and are not necessarily bad 
IPOs. Even in the group of busted IPOs, some of them could survive more than 5 years on the 
public equity market and might delist or bankrupt due to systematic risks, such as the 2008-09 
financial crisis. Therefore, it is reasonable to explore the robustness of previous results by 
alternative and broader definition of success IPOs, which in this section is the post-IPO five-year 




an IPO with positive five-year cumulative return should be considered as a relatively successful 
IPO. Moreover, those IPOs will also be more likely to succeed through the tough experimental 
process and achieve extreme success. For the sample of IPOs with positive long-term cumulative 
return, I perform regressions similar to previous tables.  
 Table A11 presents the results. As predicted, the column (1) of table A11 shows that the 
logarithm of three-month moving average IPO volume remains positive and significant on long-
term market capitalization of IPOs in this alternative success sample. Those results confirm the 
previous documented patterns in table A3, table A4, and table A5. Moreover, the column (2) 
indicates that the interactive variable between dummy of high-quality lead underwriters and IPO 
volume is still positive and significant in this alternative successful IPO sample, which support 
that high-quality lead underwriters do identify the potential extremely successful IPOs during the 
hot periods and during the time when investors have greater tolerance of failure.  
However, similar to table A8, the interactive variable becomes insignificant in column (3) 
as I include both IPO volume and Cater-Manaster underwriter rank in the regressions. Those 
results raise the concerns that lead underwriters only rely on their market-timing skills and tend 
to take advantage of IPOs with greater potential during the hot periods. To address this concern, I 
perform similar regression as table A9 and table A10 at lead underwriter level. Column (4) to (6) 
in table A11 show that the IPO volume remains significant after I include the lead underwriter 
fixed effects. Moreover, the group of high-quality lead underwriters most likely drives this 
significant and positive coefficient since the IPO volume only has positive and significant 
coefficient in the sample of high-quality lead underwriters. Therefore, those results confirm that 
high-quality lead underwriters could use their IPO selection expertise to maximize the reward to 




that lead underwriters could contribute to more efficient asset allocation in IPO market. Overall, 
table A11 ensures the previous results are not driven by sample biases.  
6. Endogeneity 
Thus far, I have shown that novel private firms are more likely to be financed during 
“windows of opportunity”, especially those have high-quality lead underwriters. In previous 
sections, I tend to argue that “windows of opportunity” may make investors less risk-averse and 
encourage investors to make investment in IPOs that have greater innovation risks. However, 
two alternative explanation might come from endogeneity problems associated with our OLS 
regression and cause biased estimation of coefficient. One alternative explanation is that the 
clustering of innovative firms might attract more public investors, and the changes of investors’ 
risk taking behaviors are driven by investment opportunities. Under this explanation, my 
coefficient estimation for the log of IPO volume is biased upward because the positive and 
significant coefficient is caused by omitted variables that drive both variations in the innovation 
and the variations in IPO investment. 
The other alternative explanation is that private firms might implement more risky 
strategies and intentionally improve their innovation ability during “windows of opportunity” in 
response to the investors who are more willing to make risky and experimental investments 
(Arora and Nandakumar, 2011). If this explanation drives the coefficients estimation in my 
regression model, my coefficient estimate will be downward. Since my coefficient is 
significantly positive, the endeogeneity issues from this explanation will only reinforce my 
explanation and make my results even stronger. It is worth exploring the extent to which 





To examine those alternative explanation and the endoegeneity issues beneath, I turn to 
an instrumental variable strategy. To appropriately control the coefficient estimation bias caused 
by endogenenity, the instrumental variable should be related to the number of IPO issued and the 
variations in the supply of capital over time. At the same time, this variable is supposed to have 
very limited correlation with the variations in the innovative properties of private firms. The 
instrumental variable that satisfies both requirements is the number of debt issuance within the 
same periods. On the one hand, the capital supply in the public capital market is partly driven by 
the asset allocation of public investors, and the public debt and public equity tend to occupy the 
majority of public investors’ portfolio. Therefore, the debt issuance volume could appropriately 
capture the supply of capital from investors. More importantly, it is reasonable to believe that 
there is significant relationship between debt investment and equity investment due to asset 
allocation decision and capital availability. On the other hand, while public investors tend to 
make debt investment based on backward looking metrics, those investors will evaluate forward 
looking metrics in making equity investment decision. More importantly, the debt investment 
will respond to different investment opportunities to equity investment due to different payoff 
structure. Normally, debt investment will receive fixed cash flow for a predetermined periods 
and have very limited upside potential. Hence, public investors who make debt investment will 
pay more attention to mature firms, such as utility and manufacturing, that could make 
sustainable earnings and stable cash flows. They are very unlikely to invest in firms with greater 
innovative potential because their debt payoff structure could not benefit from greater risk taking 
and upside potential created by innovation. In contrast, equity investors are more likely to enjoy 
the unlimited upside potential from their investment and thus more willing to respond to risky 




Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the number of debt issuance prior to the IPOs should not 
directly related to the innovative properties of IPO market.  
Given previous discussion, the use of debt volume as instrumental variable is appropriate 
in my regression settings. This instrumental variable selection is similar to Gompers and Lerner 
(2000) and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013). I use three-month moving average debt issuance 
volume prior to IPO month as the instrumental variable to ensure consistency between 
instrumental variable, debt volume, and endogeneous variable, IPO volume. Specifically, I 
perform the first-stage OLS regression of IPO volume on debt volume, both of which are three-
month moving average and transform to logarithm to eliminate extreme outliers. Then, I replace 
the IPO volume with the fitted value from the first-stage regression as my exogeneous 
independent variable in my main regression. The results are shown in table A12. 
Table A12 shows that the debt volume has significant and negative relationship with the 
number of IPO issued prior to the IPO month. This significant and negative coefficient suggests 
that greater debt issuance volume is associated with smaller number of IPO issued. This is 
consistent with the prediction that investors have limited amount of capitals and tend to allocate 
most capitals between debts and equities. If they allocate more capitals to debt securities, they 
have less capital and tend to invest less in equity securities. The high F-statistics suggests that the 
instrumental variable is relatively strong.  
More importantly, Table A12 shows that the positive relationship between logarithm of 
IPO volume and firm’s innovation output is still significant after we control for the endogeneity 
issues. This significant positive coefficient further supports that innovative private firms are 
more likely to be financed by public investors through IPOs during the “windows of 




the same period. It is important to note that the positive coefficient for my instrumental variable 
is much larger than that before the endogeneity control. This pattern further supports that the 
investment opportunities available during the “windows of opportunity” is not the main driver of 
my findings. Table A12 provides further evidence to support my argument that investors with 
more capital during “windows of opportunity” are more willing to invest in risky and novel IPOs, 
which is consistent with the empirical findings in venture capital market (Nanda and Rhodes-
Kropf, 2013) and the theoretical model (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2017). Interestingly, the 
exogenous IPO volume only has significant positive coefficient in the regression of innovation 
outputs, such as the level of both patents and citations. However, it looks like that the exogenous 
IPO volume do not significantly predict the quality of patent filed by IPO issuers after the IPO 
date. One possible explanation is that the information production and evaluation ability of 
investors are still limited. Therefore, even though they could identify innovative firms in terms of 
their innovative quantity, they might not be able to accurately capture those real impactful 
innovators that could create high-quality inventions. 
 To further explore the interesting pattern documented in table A12 and examine the role 
of lead underwriter in previous pattern after the control of endogeneity issues. I perform the 
similar regression in table A12 but include one more interactive variable between exogeneous 
IPO volume and dummy variable that equals to one if the lead underwriters of an IPO have 
above average CM Underwriter Ranks. The results are presented in table A13. Consistent with 
previous findings, the interactive variable is consistently significant and have positive predictive 
power on IPO issuers’ post-IPO innovative quantity. More interestingly, the interactive variable 
also has positive and significant coefficient in the regression of post-IPO innovative quality, 




support that high-quality lead underwriters are more able to identify firms that could create not 
only greater innovative outputs but also more important and impactful inventions. Table A12 and 
A13 together suggests that while individual public investors who make excessive investment in 
IPOs during the “windows of opportunity” could benefit from greater post-IPO innovative 
outputs but not necessarily the most important inventions, high-quality lead underwriters could 
improve public investors’ investment efficiency by guiding their capitals to the most innovative 
IPOs that create both significant patent quantity and patent quality.  
Overall, the results discussed in this section accentuate my previous findings that 
innovative IPOs are more likely to be financed during the “windows of opportunity”, and this 
pattern is not driven by investment opportunities variations across IPO cycles. Moreover, those 
results further support that high-quality lead underwriters contribute to more efficient capital 
allocation in the IPO market since investors who follow the guidance from these high reputation 
investment banks are more likely to benefit from the most innovative IPOs. 
7. Conclusion 
IPO market has significant time variations over time and IPOs issued during the high-
volume period are more likely to have worse performance on average than those issued during 
other periods (Ritter, 1991; Fama and French, 2004; . Khanna, Noe, and Santi, 2008; Liu and 
Ritter, 2011; Dumbar, 2014). Conventional wisdom tend to argue that the high failure rate of 
IPOs issued during the “hot” period is due to lower screening standard, lower required return on 
equity, or overoptimistic investors. Following this explanation, “windows of opportunity” is 
actually the windows of misopportunity for both investors and IPO issuers, similar to the 




In this study, I propose an alternative explanation, following the empirical evidence from 
Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) and theoretical model from Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2017). I 
tend to argue that the high failure rate of IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” is due 
to greater risk-taking of investors. Specifically, investors tend to occupy excess capitals during 
“windows of opportunity”, so they are more likely to invest in risky IPOs that invest in 
experimental and uncertain innovation procedures. Following this explanation, more 
experimental and risky IPOs tend to be associated with greater failure rate on average. However, 
those IPOs that survive through this tough process should be more successful than other IPOs. 
The empirical analysis presents that although IPOs issued during the “windows of opportunity” 
are more likely to delist due to operating inefficiency, those IPOs that are still publicly traded 
tend to become more innovative, in terms of patent quantity and patent quality, than “active” 
IPOs that issued during other periods. It is also interesting to note that this pattern is more 
outstanding among IPOs that have high-quality lead underwriters. This observation tend to 
further support the certification hypothesis that high-quality lead underwriters are more able to 
identify private firms that have the greatest innovative potential. Therefore, high-quality lead 
underwriters could make public investors benefit more from their risk-taking behaviors during 
the “windows of opportunity” and contribute to more efficient capital allocation even though 
they are not direct investors. Finally, those pattern and results are not driven by issuer-specific 
characteristics, industry effects, underwriting patterns, and availability of investment 
opportunities during “windows of opportunity”. Overall, this chapter tend to conclude that 
“windows of opportunity” provides real opportunity to the most inventive private firms and 




The findings in this chapter also suggest potential future research path. Firstly, the 
research that focus on factors that drive innovation should extend their research to take the 
investment cycles into consideration. Second, further research on IPOs should consider whether 
financial intermediaries during the IPO process could contribute to efficient asset allocation 
rather than provide pure certification and screening service. Thirdly, previous empirical research 
on “windows of opportunity” tend to focus on the average high failure rate of IPOs issued during 
the same periods. Following the idea that focus on IPOs that survive over time, it is possible to 
discover more bright side of “windows of opportunity”.  








Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  
IPO Age is the number of years between issue date and December 31, 2017. Log Revenue is the natural logarithm of 
the issuer’s revenue in the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO. Log Asset is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s 
asset in the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO.Reputaion is the Carter-Manaster underwriter quality ranking 
updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004), a discrete underwriter reputation variable between 0 and 9, where 9 
indicates the most prestigious underwriter and 0 indicates the least prestigious underwriter. ∆P is the difference 
between the actual offer price and the expected offer price divided by the expected offer price, where the expected 
offer price is calculated as sum of the highest and lowest anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the 
preliminary prospectus, divided by two. ∆P+ (∆P-) is the positive (negative) price adjustment, max(∆P, 0) 
(min(∆P,0)).  Issue_Size_Pct is the natural log of one plus the percentage change in the number of shares offered, 
calculated as the actual number of shares offered (excluding the exercise of the overallotment option) minus the 
number of shares quoted in the preliminary prospectus, divided by the number of shares quoted in the preliminary 
prospectus. Dollar Range is the dollar width of offer range, calculated as the difference between the highest and 
lowest anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus divided by the expected offer 
price. OAO is the number of additional shares issued by the underwriter through exercise of the overallotment 
option divided by the actual number of registered shares offered.  Price Support is the price stabilization proxy, 
calculated as a three-level categorical variable based on the number of days between the offer date and the first date 
that the secondary market price drops below the offer price. VC is a dummy that is equal to one if the firm is VC-
backed. “nascent” is a dummy that is equal to one if the firm has three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 
383, 384, and 737. Liabilities / Assets and Working Capital / Assets are all measured at the end of the fiscal year 
ending prior to IPO. EBIT Dummy is dummy equal to 1 if the firms have positive earnings before interest and taxes 




Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum Observations
Reputation 7.339 2.197 1.000 8.000 9.000 6502
∆P+ 0.080 0.166 0.000 0.000 3.444 6502
∆P- -0.077 0.122 -0.756 0.000 0.000 6502
Issue_Size_Pct 0.015 0.217 -3.912 0.095 2.079 6502
Dollar Range 0.147 0.072 0.000 0.154 1.511 6502
OAO 0.094 0.069 0.000 0.150 0.150 6502
Price Support 2.474 0.698 1.000 3.000 3.000 6502
Log Revenue 3.269 2.696 -4.605 3.627 11.500 6502
IPO Age 17.023 6.782 0.115 18.923 27.940 6502
Log Asset 3.950 1.972 -4.605 3.721 12.597 6502
nascent 0.408 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 6502
VC 0.397 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000 6502
Liabilities / Assets 0.694 1.298 0.000 0.583 81.500 6125
Working Capital / Assets 0.098 1.164 -73.934 0.122 6.077 5626








Table 2: Distribution of Sample IPOs by Issue Year 
 
The total number of IPOs and their gross proceeds (in billions of US dollars) for the full sample and sorted by delisting event classification. Each 
new issue is sorted into one of three mutually exclusive groups, based upon the CRSP delisting code as of December 31, 2017.  An issue is 
classified as a busted IPO if the firm has a delist code between 500 and 585. An issue is classified as an acquired IPO if the firm has a delist code 
between 200 and 301.  An issue is classified as an active IPO if the firm has a delist code of 100.  Sample data for the sample of 6,502 IPOs issued 
between January 1988 and December 2015 are obtained from the Securities Data Corporation New Issues Database (SDC). 
 
 
n % $ % n % $ % n % $ % n % $ %
1988 103 1.58 5.132 0.57 32 1.79 0.826 0.57 63 1.98 3.948 1.04 8 0.52 0.358 0.09
1989 120 1.85 7.797 0.86 35 1.96 1.506 1.03 69 2.17 5.434 1.43 16 1.04 0.857 0.23
1990 115 1.77 6.100 0.67 30 1.68 1.160 0.80 72 2.27 4.414 1.16 13 0.85 0.526 0.14
1991 302 4.64 23.607 2.61 90 5.03 4.733 3.25 172 5.41 15.097 3.96 40 2.61 3.777 1.00
1992 428 6.58 30.856 3.40 131 7.32 5.926 4.07 224 7.05 19.867 5.21 73 4.76 5.062 1.33
1993 538 8.27 39.842 4.40 185 10.34 9.194 6.31 283 8.91 23.398 6.14 70 4.56 7.250 1.91
1994 436 6.71 22.921 2.53 146 8.16 5.226 3.59 236 7.43 14.511 3.81 54 3.52 3.183 0.84
1995 483 7.43 36.387 4.02 155 8.66 8.172 5.61 264 8.31 21.494 5.64 64 4.17 6.721 1.77
1996 712 10.95 56.667 6.25 251 14.02 11.997 8.23 382 12.02 39.338 10.32 79 5.15 5.332 1.41
1997 487 7.49 38.920 4.29 180 10.06 9.240 6.34 240 7.55 23.075 6.05 67 4.36 6.604 1.74
1998 307 4.72 36.116 3.99 114 6.37 7.958 5.46 148 4.66 19.912 5.22 45 2.93 8.246 2.17
1999 463 7.12 75.029 8.28 143 7.99 20.647 14.16 251 7.90 33.640 8.83 69 4.50 20.742 5.47
2000 363 5.58 62.481 6.89 101 5.64 17.537 12.03 201 6.33 31.478 8.26 61 3.97 13.465 3.55
2001 77 1.18 43.091 4.75 13 0.73 3.764 2.58 44 1.38 16.984 4.46 20 1.30 22.342 5.89
2002 64 0.98 23.694 2.61 12 0.67 7.191 4.93 32 1.01 12.075 3.17 20 1.30 4.429 1.17
2003 65 1.00 12.590 1.39 13 0.73 2.176 1.49 27 0.85 5.898 1.55 25 1.63 4.516 1.19
2004 175 2.69 39.305 4.34 27 1.51 2.954 2.03 98 3.08 20.331 5.33 50 3.26 16.021 4.22
2005 160 2.46 34.591 3.82 26 1.45 5.331 3.66 78 2.46 13.668 3.59 56 3.65 15.591 4.11
2006 150 2.31 32.871 3.63 22 1.23 3.708 2.54 67 2.11 13.890 3.64 61 3.97 15.272 4.03
2007 146 2.25 31.857 3.52 22 1.23 6.194 4.25 58 1.83 10.520 2.76 66 4.30 15.143 3.99
2008 21 0.32 26.115 2.88 5 0.28 1.133 0.78 5 0.16 0.721 0.19 11 0.72 24.260 6.40
2009 38 0.58 13.696 1.51 6 0.34 2.026 1.39 14 0.44 4.356 1.14 18 1.17 7.314 1.93
2010 94 1.45 34.236 3.78 10 0.56 1.251 0.86 28 0.88 4.144 1.09 56 3.65 28.840 7.60
2011 79 1.22 28.375 3.13 11 0.61 1.525 1.05 19 0.60 4.030 1.06 49 3.19 22.820 6.02
2012 97 1.49 34.464 3.80 8 0.45 2.101 1.44 30 0.94 3.803 1.00 59 3.84 28.561 7.53
2013 155 2.38 41.040 4.53 9 0.50 1.142 0.78 33 1.04 5.401 1.42 113 7.36 34.497 9.10
2014 206 3.17 46.862 5.17 9 0.50 0.910 0.62 27 0.85 7.775 2.04 170 11.07 38.177 10.07
2015 118 1.81 21.581 2.38 4 0.22 0.250 0.17 12 0.38 1.951 0.51 102 6.64 19.380 5.11
Total 6502 100.00 906.221 100.00 1790 100.00 145.781 100.00 3177 100.00 381.154 100.00 1535 100.00 379.286 100.00
Active IPOs
(4)















Table 3: Bust Rates and Excess Return Performance of IPOs by Issue Year 
 
IPOs are as classified as busted, acquired, and active according to the sorting scheme described in Table 2. Investor returns are measured as buy-
and-hold returns, and size-adjusted excess returns are measured for each IPO as the difference between the issuer’s buy-and-hold-returns and the 
contemporaneous buy-and-hold returns on a portfolio of similarly sized non-IPO firms.  Buy-and-hold returns are calculated from the first CRSP-
listed post-issue closing price to several different anniversary dates for each offering in the same cohort-year. For each issue year, excess returns at 
each holding-period horizon are calculated as an equally weighted average of all cohort-year excess returns and are in percentages (e.g., 3.0 is 3%). 
 
n % n % n % n %
1988 103 1.58 32 1.79 63 1.98 8 0.52 1.23 2.56 5.65 7.06 36.94
1989 120 1.85 35 1.96 69 2.17 16 1.04 2.65 9.03 5.42 11.18 -4.64
1990 115 1.77 30 1.68 72 2.27 13 0.85 -3.52 -8.14 -12.90 -37.05 -36.76
1991 302 4.64 90 5.03 172 5.41 40 2.61 7.70 4.59 -10.08 -23.27 -24.47
1992 428 6.58 131 7.32 224 7.05 73 4.76 -3.76 -4.02 -11.06 -24.05 -26.90
1993 538 8.27 185 10.34 283 8.91 70 4.56 2.04 -4.13 -11.08 -18.86 -27.88
1994 436 6.71 146 8.16 236 7.43 54 3.52 -1.11 -2.10 -1.09 -12.51 -6.81
1995 483 7.43 155 8.66 264 8.31 64 4.17 2.49 5.49 -2.04 -26.30 -2.19
1996 712 10.95 251 14.02 382 12.02 79 5.15 0.54 -8.45 -15.94 -16.81 -27.75
1997 487 7.49 180 10.06 240 7.55 67 4.36 -1.94 0.20 -4.46 11.40 -27.97
1998 307 4.72 114 6.37 148 4.66 45 2.93 0.21 -1.27 9.35 -3.99 -29.11
1999 463 7.12 143 7.99 251 7.90 69 4.50 29.94 35.50 4.08 -57.10 -60.20
2000 363 5.58 101 5.64 201 6.33 61 3.97 -9.50 -34.13 -54.70 -68.31 -69.43
2001 77 1.18 13 0.73 44 1.38 20 1.30 -5.29 -15.61 -15.06 -25.42 -26.80
2002 64 0.98 12 0.67 32 1.01 20 1.30 2.04 -2.88 -8.44 3.58 0.73
2003 65 1.00 13 0.73 27 0.85 25 1.63 2.39 -5.23 0.44 -14.47 -17.88
2004 175 2.69 27 1.51 98 3.08 50 3.26 6.24 2.27 3.87 3.57 -7.62
2005 160 2.46 26 1.45 78 2.46 56 3.65 -1.11 0.27 1.68 6.97 -17.91
2006 150 2.31 22 1.23 67 2.11 61 3.97 0.05 -3.75 8.94 -15.58 -15.59
2007 146 2.25 22 1.23 58 1.83 66 4.30 1.78 0.39 -10.13 -20.08 0.81
2008 21 0.32 5 0.28 5 0.16 11 0.72 -6.14 -19.77 -15.14 -18.78 -19.27
2009 38 0.58 6 0.34 14 0.44 18 1.17 -3.95 -12.05 -13.62 -11.92 -19.29
2010 94 1.45 10 0.56 28 0.88 56 3.65 0.80 4.02 0.75 -6.21 2.35
2011 79 1.22 11 0.61 19 0.60 49 3.19 1.24 -6.15 -14.05 -4.94 -13.83
2012 97 1.49 8 0.45 30 0.94 59 3.84 7.88 3.25 8.25 22.11 11.86
2013 155 2.38 9 0.50 33 1.04 113 7.36 10.65 3.65 -3.32 -5.71 NaN
2014 206 3.17 9 0.50 27 0.85 170 11.07 6.40 6.54 17.83 -0.69 NaN
2015 118 1.81 4 0.22 12 0.38 102 6.64 -1.31 -10.08 -22.17 NaN NaN




3    
Months
6   
Months
12   
Months
36    
Months
Average Size-Adjusted Excess Issuer Returns







Table 4: Aging Analysis of Busted IPOs by Issue Year Based Upon the Number of Sample 
Period New Issues 
 
Panel A presents annual bust rates for each issue year.  An IPO busts in the nth year if the delisting date occurs 
within n x 365 days of the issue date. Busted IPOs are defined as described in Table 2.  Missing entries indicate that 
the cohort-year sample did not extend to that time period.  Panel B reports cumulative bust rates for each issue year. 
Cumulative bust rates are the sum of the individual year bust rates up to and including n x 365 days after issue. Bust 
rates are expressed in percentages, so that 0.28 is equal to 0.28%. 
 
 
Panel A: Annual IPO Bust Rates
1 2 3 4 5
1988 0.10 1.22 0.80 0.89 2.99 10.10 16.10
1989 0.80 0.08 1.53 0.29 0.23 16.39 19.32
1990 0.00 0.29 1.53 1.70 0.00 15.49 19.01
1991 0.00 0.29 0.37 0.74 0.86 17.79 20.05
1992 0.00 0.34 0.99 1.05 2.06 14.77 19.21
1993 0.08 1.08 0.83 0.30 3.41 17.37 23.08
1994 0.13 1.25 1.21 1.31 1.07 17.84 22.80
1995 0.02 0.69 1.40 1.80 1.00 17.56 22.46
1996 0.04 1.49 3.43 4.16 3.10 8.96 21.17
1997 0.04 1.48 3.92 4.74 4.57 8.99 23.74
1998 0.00 2.68 3.98 5.79 2.37 7.22 22.04
1999 0.16 5.35 4.58 2.53 0.96 13.94 27.52
2000 0.04 5.70 12.95 1.59 1.84 5.94 28.07
2001 0.21 0.00 0.73 0.22 0.02 7.56 8.74
2002 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.37 29.78 30.35
2003 0.07 1.46 0.00 4.05 2.06 9.66 17.29
2004 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.46 0.61 6.28 7.52
2005 2.09 0.10 0.92 3.75 1.94 6.61 15.41
2006 0.00 1.50 3.50 1.49 0.00 4.79 11.28
2007 0.00 0.77 1.66 0.98 10.80 5.24 19.44
2008 0.55 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.94 4.34
2009 0.00 0.45 0.21 3.14 0.00 11.00 14.79
2010 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.30 1.39 1.41 3.65
2011 0.02 0.00 0.95 0.65 1.95 1.81 5.37
2012 0.00 0.00 0.20 5.12 0.77 0.00 6.10
2013 0.00 0.00 1.65 0.88 0.26 0.00 2.78
2014 0.00 0.00 1.71 0.23 -- -- 1.94
2015 0.14 0.00 1.01 -- -- -- 1.16


















Panel B: Cumulative IPO Bust Rates
1 2 3 4 5
1988 0.10 1.32 2.12 3.01 6.00 16.10 16.10
1989 0.80 0.88 2.41 2.70 2.93 19.32 19.32
1990 0.00 0.29 1.82 3.52 3.52 19.01 19.01
1991 0.00 0.29 0.66 1.41 2.27 20.05 20.05
1992 0.00 0.34 1.33 2.38 4.44 19.21 19.21
1993 0.08 1.16 2.00 2.30 5.71 23.08 23.08
1994 0.13 1.38 2.59 3.89 4.96 22.80 22.80
1995 0.02 0.71 2.11 3.91 4.90 22.46 22.46
1996 0.04 1.53 4.95 9.11 12.21 21.17 21.17
1997 0.04 1.52 5.44 10.18 14.75 23.74 23.74
1998 0.00 2.68 6.65 12.44 14.82 22.04 22.04
1999 0.16 5.51 10.10 12.62 13.58 27.52 27.52
2000 0.04 5.74 18.70 20.29 22.13 28.07 28.07
2001 0.21 0.21 0.93 1.15 1.17 8.74 8.74
2002 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.20 0.57 30.35 30.35
2003 0.07 1.52 1.52 5.57 7.63 17.29 17.29
2004 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.63 1.24 7.52 7.52
2005 2.09 2.19 3.11 6.86 8.80 15.41 15.41
2006 0.00 1.50 5.00 6.49 6.49 11.28 11.28
2007 0.00 0.77 2.43 3.40 14.21 19.44 19.44
2008 0.55 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 4.34 4.34
2009 0.00 0.45 0.66 3.80 3.80 14.79 14.79
2010 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.86 2.25 3.65 3.65
2011 0.02 0.02 0.98 1.62 3.57 5.37 5.37
2012 0.00 0.00 0.20 5.32 6.10 6.10 6.10
2013 0.00 0.00 1.65 2.52 2.78 2.78 2.78
2014 0.00 0.00 1.71 1.94 -- -- 1.94
2015 0.14 0.14 1.16 -- -- -- 1.16
Issue 
Year


































Table 5: Unaged Yearly IPO Bust Rates Based Upon the Dollar Value and Number of the 
Aggregate Sample Period New Issues 
 
Unaged IPO bust rates are calculated as the cumulative number of busts divided by the cumulative number of new 
issues since 1988. Busted IPOs are defined in Table 2.   Unaged bust rates are expressed in percentages, so that 1.08 
is equal to 1.08%. 
 
1988 1 0.005 103 5.13 0.97 0.10
1989 2 0.014 223 12.93 0.90 0.11
1990 12 0.155 338 19.03 3.55 0.82
1991 14 0.184 640 42.64 2.19 0.43
1992 25 0.491 1068 73.49 2.34 0.67
1993 39 0.789 1606 113.33 2.43 0.70
1994 63 1.335 2042 136.26 3.09 0.98
1995 109 2.527 2525 172.64 4.32 1.46
1996 159 4.406 3237 229.31 4.91 1.92
1997 241 7.522 3724 268.23 6.47 2.80
1998 386 11.842 4031 304.34 9.58 3.89
1999 545 19.786 4494 379.37 12.13 5.22
2000 696 28.189 4857 441.85 14.33 6.38
2001 925 44.242 4934 484.94 18.75 9.12
2002 1086 61.079 4998 508.64 21.73 12.01
2003 1212 71.109 5063 521.23 23.94 13.64
2004 1262 75.030 5238 560.53 24.09 13.39
2005 1322 82.867 5398 595.12 24.49 13.92
2006 1366 85.073 5548 628.00 24.62 13.55
2007 1410 88.016 5694 659.85 24.76 13.34
2008 1474 96.504 5715 685.97 25.79 14.07
2009 1555 114.139 5753 699.66 27.03 16.31
2010 1595 116.995 5847 733.90 27.28 15.94
2011 1632 125.051 5926 762.27 27.54 16.40
2012 1657 127.074 6023 796.74 27.51 15.95
2013 1676 128.609 6178 837.78 27.13 15.35
2014 1693 131.479 6384 884.64 26.52 14.86
2015 1715 134.089 6502 906.22 26.38 14.80
2016 1759 140.744 --- --- 27.05 15.53
2017 1790 145.781 --- --- 27.53 16.09






























Table 6: Distribution by Issue Year of Sample and Busted IPOs According to the Quality 
of the Lead Underwriter 
 
Underwriter IPO market share in Panel A is based on the issuer’s proceeds amount (in billions of US dollars) based on 2017 
purchasing power. For each issue year, investment bank market share percentages are calculated as the sum of all issuer proceeds 
amounts underwritten by similar-quality underwriters divided by the total issue-year proceeds amount.  Lead underwriters for 
each IPO are identified from the SDC database, and updated Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation measures are obtained from 
Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). An underwriter is classified as high-quality if it has a Carter-
Manaster reputation measure greater than the overall sample median, and classified as low-quality otherwise. Underwriter IPO 
market share in Panel B is based on the number of IPOs.  For each issue year, investment bank market share percentages are 
calculated as the number of IPOs underwritten by similar-quality underwriters divided by the total Number of IPOs issued during 
that year.  Busted IPOs are defined in Table 2.  
Panel A. By Proceeds Amount
1988 103 5.132 77.09 22.91 0.826 59.99 40.01
1989 120 7.797 88.05 11.95 1.506 81.47 18.53
1990 115 6.100 83.99 16.01 1.160 87.48 12.52
1991 302 23.607 82.86 17.14 4.733 76.71 23.29
1992 428 30.856 65.07 34.93 5.926 47.47 52.53
1993 538 39.842 59.41 40.59 9.194 50.56 49.44
1994 436 22.921 48.84 51.16 5.226 38.52 61.48
1995 483 36.387 54.85 45.15 8.172 55.21 44.79
1996 712 56.667 56.92 43.08 11.997 36.06 63.94
1997 487 38.920 57.34 42.66 9.240 48.43 51.57
1998 307 36.116 72.19 27.81 7.958 50.06 49.94
1999 463 75.029 80.16 19.84 20.647 76.26 23.74
2000 363 62.481 81.74 18.26 17.537 80.50 19.50
2001 77 43.091 92.79 7.21 3.764 86.00 14.00
2002 64 23.694 90.80 9.20 7.191 95.02 4.98
2003 65 12.590 75.40 24.60 2.176 72.06 27.94
2004 175 39.305 84.62 15.38 2.954 63.61 36.39
2005 160 34.591 81.36 18.64 5.331 85.49 14.51
2006 150 32.871 86.47 13.53 3.708 86.57 13.43
2007 146 31.857 89.03 10.97 6.194 83.13 16.87
2008 21 26.115 99.64 0.36 1.133 99.41 0.59
2009 38 13.696 96.61 3.39 2.026 95.55 4.45
2010 94 34.236 94.52 5.48 1.251 74.93 25.07
2011 79 28.375 95.81 4.19 1.525 79.25 20.75
2012 97 34.464 96.92 3.08 2.101 93.15 6.85
2013 155 41.040 95.41 4.59 1.142 74.91 25.09
2014 206 46.862 91.25 8.75 0.910 87.14 12.86
2015 118 21.581 89.28 10.72 0.250 48.02 51.98















Full Sample Busted IPOs
Underwriter IPO market share as 
a % of total proceeds amount
Underwriter IPO market share as a 








Panel B. By Number of IPOs
1988 103 103 51.46 48.54 32 34.38 65.63
1989 120 120 56.67 43.33 35 37.14 62.86
1990 115 115 60.87 39.13 30 56.67 43.33
1991 302 302 58.28 41.72 90 47.78 52.22
1992 428 428 29.67 70.33 131 17.56 82.44
1993 538 538 25.46 74.54 185 18.92 81.08
1994 436 436 19.50 80.50 146 10.96 89.04
1995 483 483 24.84 75.16 155 14.84 85.16
1996 712 712 26.97 73.03 251 17.13 82.87
1997 487 487 28.95 71.05 180 18.89 81.11
1998 307 307 34.85 65.15 114 21.93 78.07
1999 463 463 54.00 46.00 143 46.15 53.85
2000 363 363 63.36 36.64 101 50.50 49.50
2001 77 77 59.74 40.26 13 38.46 61.54
2002 64 64 57.81 42.19 12 41.67 58.33
2003 65 65 49.23 50.77 13 30.77 69.23
2004 175 175 56.00 44.00 27 40.74 59.26
2005 160 160 56.88 43.13 26 53.85 46.15
2006 150 150 64.00 36.00 22 54.55 45.45
2007 146 146 71.92 28.08 22 45.45 54.55
2008 21 21 85.71 14.29 5 80.00 20.00
2009 38 38 84.21 15.79 6 66.67 33.33
2010 94 94 76.60 23.40 10 50.00 50.00
2011 79 79 81.01 18.99 11 54.55 45.45
2012 97 97 84.54 15.46 8 62.50 37.50
2013 155 155 80.65 19.35 9 55.56 44.44
2014 206 206 65.53 34.47 9 55.56 44.44





Full Sample Busted IPOs
Underwriter IPO market share as a 
% of total number of issues
Underwriter IPO market share as a % 




















Table 7: Distribution of Equity Issuance, Macroeconomic, and Stock Market Conditions 
by IPO Issue Volume. 
 
Hot, normal and cold market conditions are defined using aggregate monthly IPO issue volume. Each month during 
the sample period is ranked according to the level of 3 month moving average of IPO issue volume.  The months in 
the top quartile of issue volume are characterized as hot. The months in the lowest quartile of issue volume are 
characterized as cold.  The remaining months are considered normal. Low-ranked underwriter market share is 
calculated as the number of IPOs that is underwritten by low-quality underwriters divided by the total number of 
IPOs issued. IPO Volume is the 3 month moving average of the volume of new issues.  SEO Volume is the 3 month 
moving average of volume of new seasoned equity issues. Average Initial Return is the 3 month moving average of 
average initial return for the IPO market where initial return is calculated as (closing price on the first day of public 
trading – offer price)/offer price. Term Premium is the 3 month moving average of monthly 10-Year U.S. 
Government bond rate minus the monthly 6-month Treasury bill rate.  Default Premium is the 3 month moving 
average of BAA bond yield minus the monthly 10-Year U.S. government bond rate.  Industrial_Prod is the 3 month 
moving average of industrial production. Market Value-Weighted Return is the 3 month moving average of the 
aggregate value-weighted return. Market Volatility is the 3 month moving average of the standard deviation of stock 
return. Market Liquidity is the 3 month moving average of Amihud’s (2002) price impact proxy for individual stocks 
– computed as the absolute stock return divided by local currency trading volume. The Amihud measure is 
multiplied by 10,000 to increase the absolute magnitude of this measurement. Market Sentiment is the 3 month 
moving average of the Consumer Confidence Index published by the Conference Board (CB), following  Antoniou 
et al. (2013). a,b,c  indicate that differences between means of columns (1) and (2), (1) and (3) and (2) and (3) are 
significant at the 0.05 level, respectively, using Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  
 
91 18.76% 507 20.37% 1192 33.79%
213 43.92% 1093 43.91% 1871 53.03%
181 37.32% 889 35.72% 465 13.18%











































































Table 8: OLS Regressions Predicting “Windows of Misopportunity” 
  
Low-Ranked Underwriter Market Share is calculated as the number of IPOs that is underwritten by low-quality 
underwriters divided by the total number of IPOs issued. Bust Rate is calculated as the number of IPOs that 
eventually bust divided by the total number of IPOs issued for each month. Equity Issuance, Macroeconomic, and 
Stock Market Condition variables are defined in table 7. The dependent variable for column (1) and column (2) is 
Low-Ranked Underwriter Market Share, and the dependent variable for column (3) and column (4) is Bust Rate. 
OLS regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported for this monthly regression from Jan 1988 
to Dec 2015. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, 




Constant 0.311 *** 0.622 *** 0.076 *** 0.405 **
9.78 2.67 3.10 2.21
0.241 *** 0.144 *
3.97 1.94
Equity Issuance Condition
0.008 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.000
15.11 4.64 3.50 0.86
SEO Volume -0.003 *** -0.002 * -0.001 ** 0.001
-4.22 -1.91 -2.50 1.44
Average Initial Return -0.333 *** -0.311 *** -0.005 0.043
-4.68 -3.49 -0.14 0.64
Macroeconomic Condition
-0.006 *** -0.003 **
-3.43 -2.25















2 0.368 0.528 0.309 0.409
Adjusted R

























Table 9: Distribution of Full Sample and Busted IPO Pre-issue and Aftermarket 
Characteristics According the Quality of the Lead Underwriter 
 
Lead underwriters for each IPO are identified from the SDC database, and updated Carter-Manaster underwriter 
reputation measures are obtained from Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). An 
underwriter is classified as high-quality if it has a Carter-Manaster reputation measure greater than the overall 
sample median, and classified as low-quality otherwise. Issuer-specific characteristic variables are all defined in 
table 1. a indicates that busted IPOs are significantly different from the acquired and active IPOs at the 0.05 level, 
using Wilcoxon rank-sum test. b indicates that acquired and active IPOs that are underwritten by high-quality 
underwriters will be significantly different from those underwritten by low-quality underwriters at the 0.05 level, 
using Wilcoxon rank-sum test. c indicates that busted IPOs that are underwritten by high-quality underwriters will be 
significantly different from those underwritten by low-quality underwriters at the 0.05 level, using Wilcoxon rank-





















0.099 0.102 0.096 0.079
a 0.083 0.078












2370 2342 496 1294
Acquired and Active Issues Busted Issues
Average by CM-Rank of 
Lead Underwriter


























Table 10: Multivariate Logistic Analyses 
 
For each regression model, the dependent variable equals one if an IPO subsequently busted by December 31, 2017, 
and is equal to zero otherwise.  The independent variables are defined in table 1 and table 7. Equity Issuance Control 
includes SEO Volume and Average Initial Return. Macroeconomic Control includes Industrial_Prod, Default 
Premium, and Term Premium. Stock Market Control includes Value-weighted Market Return, Market Volatility, 
Market Liquidity, and Market Sentiment. Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 
357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. Logit regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported 
for this monthly regression from Jan 1988 to Dec 2015. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as 
mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), 
respectively.   
 
 
Constant -0.002 0.388 ** -0.124 -5.484 *** -5.570 ***
-0.01 2.20 -0.58 -4.59 -4.01
-0.231 *** -0.227 *** -0.225 *** -0.227 *** -0.207 ***
-15.87 -15.57 -15.06 -15.23 -13.56
0.004 ** 0.004 * 0.003
2.34 1.95 1.31
Issuer specific characteristics
0.058 *** 0.058 *** 0.057 *** 0.152 *** 0.161 ***
12.35 12.15 9.41 7.36 5.26
-0.084 *** -0.078 *** -0.071 *** -0.074 *** -0.127 ***
-6.96 -6.43 -5.75 -5.88 -8.77
Premarket activities
-1.052 *** -0.877 *** -0.875 *** -0.881 *** -1.180 ***
-4.03 -3.32 -3.26 -3.24 -4.16
0.142 0.315 * 0.025 0.071 0.103
0.75 1.71 0.13 0.36 0.49
0.036 0.114 0.132 0.194 0.212
0.27 0.83 0.96 1.40 1.49
-1.394 *** -1.313 *** -1.354 *** -1.410 *** -1.005 **
-3.05 -2.87 -2.93 -3.09 -2.30
Aftermarket activities
-1.672 *** -1.824 *** -1.671 *** -1.394 ***
-3.27 -3.55 -3.25 -2.71
-0.119 ** -0.120 ** -0.131 *** -0.148 ***
-2.40 -2.41 -2.61 -2.94
Equity Issuance Control No No Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Control No No No Yes Yes
Stock Market Control No No No No Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes
Diagnostics
Concordant 0.709 0.716 0.724 0.727 0.738




















 Table 11: IPO Market Cycle Multivariate Logistic Analyses 
 
For each regression model, the dependent variable equals one if an IPO subsequently busted by December 31, 2017, 
and is equal to zero otherwise. Hot, normal and cold market conditions are defined using aggregate monthly IPO 
issue volume. Each month during the sample period is ranked according to the level of 3 month moving average of 
IPO issue volume.  The months in the top quartile of issue volume are characterized as hot. The months in the lowest 
quartile of issue volume are characterized as cold.  The remaining months are considered normal. The independent 
variables are defined in table 1 and table 7. Equity Issuance Control includes SEO Volume and Average Initial 
Return. Macroeconomic Control includes Industrial_Prod, Default Premium, and Term Premium. Stock Market 
Control includes Value-weighted Market Return, Market Volatility, Market Liquidity, and Market Sentiment. 
Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 
737. Logit regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported for this monthly regression from Jan 
1988 to Dec 2015. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use 
***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
 
Panel A: Delisted cold and not delisted cold
Constant 0.488 1.330 * -0.271 -9.710 *** -15.086 ***
0.77 1.69 -0.22 -2.88 -2.68
-0.288 *** -0.276 *** -0.270 *** -0.244 *** -0.228 ***




0.038 *** 0.042 *** 0.072 *** 0.238 *** 0.281 ***
2.59 2.70 3.27 4.00 2.61
-0.067 -0.048 -0.050 -0.062 -0.127 **
-1.47 -1.04 -1.11 -1.31 -2.39
Premarket activities
-2.347 ** -2.323 ** -2.452 ** -3.145 *** -3.882 ***
-2.16 -2.18 -2.25 -2.68 -2.90
0.510 0.833 0.765 1.073 1.109
0.63 0.98 0.85 1.16 1.06
0.148 0.203 0.223 0.384 0.380
0.35 0.48 0.50 0.84 0.78
-1.993 -2.200 -2.396 -2.742 -2.772
-0.94 -1.07 -1.13 -1.33 -1.28
Aftermarket activities
-2.826 -3.197 -3.524 -2.204
-1.30 -1.44 -1.49 -0.93
-0.340 -0.329 -0.260 -0.327
-1.63 -1.56 -1.21 -1.54
Equity Issuance Control No No Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Control No No No Yes Yes
Stock Market Control No No No No Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes
Diagnostics
Concordant 0.730 0.759 0.759 0.775 0.804


























Panel B: Delisted hot and not delisted hot
Constant 2.247 *** 2.546 *** 2.114 *** -5.748 -10.974
6.03 6.35 3.63 -0.77 -1.03
-0.224 *** -0.219 *** -0.218 *** -0.220 *** -0.203 ***




-0.047 *** -0.045 *** -0.038 * 0.143 0.311
-2.82 -2.67 -1.68 0.69 1.03
-0.102 *** -0.096 *** -0.096 *** -0.097 *** -0.142 ***
-5.90 -5.51 -5.43 -5.51 -7.12
Premarket activities
-0.649 * -0.488 -0.486 -0.416 -0.590
-1.83 -1.36 -1.35 -1.15 -1.58
-0.687 *** -0.484 * -0.498 * -0.501 * -0.549 **
-2.62 -1.89 -1.88 -1.87 -2.02
0.249 0.350 * 0.347 * 0.364 ** 0.339 *
1.39 1.94 1.92 2.02 1.82
-1.279 ** -1.131 * -1.141 * -1.162 * -0.827
-2.16 -1.89 -1.89 -1.91 -1.44
Aftermarket activities
-2.244 *** -2.268 *** -2.236 *** -1.982 ***
-3.44 -3.48 -3.43 -3.08
-0.089 -0.088 -0.083 -0.103
-1.39 -1.38 -1.29 -1.60
Equity Issuance Control No No Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Control No No No Yes Yes
Stock Market Control No No No No Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes
Diagnostics
Concordant 0.683 0.693 0.694 0.695 0.707










































Panel C: Delisted normal and not delisted normal
Constant -0.438 * -0.009 -0.782 * -3.879 ** -3.489
-1.82 -0.03 -1.95 -2.11 -1.52
-0.245 *** -0.244 *** -0.233 *** -0.232 *** -0.210 ***
-8.74 -8.67 -8.20 -8.24 -7.33
0.018 *** 0.018 ** 0.018 **
2.62 2.45 2.23
Issuer specific characteristics
0.070 *** 0.071 *** 0.067 *** 0.124 ** 0.134 ***
10.82 10.83 7.32 3.96 3.13
-0.041 * -0.036 * -0.036 * -0.039 * -0.105 ***
-1.95 -1.74 -1.70 -1.86 -4.30
Premarket activities
-1.710 *** -1.549 *** -1.612 *** -1.639 *** -2.042 ***
-3.89 -3.46 -3.60 -3.56 -4.08
0.997 *** 1.141 *** 0.894 *** 0.848 ** 0.995 ***
3.05 3.41 2.58 2.45 2.76
-0.208 -0.176 -0.228 -0.211 -0.105
-0.96 -0.81 -1.06 -0.98 -0.48
-1.942 *** -1.887 ** -1.716 ** -1.821 ** -1.216 *
-2.61 -2.55 -2.29 -2.45 -1.65
Aftermarket activities
-0.190 -0.301 -0.277 -0.086
-0.60 -0.68 -0.65 -0.30
-0.185 ** -0.200 ** -0.201 ** -0.208 ***
-2.39 -2.51 -2.52 -2.58
Equity Issuance Control No No Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Control No No No Yes Yes
Stock Market Control No No No No Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes
Diagnostics
Concordant 0.734 0.737 0.744 0.748 0.762
Psuedo R-square 0.121 0.124 0.129 0.134 0.151
(1)
Logit Regression Model
















Table 12: Partial Endogeneity Controls of Underwriter Selection 
 
Endogeneous variable Reputation is instrumented using 2SLS. The instrumental variables include Log Asset, VC 
Dummy, Nascent Industry Dummy, and Log Revenue, following Benveniste et al (2003) and Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). All instrumental variables are specifically defined in table 1. Reputation2SLS is the fitted value of the OLS 
regression in column (1). For the rest of the regression models, the dependent variable equals one if an IPO 
subsequently busted by December 31, 2017, and is equal to zero otherwise. Hot, normal and cold market conditions 
are defined using aggregate monthly IPO issue volume. Each month during the sample period is ranked according to 
the level of 3 month moving average of IPO issue volume.  The months in the top quartile of issue volume are 
characterized as hot. The months in the lowest quartile of issue volume are characterized as cold.  The remaining 
months are considered normal. The independent variables are defined in table 1 and table 7. Equity Issuance Control 
includes SEO Volume and Average Initial Return. Macroeconomic Control includes Industrial_Prod, Default 
Premium, and Term Premium. Stock Market Control includes Value-weighted Market Return, Market Volatility, 
Market Liquidity, and Market Sentiment. Logit regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported 
for this monthly regression from Jan 1988 to Dec 2015. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as 
mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), 
respectively.   
Dependent Variable:
Constant 3.907 *** -4.840 *** -15.060 *** -11.525 -2.124
44.57 -3.52 -2.76 -1.08 -0.93
-0.385 *** -0.462 *** -0.361 *** -0.404 ***
-11.84 -3.10 -8.87 -6.67
0.002 0.006 0.000 0.019 **
0.75 0.13 0.05 2.42
Instrument variable
Log Asset 0.548 ***
27.71
VC Dummy 1.373 ***
27.63
Nascent Industry Dummy 0.517 ***
9.75
Issuer specific characteristics
0.177 *** 0.278 *** 0.361 0.137 ***
5.91 2.65 1.20 3.26
0.156 *** -0.032 ** 0.017 -0.065 *** 0.010
12.18 -2.12 0.25 -3.22 0.38
Premarket activities
-0.843 *** -3.621 *** -0.326 -1.639 ***
-3.11 -2.90 -0.91 -3.54
-0.081 1.326 -0.770 *** 0.743 **
-0.35 1.41 -2.67 2.20
0.231 0.445 0.376 ** -0.174
1.58 0.89 2.04 -0.73
-1.682 *** -2.890 -1.452 ** -2.178 ***
-3.54 -1.36 -2.32 -2.72
Aftermarket activities
-1.866 *** -3.399 -2.419 *** -0.289
-3.62 -1.36 -3.74 -0.30
-0.130 *** -0.198 -0.095 -0.211 **
-2.60 -0.87 -1.48 -2.37
Capital Market Control No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Control No Yes Yes Yes Yes

























Bust Dummy Bust Dummy Bust Dummy Bust Dummy
Whole Sample Cold Period Hot Period Normal Period
Logit Logit
0.403 0.112 0.180 0.080 0.129






Table 13: Partial Endogeneity Controls of Issuer Fundamentals 
Endogeneous variable Reputation is instrumented using 2SLS as in table 12. All instrumental variables are 
specifically defined in table 1. Reputation2SLS is the fitted value of the OLS regression in column (1). For the rest 
of the regression models, the dependent variable equals one if an IPO subsequently busted by December 31, 2017, 
and is equal to zero otherwise. The independent variables are defined in table 1 and table 7. Equity Issuance Control 
includes SEO Volume and Average Initial Return. Macroeconomic Control includes Industrial_Prod, Default 
Premium, and Term Premium. Stock Market Control includes Value-weighted Market Return, Market Volatility, 
Market Liquidity, and Market Sentiment. Logit regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported 
for this monthly regression from Jan 1988 to Dec 2015. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as 
mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), 
respectively.   
 
Dependent Variable:
Constant 3.612 *** 1.292 *** 1.658 *** -2.717 *
42.06 4.38 5.20 -1.72
-0.372 *** -0.362 *** -0.345 ***
-10.03 -9.75 -9.19
Instrument variable
Log Asset 0.684 ***
28.75
VC Dummy 1.310 ***
24.54
Nascent Industry Dummy 0.522 ***
9.82
Issuer specific characteristics
0.053 *** 0.051 *** 0.130 ***
8.51 8.32 3.70
0.116 *** -0.045 * -0.043 -0.047 *
5.83 -1.71 -1.62 -1.75
Liabilities / Assets 0.035 0.388 0.043
0.53 0.54 0.64
Working Capital / Assets -0.158 -0.148 -0.148
-1.41 -1.33 -1.31
EBIT Dummy -0.295 *** -0.260 *** -0.188 **
-3.34 -2.91 -2.08
Premarket activities




0.151 0.269 0.334 *
0.76 1.36 1.67
-1.776 *** -1.643 *** -1.634 ***
-3.16 -2.92 -2.91
Aftermarket activities
-1.860 *** -1.927 ***
-3.20 -3.29
-0.121 ** -0.130 **
-2.15 -2.28
Capital Market Control No No No Yes
Macroeconomic Control No No No Yes























Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Reputation Bust Dummy Bust Dummy Bust Dummy






Table 14: Multivariate Logistic Analyses by Quality of Lead Underwriters 
The dependent variable equals one if an IPO subsequently busted by December 31, 2017, and is equal to zero 
otherwise. The independent variables are defined in table 1 and table 7. Lead underwriters for each IPO are 
identified from the SDC database, and updated Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation measures are obtained from 
Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). An underwriter is classified as high-quality if it has 
a Carter-Manaster reputation measure greater than the overall sample median, and classified as low-quality 
otherwise. Equity Issuance Control includes SEO Volume and Average Initial Return. Macroeconomic Control 
includes Industrial_Prod, Default Premium, and Term Premium. Stock Market Control includes Value-weighted 
Market Return, Market Volatility, Market Liquidity, and Market Sentiment. Industry fixed effects include the firms 
that have three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. Logit regression coefficients and t-
statistics (in parentheses) are reported for this monthly regression from Jan 1988 to Dec 2015. The t-statistics are 
adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 
0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
Panel A: Low-Quality Lead Underwriter
Constant -0.959 *** -8.252 *** -0.528 *** -6.139 ***
-6.10 -4.43 -2.71 -3.21
Issuer specific characteristics
0.060 *** 0.193 *** 0.060 *** 0.167 ***
8.61 4.44 8.56 3.79
-0.137 *** -0.148 *** -0.126 *** -0.194 ***
-9.32 -9.51 -8.45 -10.61
Premarket activities
-0.383 -0.420 -0.249 -0.676 *
-1.18 -1.25 -0.77 -1.94
-0.343 -0.441 -0.110 -0.072
-0.84 -1.00 -0.29 -0.17
-0.050 -0.019 0.025 0.101
-0.30 -0.11 0.15 0.57
-3.140 *** -3.191 *** -3.024 *** -2.462 ***
-6.07 -6.09 -5.89 -4.73
Aftermarket activities
-2.204 *** -1.943 ***
-3.74 -3.24
-0.115 ** -0.142 **
-1.99 -2.40
Capital Market Control No Yes No Yes
Macroeconomic Control No Yes No Yes
Stock Market Control No Yes No Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No No No Yes
Diagnostics
Concordant 0.639 0.663 0.654 0.693
Psuedo R-square 0.048 0.059 0.055 0.085
Logit Regression Model
























Panel B: High-Quality Lead Underwriter
Constant -2.335 *** -8.956 *** -1.839 *** -7.943 ***
-13.28 -4.23 -7.38 -3.68
Issuer specific characteristics
0.068 *** 0.185 *** 0.064 *** 0.171 ***
10.31 4.22 9.47 3.89
-0.104 *** -0.096 *** -0.098 *** -0.148 ***
-5.50 -4.80 -5.15 -6.42
Premarket activities
-1.416 *** -1.450 *** -1.095 ** -1.365 ***
-3.21 -3.13 -2.42 -2.81
0.003 -0.356 0.252 -0.058
0.01 -1.20 0.95 -0.19
0.181 0.297 0.360 0.543 **
0.77 1.25 1.44 2.16
-0.064 -0.206 0.098 0.345
-0.09 -0.30 0.14 0.51
Aftermarket activities




Capital Market Control No Yes No Yes
Macroeconomic Control No Yes No Yes
Stock Market Control No Yes No Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No No No Yes
Diagnostics
Concordant 0.648 0.670 0.662 0.734



















Table 15: Multivariate Logistic Analyses with Underwriter Fixed Effects 
 
For each regression model, the dependent variable equals one if an IPO subsequently busted by December 31, 2017, 
and is equal to zero otherwise.  The independent variables are defined in table 1 and table 7. Underwriter fixed effect 
is derived from the dummy of underwriters that serve as both lead underwriter and book runner. The lead 
underwriters that underwrite less than 5 IPOs for the whole sample will be excluded. Equity Issuance Control 
includes SEO Volume and Average Initial Return. Macroeconomic Control includes Industrial_Prod, Default 
Premium, and Term Premium. Stock Market Control includes Value-weighted Market Return, Market Volatility, 
Market Liquidity, and Market Sentiment. Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 
357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. Logit regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported 
for this monthly regression from Jan 1988 to Dec 2015. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as 
mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), 
respectively.   
 
 
Constant -0.719 *** -0.216 -0.968 *** -5.487 *** -5.683 ***
-3.33 -0.90 -3.42 -3.62 -3.32
0.005 *** 0.005 ** 0.003
2.66 2.33 1.42
Issuer specific characteristics
0.043 *** 0.042 *** 0.049 *** 0.136 *** 0.151 ***
4.75 4.59 4.93 4.87 3.98
-0.109 *** -0.102 *** -0.099 *** -0.102 *** -0.154 ***
-8.13 -7.57 -7.27 -7.42 -9.94
Premarket activities
-1.019 *** -0.835 *** -0.831 *** -0.839 *** -1.139 ***
-3.57 -2.90 -2.86 -2.87 -3.75
-0.101 0.095 -0.066 -0.038 -0.046
-0.46 0.46 -0.29 -0.17 -0.19
0.015 0.102 0.115 0.154 0.180
0.11 0.71 0.79 1.07 1.22
-1.308 ** -1.270 ** -1.254 ** -1.304 ** -0.909 *
-2.56 -2.44 -2.39 -2.52 -1.86
Aftermarket activities
-1.656 *** -1.794 *** -1.727 *** -1.425 **
-3.03 -3.27 -3.14 -2.57
-0.152 *** -0.153 *** -0.161 *** -0.181 ***
-2.86 -2.86 -3.00 -3.33
Underwriter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Issuance Control No No Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Control No No No Yes Yes
Stock Market Control No No No No Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes
Diagnostics
Concordant 0.734 0.738 0.744 0.745 0.755
Psuedo R-square 0.132 0.136 0.142 0.144 0.156
Logit Regression Model















Table A1: Characteristics of IPOs Issued in Hot versus Cold Period 
  
Hot and cold market conditions are defined using aggregate monthly IPO issue volume. Each month during the 
sample period is ranked according to the level of 3 month moving average of IPO issue volume.  The months in the 
top quartile of issue volume are characterized as hot. The months in the lowest quartile of issue volume are 
characterized as cold. IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO month. Log 
Revenue is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s revenue in the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO. Log Asset is 
the natural logarithm of the issuer’s asset in the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO. Lead Underwriter Rank is 
the Carter-Manaster underwriter quality ranking updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004), a discrete underwriter 
reputation variable between 0 and 9, where 9 indicates the most prestigious underwriter and 0 indicates the least 
prestigious underwriter. IPO is defined as “active” IPO if the issuer is still public traded and do not delist due to 





All IPOs in the sample
Number of months 252 65 63
IPO Volume 42.26 77.72 15.14
Lead Underwriter Rank 7.20 6.94 7.76
Log Revenue 3.20 2.94 3.76
Log Asset 3.78 3.47 4.44
Share that are busted (%) 30.32 33.53 22.45
Share that are active (%) 16.94 12.82 24.04
Log Revenue 3.78 3.46 4.65
Firm-level Avearge Number of Patents per Year 4.53 5.58 3.95
Firm-level Avearge Number of Citiations per Year 4.96 5.40 4.46
Firm-level Cumulative Citations per Patent 0.58 0.71 0.56
Variable







Table A2 IPO Cycles and Busted IPOs 
 
For each regression model, the dependent variable equals one if an IPO subsequently busted by December 31, 2017, 
and is equal to zero otherwise. IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO 
month. Log Revenue is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s revenue in the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO. 
Log Asset is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s asset in the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO. Lead 
Underwriter Rank is the Carter-Manaster underwriter quality ranking updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004), a 
discrete underwriter reputation variable between 0 and 9, where 9 indicates the most prestigious underwriter and 0 
indicates the least prestigious underwriter. ∆P is the difference between the actual offer price and the expected offer 
price divided by the expected offer price, where the expected offer price is calculated as sum of the highest and 
lowest anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus, divided by two. Positive Price 
Adjustment (Negative Price Adjustment) is the positive (negative) price adjustment, max(∆P, 0) (min(∆P,0)).  Issue 
Size Percentage is the natural log of one plus the percentage change in the number of shares offered, calculated as 
the actual number of shares offered (excluding the exercise of the overallotment option) minus the number of shares 
quoted in the preliminary prospectus, divided by the number of shares quoted in the preliminary prospectus. Offer 
Price Range is the dollar width of offer range, calculated as the difference between the highest and lowest 
anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus divided by the expected offer price. 
Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 
737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * 
to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
Log of IPO Volume 0.512 *** 0.337 *** 0.304 *** 0.256 ***
8.115 5.216 4.634 3.901
Lead Underwriter Rank -0.272 *** -0.209 *** -0.179 ***
-20.688 -13.052 -10.789
Log Revenue -0.080 *** -0.123 ***
-4.867 -6.880
Log Assets -0.052 ** -0.082 ***
-2.079 -3.117
Negative Price Adjustment -0.782 *** -1.034 ***
-2.810 -3.641
Positive Price Adjustment -0.152 -0.071
-0.734 -0.337
Issue Size Percentage 0.076 0.110
0.517 0.739




Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.10
No No No Yes
5715 5715 5715 5715






Table A3 IPO Cycles and Innovation Outputs 
 
For regression model from column (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the firm-level log(Pat), defined as the 
logarithm of the average level of filed patent for each year. For regression model from column (4) to (6), the 
dependent variable is the firm-level log(Cite), defined as the logarithm of the average level of citations received by 
filed patent for each year.  IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO month. 
Log Revenue is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s revenue in the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO. Log 
Asset is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s asset in the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO. Lead Underwriter 
Rank is the Carter-Manaster underwriter quality ranking updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004), a discrete 
underwriter reputation variable between 0 and 9, where 9 indicates the most prestigious underwriter and 0 indicates 
the least prestigious underwriter. ∆P is the difference between the actual offer price and the expected offer price 
divided by the expected offer price, where the expected offer price is calculated as sum of the highest and lowest 
anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus, divided by two. Positive Price 
Adjustment (Negative Price Adjustment) is the positive (negative) price adjustment, max(∆P, 0) (min(∆P,0)).  Issue 
Size Percentage is the natural log of one plus the percentage change in the number of shares offered, calculated as 
the actual number of shares offered (excluding the exercise of the overallotment option) minus the number of shares 
quoted in the preliminary prospectus, divided by the number of shares quoted in the preliminary prospectus. Offer 
Price Range is the dollar width of offer range, calculated as the difference between the highest and lowest 
anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus divided by the expected offer price. 
Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 
737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * 
to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
Log of IPO Volume 0.138 *** 0.123 ** 0.120 *** 0.200 *** 0.170 *** 0.162 ***
2.513 2.153 2.581 3.512 2.891 3.326
Lead Underwriter Rank 0.101 *** 0.074 *** 0.097 *** 0.075 ***
5.918 4.656 5.312 4.507
Log Revenue -0.029 ** 0.020 -0.026 0.005
-2.019 1.4497 -1.635 0.290
Log Assets -0.053 ** -0.015 -0.064 *** -0.019
-2.081 -0.708 -2.410 -0.845
Negative Price Adjustment -0.899 *** -0.275 -0.600 * -0.103
-2.965 -0.934 -1.845 -0.332
Positive Price Adjustment 1.502 *** 1.282 *** 1.597 *** 1.307 ***
2.809 2.886 2.631 2.547
Issue Size Percentage 0.447 *** 0.245 * 0.392 *** 0.218
3.328 1.810 2.839 1.631
Offer Price Range 0.836 ** 0.384 0.864 ** 0.420




No No Yes No
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
968 968
0.004 0.099 0.329 0.009 0.098 0.288









Table A4 IPO Cycles and Innovation Quality 
For regression model from column (1) to (2), the dependent variable is the firm-level Novelty, defined as the average 
level of citations receive by each patent over time, adjusted for year and technology effects. For column (3) to (4), 
the dependent variable is the firm-level Originality, defined as the one minus the Herfindahl concentration index for 
the fraction of citations made by the patent to patents in other technological classes. For column (5) to (6), the 
dependent variable is the firm-level Scope, calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index across technological 
classes of future citations of the patent. IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to 
the IPO month. Log Revenue is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s revenue in the fiscal year immediately prior to 
the IPO. Log Asset is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s asset in the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO. Lead 
Underwriter Rank is the Carter-Manaster underwriter quality ranking updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004), a 
discrete underwriter reputation variable between 0 and 9, where 9 indicates the most prestigious underwriter and 0 
indicates the least prestigious underwriter. ∆P is the difference between the actual offer price and the expected offer 
price divided by the expected offer price, where the expected offer price is calculated as sum of the highest and 
lowest anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus, divided by two. Positive Price 
Adjustment (Negative Price Adjustment) is the positive (negative) price adjustment, max(∆P, 0) (min(∆P,0)).  Issue 
Size Percentage is the natural log of one plus the percentage change in the number of shares offered, calculated as 
the actual number of shares offered (excluding the exercise of the overallotment option) minus the number of shares 
quoted in the preliminary prospectus, divided by the number of shares quoted in the preliminary prospectus. Offer 
Price Range is the dollar width of offer range, calculated as the difference between the highest and lowest 
anticipated values of the offer price as quoted in the preliminary prospectus divided by the expected offer price. 
Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 
737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * 
to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.  
   
 
Log of IPO Volume 0.170 *** 0.117 ** 0.068 *** 0.056 *** 0.108 *** 0.091 ***
2.590 2.069 5.479 5.003 4.897 4.435
Lead Underwriter Rank 0.042 ** 0.011 *** 0.012 *
2.122 2.964 1.656
Log Revenue -0.056 -0.005 0.009
-1.534 -1.359 1.365
Log Assets 0.002 -0.003 -0.019 **
0.042 -0.686 -2.223
Negative Price Adjustment -0.176 -0.034 -0.331 ***
-0.529 -0.573 -2.639
Positive Price Adjustment 0.686 * 0.131 ** 0.351 ***
1.837 2.278 3.873
Issue Size Percentage 0.120 0.017 0.067
1.037 0.418 1.089








Novelty Novelty Originality Originality Scope
(5)Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.193
No Yes No Yes No Yes
968







Table A5 IPO Cycles and Long-Term Market Value 
For regression model below, the dependent variable is the long-term market value of IPOs, calculated as market 
capitalization of IPOs five years after the issue date adjusted by initial proceeds and inflation. IPO Volume is the 
three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO month. Fundamental control variables include Log 
Revenue and Log Asset. Underwriting control variables include Cater-Manaster Underwriter Rank, Positive Price 
Adjustment, Negative Price Adjustment, Issue Size Percentage, and Offer Price Range. Industry fixed effects 
include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. The t-statistics are 
adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 
0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
 
Log of IPO Volume 5.706 *** 5.073 *** 5.298 *** 5.183 ***





Adjusted R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.019 0.023
Long-Term Market Value
No Yes Yes Yes
No No No Yes
968 968 968 968
No No Yes Yes







Table A6 Effects of interaction between IPO cycles and lead underwriter reputation on 
firm innovation 
For regression model from column (1), the dependent variable is the firm-level log(Pat), defined as the logarithm of 
the average level of filed patent for each year. For regression model from column (2), the dependent variable is the 
firm-level log(Cite), defined as the logarithm of the average level of citations received by filed patent for each year.  
For regression model from column (3), the dependent variable is the firm-level Novelty, defined as the average level 
of citations receive by each patent over time, adjusted for year and technology effects. For column (4), the 
dependent variable is the firm-level Originality, defined as the one minus the Herfindahl concentration index for the 
fraction of citations made by the patent to patents in other technological classes. For column (6), the dependent 
variable is the firm-level Scope, calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index across technological classes of future 
citations of the patent. IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO month. 
Control variables include Log Revenue, Log Asset, Positive Price Adjustment, Negative Price Adjustment, Issue 
Size Percentage, and Offer Price Range. Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 
357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned 
in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
 
Log of IPO Volume 0.040 0.080 0.073 0.045 *** 0.076 ***
0.803 1.522 1.265 3.837 3.544
Log of IPO Volume * Dummy if 0.088 *** 0.092 *** 0.047 ** 0.013 *** 0.017 **





968 968 968 968 968
0.332 0.292 0.115 0.233 0.195
Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes







Table A7 Effects of interaction between IPO cycles and lead underwriter reputation on 
innovation output 
For regression model from column (1) to (2), the dependent variable is the firm-level log(Pat), defined as the 
logarithm of the average level of filed patent for each year. For regression model from column (3) to (4), the 
dependent variable is the firm-level log(Cite), defined as the logarithm of the average level of citations received by 
filed patent for each year.  IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO month. 
Control variables include Log Revenue, Log Asset, Positive Price Adjustment, Negative Price Adjustment, Issue 
Size Percentage, and Offer Price Range. Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 
357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned 
in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
Log of IPO Volume 0.062 0.100 **
1.301 1.979
Log of IPO Volume * Dummy if 0.078 *** 0.066 *** 0.092 *** 0.071 ***
the lead underwriter rank  >= sample median 3.843 3.148 4.128 3.105
Lead Underwriter Rank 0.017 0.027 0.008 0.025




Adjusted R-squared 0.332 0.332 0.291 0.292
Yes Yes Yes Yes
968 968 968 968
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Level of Patenting Level of Patenting Level of Citations Level of Citations







Table A8 Effects of interaction between IPO cycles and lead underwriter reputation on 
innovation quality 
For regression model from column (1) to (2), the dependent variable is the firm-level Novelty, defined as the average 
level of citations receive by each patent over time, adjusted for year and technology effects. For column (3) to (4), 
the dependent variable is the firm-level Originality, defined as the one minus the Herfindahl concentration index for 
the fraction of citations made by the patent to patents in other technological classes. For column (5) to (6), the 
dependent variable is the firm-level Scope, calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index across technological 
classes of future citations of the patent. IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to 
the IPO month. Control variables include Log Revenue, Log Asset, Positive Price Adjustment, Negative Price 
Adjustment, Issue Size Percentage, and Offer Price Range. Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three 
digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering 
error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-
sided), respectively.   
Log of IPO Volume 0.090 0.050 *** 0.076 ***
1.608 4.103 3.396
Log of IPO Volume * Dummy if 0.049 0.031 0.017 *** 0.007 0.032 *** 0.016
the lead underwriter rank  >= sample median 1.439 0.874 3.152 1.209 3.220 1.513
Lead Underwriter Rank 0.005 0.020 -0.002 0.006 -0.012 0.000










0.114 0.114 0.222 0.233 0.186 0.194
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
968 968 968 968 968
(5)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Novelty Novelty Originality Originality Scope







Table A9 IPO Cycles and Innovation Outputs with Underwriter Fixed Effects 
For regression model from column (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the firm-level log(Pat), defined as the 
logarithm of the average level of filed patent for each year. For regression model from column (4) to (6), the 
dependent variable is the firm-level log(Cite), defined as the logarithm of the average level of citations received by 
filed patent for each year.  IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO month. 
Control variables include Log Revenue, Log Asset, Positive Price Adjustment, Negative Price Adjustment, Issue 
Size Percentage, and Offer Price Range. Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 
357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned 
in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
 
Log of IPO Volume 0.121 ** 0.131 ** 0.125 0.132 ** 0.142 ** 0.139







IPOs with lead 
underwriter rank 
>= sample medianVariable All IPOs All IPOs
Level of Patenting Level of Patenting Level of Patenting Level of Citations Level of Citations
0.238
1194 867 327 1194 867 327
0.294 0.346 0.264 0.250 0.316
Yes
IPOs with lead 
underwriter rank < 
sample median
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPOs with lead 
underwriter rank >= 
sample median
IPOs with lead 
underwriter rank < 
sample median








Table A10 IPO Cycles and Innovation Quality with Underwriter Fixed Effects 
For regression model from column (1) to (2), the dependent variable is the firm-level Novelty, defined as the average 
level of citations receive by each patent over time, adjusted for year and technology effects. For column (3) to (4), 
the dependent variable is the firm-level Originality, defined as the one minus the Herfindahl concentration index for 
the fraction of citations made by the patent to patents in other technological classes. For column (5) to (6), the 
dependent variable is the firm-level Scope, calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index across technological 
classes of future citations of the patent. IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to 
the IPO month. Control variables include Log Revenue, Log Asset, Positive Price Adjustment, Negative Price 
Adjustment, Issue Size Percentage, and Offer Price Range. Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three 
digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering 
error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-
sided), respectively.   
 
 
Log of IPO Volume 0.088 0.261 0.046 *** 0.053 0.075 *** 0.098 *







867 327 867 327 867 327
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Novelty Novelty Originality Originality Scope
0.199 0.363
IPOs with lead 
underwriter 
rank < sample Variable
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
IPOs with lead 
underwriter 
rank < sample 
IPOs with lead 
underwriter 
rank >= sample 
IPOs with lead 
underwriter 
rank >= sample 
IPOs with lead 
underwriter 
rank >= sample 
IPOs with lead 
underwriter 
rank < sample 






Table A11 IPO Cycles and Long-Term Market Value with Underwriter Fixed Effects for 
IPOs with Positive Five-Year Cumulative Returns 
For regression model below, the dependent variable is the long-term market value of IPOs, calculated as market 
capitalization of IPOs five years after the issue date adjusted by initial proceeds and inflation. IPO Volume is the 
three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO month. Control variables include Log Revenue, Log 
Asset, Positive Price Adjustment, Negative Price Adjustment, Issue Size Percentage, and Offer Price Range. 
Industry fixed effects include the firms that have three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 
737.The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * 
to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 level (two-sided), respectively.  
Log of IPO Volume 7.093 *** 5.359 *** 6.008 *** 6.353 *** 6.196 *** 7.726
3.708 3.180 2.984 3.052 2.788 1.303
Log of IPO Volume * Dummy if 1.965 ** 1.306
the lead underwriter rank  >= sample median 2.548 1.218


















1441 1441 1441 1630 1161 469
0.060 0.060 0.060 0.115 0.070
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes



















Table A12 IPO Cycles and Firm Innovation, with Instrumental Variable 
For regression model from column (1), the dependent variable is the firm-level log(Pat), defined as the logarithm of 
the average level of filed patent for each year. For regression model from column (2), the dependent variable is the 
firm-level log(Cite), defined as the logarithm of the average level of citations received by filed patent for each year.  
For regression model from column (3), the dependent variable is the firm-level Novelty, defined as the average level 
of citations receive by each patent over time, adjusted for year and technology effects. For column (4), the 
dependent variable is the firm-level Originality, defined as the one minus the Herfindahl concentration index for the 
fraction of citations made by the patent to patents in other technological classes. For column (6), the dependent 
variable is the firm-level Scope, calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index across technological classes of future 
citations of the patent. IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO month. 
The instrumental variable is the debt issuance volume, the three-month moving average number of debt issuance 
prior to the IPO month. Control variables include Log Revenue, Log Asset, Positive Price Adjustment, Negative 
Price Adjustment, Issue Size Percentage, and Offer Price Range. Industry fixed effects include the firms that have 
three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-
clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 
level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
 
Instrumental Log of IPO Volume 1.126 ** 1.850 *** 0.466 0.071 0.140





Coefficient on instrument and first stage statistics
Log of Debt Issuance volume -0.087 ***
F-statistic
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Level of Patenting Level of Citations Novelty Originality Scope
968
(5)














Table A13 Effects of interaction between IPO cycles and lead underwriter reputation on 
firm innovation, with Instrumental Variable 
For regression model from column (1), the dependent variable is the firm-level log(Pat), defined as the logarithm of 
the average level of filed patent for each year. For regression model from column (2), the dependent variable is the 
firm-level log(Cite), defined as the logarithm of the average level of citations received by filed patent for each year.  
For regression model from column (3), the dependent variable is the firm-level Novelty, defined as the average level 
of citations receive by each patent over time, adjusted for year and technology effects. For column (4), the 
dependent variable is the firm-level Originality, defined as the one minus the Herfindahl concentration index for the 
fraction of citations made by the patent to patents in other technological classes. For column (6), the dependent 
variable is the firm-level Scope, calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index across technological classes of future 
citations of the patent. IPO Volume is the three-month moving average number of issues prior to the IPO month. 
The instrumental variable is the debt issuance volume, the three-month moving average number of debt issuance 
prior to the IPO month. Control variables include Log Revenue, Log Asset, Positive Price Adjustment, Negative 
Price Adjustment, Issue Size Percentage, and Offer Price Range. Industry fixed effects include the firms that have 
three digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. The t-statistics are adjusted for the time-
clustering error, as mentioned in White (1980). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at 0.01, 0.5, and 0.1 
level (two-sided), respectively.   
 
 
Instrumental Log of IPO Volume 1.008 ** 1.729 *** 0.401 0.054 0.120
2.051 3.306 0.916 0.568 0.678
Instrumental Log of IPO Volume * Dummy if 0.091 *** 0.094 *** 0.051 ** 0.013 *** 0.019 ***





Coefficient on instrument and first stage statistics
Log of Debt Issuance volume -0.087 ***
F-statistic
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Level of Patenting Level of Citations Novelty Originality Scope
968
(5)


















Figure 1: Cumulative Excess Returns for Busted, Acquired and Active IPOs  
 
 
Investor returns are measured as buy-and-hold returns, and size-adjusted excess returns are measured for 
each IPO as the difference between the issuer’s buy-and-hold-returns and the contemporaneous buy-and-
hold returns on a portfolio of similarly sized non-IPO firms.  Issues identified by CRSP as delisted as of 
December 31, 2017, are sorted into one of three mutually exclusive groups, based upon the CRSP 
delisting code.  Sample data for the sample of 6,502 IPOs issued between January 1988 and December 














Investor returns are measured as buy-and-hold returns, and size-adjusted excess returns are measured for 
each IPO as the difference between the issuer’s buy-and-hold-returns and the contemporaneous buy-and-
hold returns on a portfolio of similarly sized non-IPO firms.  Issues identified by CRSP as delisted as of 
December 31, 2017, are sorted into one of three mutually exclusive groups, based upon the CRSP 
delisting code.  Sample data for the sample of 6,502 IPOs issued between January 1988 and December 







Figure 3. Hot, Cold and Normal IPO Market Conditions 
 
Hot, normal and cold market conditions are defined using aggregate monthly IPO issue volume (Panel A) and 
Industrial Production (Panel B). Each month during the sample period is ranked according to the level of 3 month 
moving average of IPO issue volume and Industrial Production.  The months in the top quartile of issue volume are 
characterized as hot. The months in the lowest quartile of issue volume are characterized as cold.  The remaining 
months are considered normal. 
 
Number Number
Period Date Busted Issued
Cold 1/88-4/88 4 6 26
Cold 2/89-6/89 5 12 38
Cold 10/90-4/91 7 10 49
Hot 1/92-9/92 9 100 322
Hot 1/93 1 6 18
Hot 4/93-1/95 22 303 879
Hot 7/95-5/97 23 405 1179
Hot 7/97-2/98 8 125 332
Hot 5/98-9/98 5 55 153
Cold 11/98-12/98 2 13 34
Hot 6/99-6/00 13 164 528
Hot 8/00-11/00 4 34 117
Cold 5/01-7/01 3 6 26
Cold 10/01-12/01 3 2 26
Cold 3/02-5/02 3 6 24
Cold 9/02-11/02 3 3 13
Cold 2/03-11/03 10 10 47
Cold 10/07 1 3 14
Cold 3/08-4/10 26 14 83
Cold 9/10-10/10 2 0 13
Cold 9/11-12/11 4 0 18
Cold 2/12 1 3 17
Cold 9/12-10/12 2 2 19
Cold 2/13-3/13 1 0 14
Cold 1/15 1 0 5
Cold 10/15-12/15 3 1 19
Duration in 
Months
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